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Thesis Abstract 
Reforming Not-for-Profit Organisations in Australia: A Work in Progress. 
Incorporated associations are founded by, and subsequently operate exclusively on, the collective 
action of individuals, which is largely voluntary and motivated by altruistic goals. 
This thesis will examine whether the law regulates the operation of incorporated associations 
in a manner that is proportionate, effective and to a standard that is acceptable. In particular, it 
will compare the raft of statutory duties and obligation of an incorporated association and a for-
profit organisation. In examining these specific legal duties, this thesis will reveal the lack of 
consistency across jurisdictions, and gaps in how the law regulates the conduct of committee 
members within an incorporated association. Furthermore, this thesis will consider whether an 
officer of an incorporated and unincorporated association is a fiduciary – and, if this is so, 
whether this status arises out of the category of principal and agent. Additionally, this thesis will 
identify specific regulatory and governance issues affecting Australia’s not-for-profit sector. 
Finally, this thesis will examine how the numerous federal parliamentary inquiries and 
government reports intend to develop a reform policy for the not-for-profit sector and to evaluate 
these policy intentions against the world’s best practice regulatory model. 
 
Keywords: Incorporated Associations, legal duties, power and 
control, agency, legal regulatory frameworks, volunteers, social 
inclusion, federal take-over of the not-for-profit sector. 
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PART I – Introduction 
  2 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.0 Hypotheses and Objective 
The not-for-profit sector and its unique institutions have, in recent times, faced rising public 
expectations for an improved model of governance. This insistence for not-for-profit entities to 
be transparent is derived from the perception that they appear and function parallel to a for-profit 
entity. For example, the Sydney Theatre Company, Australia’s largest theatre company, is 
recorded to be a not-for-profit organisation worth $30 million dollars.1 An examination of the 
Sydney Theatre Company reveals an organisational structure that resembles a large corporation.2 
Despite the Company possessing the status of a not-for-profit, the organisation undertakes long-
term strategic planning and utilises marketing and publicity strategies to raise capital similar to 
those practices seen in the commercial sector.3 
This appearance of not-for-profit organisations operating in a manner akin to a for-profit one 
has led to numerous misunderstandings surrounding not-for-profit organisations. The core fallacy 
is that committee members are in a similar position to a company director and, therefore, should 
be held to account in a manner similar to that of a company director.4 Such a proposition serves 
only as a hindrance to effectively understand the role of a committee member. This thesis will 
assert the hypothesis that a committee member of an incorporated association is not in the same 
position as a company director, and a committee member should not be treated as a company 
director. Furthermore, this thesis will clarify the role of a committee member, which will prove 
that a committee member and a company director have different roles in their respective 
organisations. Moreover, not-for-profit organisations continue to present legal problems owing to 
their sui juris nature. 
                                               
1 Rosy Mobbs, ‘Sydney Theatre Company’s Great Revival’ (March 2011) In the Black CPA Australia, 12–13. 
2 The organisational form of the Sydney Theatre Company is that of a company limited by guarantee. However, the 
form of a company limited by guarantee does not always need to be of a hierarchal and formal structure, which is 
seen within the Sydney Theatre Company. The Sydney Theatre Company has a chairman, a board of directors 
made up of 13 individuals and a company secretary. There are approximately 300 staff employed by the Sydney 
Theatre Company and there is no indication whether volunteers are involved with the Sydney Theatre Company. 
See Sydney Theatre Company Annual Report 2011. 
3 See Sydney Theatre Company Annual Report 2011 and, also, Rosy Mobbs, ‘Sydney Theatre Company’s Great 
Revival’ (March 2011) In the Black CPA Australia, 12-13. 
4 See Keith Fletcher, The Law Relating to Non-Profits Associations in Australia and New Zealand (Law Book 
Company, 1986) 298; Andrew Twaits, ‘The Duties of Officers in Non-Profit Organisations (1998) 10(2) Bond Law 
Review, 313. 
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The not-for-profit sector has made strong contributions both economically and to social 
wellbeing. In Australia, the economic value of not-for-profit organisations is significant. 
According to the Productivity Commission, not-for-profit organisations contribute $43 billion to 
Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). They claim there are 59,000 economically significant 
organisations and a 7.7 per cent growth within the not-for-profit sector from 1999/2000 to 
2006/2007.5 In the same period, volunteer time increased to $14.6 billion with a 2.2 per cent 
annual growth in total hours.6 This data illustrates the importance of the not-for-profit sector not 
only in an economic sense, but also to social capital. 
The debate for better governance and regulation of this significant economic player is largely 
based on a corporate rationale that is focused on profit and financial transparency rather than a 
broader conception of legal duties. The exclusion of legal duties from this debate raises the 
question, what legal principles guide or should guide an officer of a management committee 
when discharging their responsibilities. By answering this question this thesis will reinterpret the 
duties of the management committee, critique the existing law and identify gaps and 
inconsistences in the associations statutes and, lastly, review Australia’s reform proposals in light 
of the United Kingdom’s best practice model.  
Reform within Australia has been confined to two Senate inquiries, a Productivity 
Commission report, and part of Australia’s Future Tax System, Report to the Treasurer7 
(commonly referred to as the ‘Henry Tax Review’). As a consequence of these inquiries, sector-
specific issues have emerged that require further attention and investigation. This has made the 
process of reform in the not-for-profit sector slow. In Australia, while there have been reports of 
charitable organisations failing,8 these events have not sparked a reform agenda commensurate to 
the magnitude undertaken by the United Kingdom. Reform of the not-for-profit sector and its 
institutions, particularly in the United Kingdom, was in response to the failure (through 
                                               
5 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector, Productivity 
Commission Research Report (January 2010) XXIV. 
6 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector, Productivity 
Commission Research Report (January 2010) 53. 
7 December 2009. 
8 Celebrity, Tania Zaetta’s charity, Peace for the Children, held a number of fundraising events that raised 
approximately $22,000. However, an audit report revealed less than a quarter of the charity’s income was 
distributed to its charitable projects. Josh Robertson, ‘TV Celebrity Tania Zaetta’s Peace for the Children Charity 
forced into Suspension, Funds Transferred’, The Courier-Mail, (online), 9 May 2011< 
http://www.news.com.au/entertainment/celebrity/tv-celebrity-tania-zaetta-has-charity-peace-for-the-children-
forced-into-suspension/story-e6frfmqi-1226052181710?from=igoogle+gadget+compact+news_rss>. 
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mismanagement) of notable charities.9 The cornerstone of reform in the United Kingdom was in 
expanding the powers of the Charity Commission to achieve better regulation of the sector.10 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom modernised its not-for-profit sector by introducing new and 
innovative forms of not-for-profits, and taking proactive measures to increase public and donor 
confidence in the sector. Legislative provisions were introduced in the United Kingdom to 
encompass the principles of governance, which not only include financial accountability, but also 
legal duties. 
This thesis will outline the path Australia is currently taking to reform the sector. It will 
identify the pitfalls of Australia’s proposed reform by comparing our model of regulation against 
world’s best regulatory practice from the United Kingdom. To contribute to this area of law, this 
thesis will also argue that a governance framework for not-for-profit organisations should be 
underpinned by legal duties appropriate to this area. 
1.1 Research Approach and Methodology 
The research approach employed for this thesis is multidisciplinary, broad and cross- 
jurisdictional. This method involved reviewing and analysing key principles of law, in addition to 
specific theories from the disciplines of economics, social and political sciences. With respect to 
the cross-jurisdictional aspects, this research includes the examination and analysis of both 
primary and secondary sources of law from Australia and the United Kingdom. 
The design of this research is fundamentally doctrinal. To identify the gaps in the current 
body of knowledge, research was gathered that included: 
• reviewing and analysing economic and social science literature to understand 
the formation of the not-for-profit sector; 
                                               
9 M. Gibelman and S. Gelman, ‘Very Public Scandals: Nongovernment Organization in Trouble’ (2001) 12 (1) 
Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 49, 52–43. In Scotland, an independent 
regulator was appointed to make changes to charity laws in response to the Breast Cancer Research (Scotland) 
scandal. Mr Tony Freeman, trustee of Breast Cancer Research (Scotland) and sole director of a fundraising 
company, Solutions RMC, would sell lottery tickets to the public to raise funds for the charity, which provided 
treatment and promoted research into the causes of breast cancer. Mr Freeman’s trading company had an 
agreement with the charity that ensured that he received more than half the funds raised from the charity’s lottery 
tickets, box collections and stalls. ‘Cancer Charity Accounts Frozen’, BBC News (online), 23 May 2003 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/scotland/2932624.stm>. 
10 The United States of America requires all charities, just like corporations, to be subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745. However, in the United Kingdom the Charity Commission regulates all 
activities of charities and other forms of not-for-profit organisations. 
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• reviewing and analysing statutory duties for Australian corporations and 
incorporated associations in all jurisdictions of Australia; 
• reviewing and analysing future policy developments for the not-for-profit 
organisations; and 
• reviewing and analysing world’s best practice for regulating the not-for-profit 
sector. 
The cumulative effect of this research design will contribute to a better understanding of the role 
a management committee performs within an incorporated association, to reveal the lack of 
consistency across jurisdictions, and gaps in how the law regulates the conduct of committee 
members within an incorporated association. 
1.2 Structure 
This thesis is arranged into three parts made up of nine chapters as follows: 
PART I – Introduction 
Chapter One provides an introduction outlining this thesis’ objectives and hypothesis, and 
research methodology. It details the terminology used throughout the thesis and summarise the 
results and recommendations, with consideration of the limitations encountered throughout this 
research. It also outlines the contribution this thesis will make to the research of incorporated 
associations. 
Chapter Two defines the structural-operational features of a non-profit organisation through 
identifying universal characteristics such as, private, organised, voluntary and non-distribution of 
profit and self-governing. By identifying these broad characteristics, the function and the role of 
the not-for-profit sector will be examined using an interdisciplinary framework of economic, 
social-origin and political theories. 
PART II – An Inter-Disciplinary Understanding of the Not-for-Profit Sector and Its 
Organisations 
Chapter Three provides a historical perspective of the incorporated association in Australia. 
Particularly, this chapter focuses on the creation of an incorporated association in South Australia 
(1858) through to the introduction of this entity in Queensland (1981). The motivating purposes 
  6 
behind the creation of a new legal entity for not-for-profits was due to the difficulties individual 
trustees experienced in managing a charitable trust’s property. Chapter Three also examines the 
historical enactment of New Zealand’s association legislation. Furthermore, it discusses the 
advanced features of New Zealand’s model of incorporation, which was developed by Sir John 
Salmond. 
Chapter Four outlines the legal structures and their unique features of an association, 
unincorporated association, incorporated association, and a company limited by guarantee. This 
analysis will illustrate how the law treats each form differently. 
Chapter Five critically analyses and compares the role of a company director and an officer of a 
management committee. It further analyses and compares statutory duties for a company director 
and an officer of a management committee, and undertakes an inter-jurisdictional analysis of the 
legal duties within state association legislation. Furthermore, this chapter explores the persistent 
question of whether there is a lack of statutory duties and fiduciary principles to provide a 
committee member with legal obligations. There exist a number of doubtful cases on this point, 
and this chapter will consider the hesitation by the courts to recognise that a committee member’s 
conduct should be subject to legal obligations. This chapter also argues that the rules governing 
the relationship of principal and agent are applicable to individual committee members of 
incorporated and unincorporated associations. 
PART III – Shaping Australia’s Not-for-Profit Sector for the Future 
Chapter Six outlines the numerous inquiries and reports that have been commissioned by the 
Australian Parliament in recent times. Emerging from all of these inquiries and reports is the call 
for urgent reform in a diverse range of areas, such as a new definition of charity, and 
implementing a framework to improve the measurement of the not-for-profit sector. Due to the 
breadth of reports, Chapter Six will briefly discuss the findings and recommendations relating 
only to transparency and governance from two key reports: (i) the Australian Government’s 
response to the disclosure inquiry; and (ii) the Productivity Commission’s report. 
Chapter Seven examines the United Kingdom’s not-for-profit sector by outlining the modern 
forms of not-for-profit organisations and the development of the Charity Commission. Included 
in this Chapter is a detailed analysis of a trustee’s statutory duties and responsibilities, and the 
  7 
Charity Commission’s wide regulatory powers to enforce trustees to meet their legal obligations. 
Chapter Seven also outlines the powers of the Charity Commission to ensure the proper 
administration of all not-for-profit organisations in the United Kingdom. 
Chapter Eight outlines the proposed reform picture so far in Australia. The prevailing demand 
emerging from both parliamentary inquiries and the Productivity Commission’s report was to 
embrace the world’s best practice regulatory model from the United Kingdom. However, the 
federal government has rejected this suggestion and has established its own regulating authority. 
This chapter critiques Australia’s proposed statutory regulatory authority. 
The centrepiece of this new regulatory system is the establishment of the Australian Charities 
and Not-for-Profits Commission. Chapter Eight outlines the functions, powers and authority of 
that the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission has in relation to the regulation of a 
specific type and sub-type not-for-profit organisation. This chapter also analyses the ACNC’s 
functions and powers to achieve transparency and restore public trust in the sector. 
Chapter Nine compares the functions and the power of the Australian Charities and Not-for-
Profits Commission to the United Kingdom’s Charities Commission, and reveals numerous 
limitations of the Australian proposed regulatory framework. These limitations are a consequence 
of the federal government being concerned with enacting its social inclusion policy rather than 
reforming the sector to be sustainable into the future. This chapter briefly explains Australia’s 
social inclusion policy and how it will create a fiscal paradigm with government and not-for-
organisations. It also discusses the known negative impact social inclusion policy has had on the 
not-for-profit sector and not-for-profit organisations and assess whether Australia is taking the 
proactive steps needed to avoid the pitfalls of the social inclusion policy. Furthermore, this 
chapter discusses how the federal government could have used its power under section 51(xx) of 
the Constitution to takeover the responsibility of not-for-profit organisations, and explains how 
this would have circumvented the duplication of reporting and registration for not-for-profit 
organisations. 
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1.3 Terminology 
Not-for-Profit Organisation – An organisation that imposes the principle of the non-distribution 
of profits to the organisations’ members. In this thesis, not-for-profit organisations will 
encompass all not-for-profit forms, unless otherwise stipulated. 
Governance – The monitoring of management’s decisions to benefit the company or members 
and the purpose of a not-for-profit organisation. 
1.4 Research Contribution and Outcomes 
This thesis aims to broaden the discussion regarding governance within the not-for-profit sector 
to include legal duties. The current body of knowledge regarding legal duties for the not-for-
profit sector is slight, and this thesis will contribute to the literature by: 
• providing an analysis of all the statutory duties across Australia’s state jurisdictions for 
an incorporated association, and a comparison with a company director’s statutory 
duties; 
• proving there is a legal theoretical basis through agency law that a committee member 
of an incorporated or unincorporated association is subject to general legal duties; 
• providing a theoretical basis for legal duties to be an integral aspect of a governance 
framework to regulate a committee member’s behaviour; and 
• critically considering the latest reform proposals. 
1.5 Limitations 
This thesis is limited to a presumption that committee members will inevitably sometimes behave 
in contradiction of the association’s altruistic mission. Characterising all committee members as 
potentially opportunistic and dishonest supports the need to introduce legal duties to regulate the 
conduct of a committee member. However, the real likelihood of either the courts or the 
legislators imposing legal duties on committee members is limited, unless the association is 
incorporated as a company limited by guarantee or there is an express provison in the state 
legislation. 
  9 
A further limitation to this thesis relates to the ongoing sector development occurring at a 
federal level. All attempts have been made to include the most recent updates regarding 
regulation and governance, but this is like shooting at a moving target. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
The Definition and Dynamic  
of the Not-for-Profit Sector 
 
The role of third sector organisations is giving a voice to many and varied 
interests.11 
2.0 Introduction 
The not-for-profit sector and its institutions have become a valuable and an entrenched feature in 
contemporary society.12 At some point in our lives it is inevitable we will have some level of 
contact with one or more non-profit groups.13 An individual’s level of contact or involvement 
with a non-profit organisation can be mixed due to the divergent purposes or mission, activity 
and size of an organisation. The sizeable organisations within the not-for-profit sector have made 
it an increasingly challenging task to clearly differentiate between a not-for-profit organisation, a 
public agency, and a profit organisation. This challenge illuminates the complexity and behaviour 
of a not-for-profit organisation that have blurred the sectors’ boundaries. It has been argued that 
non-profit organisations are more like for-profits in disguise,14 which has lead to many attempts 
to produce a steadfast meaning of a not-for-profit organisation. 
Chapter Two first defines and classifies the structural-operational features of the non-profit 
sector by identifying the universal characteristics that are intrinsic, recurrent and operating within 
it. Identifying these characteristics and the appropriate taxonomy of the non-profit sector is 
pivotal to understanding how not-for-profit organisations have evolved. This is explored through 
an interdisciplinary framework of economic, social-origin and political theories. 
                                               
11 Mark Lyons, Third Sector – The Contribution of Nonprofit and Cooperative Enterprises in Australia (Allen & 
Unwin, 2001) 20. 
12 The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) reports that in 2006–07 the not-for-profit sector contributed $43 billion 
to Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Further, the ABS has identified a strong growth in the not-for-
profit sector by 7.7 per cent from 1999–2000 to 2006–2007. Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-
for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity Commission, January 2010) Terms of Reference XXVI. 
13 Kim Weinert, ‘How Alternative Dispute Resolution has by-passed Incorporated Associations in Queensland’ 
(Paper presented at Non-Adversarial Justice Implications for the Legal System and Society Conference of the 
Australian Institute of Judicial Administration and Monash University, Melbourne, 4 May 2010). 
14 Jill Horwitz, ‘Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?’ (2007) 24 Yale Journal on Regulation 139, 141. 
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2.1 Characteristics of the Non-Profit Sector 
2.1.1 Terminology 
Numerous labels or terms have been ascribed to the not-for-profit sector in an attempt to 
accurately define the sector:15 
• Charitable sector – The concept of charity represents the collective moral 
strength of a sector that contributes to society in a non-exploitive manner.16 
This particular form must benefit the public and have the capacity to carry out 
its intended purposes.17 However, this term emphasises and describes only one 
type of a non-profit organisational form and overlooks all the other different 
forms in the wider sector.18 
• Independent sector – A term suggesting that these organisations are outside 
the reach of government and private business. In actuality, a significant 
number of not-for-profit organisations rely on government funding and 
donations from private business for revenue.19 Furthermore, it is not 
uncommon to find an employee of a company that has made a monetary 
donation to be appointed as an officer of the not-for-profit organisation. These 
arrangements do not make not-for-profit organisations truly independent.20 
• Tax-exempt sector – Initially this term appears to be incongruent to this sector. 
However, it emphasises the fact that organisations generally benefit from 
many tax advantages. Nevertheless, the term is misleading and is an 
inadequate description because not all non-profit organisations receive the 
same favourable tax concessions. For example, in Australia, a charitable 
organisation will not be taxed on the revenue the organisation earns from 
fundraising activities. However, a charitable organisation in Russia pays 24 
per cent corporate profit tax on most of its revenue. Further, Russian not-for-
                                               
15 Lester Salmon and Helmut Anheier, ‘In Search of the Nonprofit Sector I: The Question of Definitions’ (Working 
Paper No 2, The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, The Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy 
Studies, June 1992) 4. 
16 Kerry O’Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study (Routledge, 2007) 12. 
17 Kerry O’Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study (Routledge, 2007) 12–13. 
18 Helmut Anheir, Nonprofit Organisations Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 38. 
19 Chapter Nine of this thesis outlines the increased reliance that not-for-profit organisations have on government 
contracts and private funding and the negative impact this reliance has the sector’s independence. 
20 Helmut Anheir, Nonprofit Organisations Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 38. Chapter Nine of this 
thesis discusses how not-for-profit organisations have come to heavily reliant on government funding. 
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profits are susceptible to additional taxation if the organisation fails to use 
monetary gifts within a specified timeframe.21 
• Voluntary sector – This term signifies the input of individuals who volunteer 
their time and effort into the operation of their organisation with no 
expectation of compensation. However, the personnel of a not-for-profit 
organisation today is a mix of paid staff and volunteers.22 
• Non-governmental (NGO) sector – Describes a non-government organisation, 
commonly found in the developing world, that engages and develops 
economic promotion and social development programmes.23 
• Économie sociale – A common term found within the European Union that 
embraces business-type organisations, such as mutual insurance companies, 
cooperatives, and saving banks.24 For these organisations to fall within the 
not-for-profit sector, they must satisfy the following criteria: (i) the 
organisation’s purpose is to serve its members or a larger part of a community; 
(ii) management is independent from external influences, such as 
governments; (iii) there is a democratic decision-making process; and (iv) the 
distribution of income is to serve certain social aspects rather than serving 
capital investment.25 
• Third sector – A generic term that describes a sector that coexists with the 
market and the state.26 Within the third sector, there are organisations that are 
not part of the public and private sector.27 
                                               
21 Australian Taxation Office, Tax Concessions – An Overview – Tax Basics for Non-Profits Organisations 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/nonprofit/content.asp?doc=/content/33743.htm&mnu=45419&mfp=001/004>. The tax 
treatment of not-for-profit organisations in Russia illustrates that attempts to define the sector by one feature of a 
not-for-profit organisation ignores the differentiation in treatment by other countries and their value of non-profit 
organisations in other societies. Leslie Lutz, ‘Economic Constraints, Political Motives: Contemporary Russian 
Nonprofit Tax Law’ (2005) 7(3) The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 73, 82 
<http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol7iss3/art_4.htm>. 
22 Helmut Anheir, Nonprofit Organisations Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 38. 
23 Similar to the term ‘charity sector’, this term too describes only one type of organisation within the not-for-profit 
sector. Helmut Anheir, Nonprofit Organisations Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 39. 
24 Helmut Anheir, Nonprofit Organisations Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 39. 
25 Helmut Anheir, Nonprofit Organisations Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 39. 
26 Sybille Mertens, ‘Nonprofit Organisations and Social Economy: Two Ways of Understanding the Third Sector’ 
(1999) 70(3) Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 501. 
27 Mark Lyons, Third Sector – The Contribution of Nonprofit and Cooperative Enterprises in Australia (Allen & 
Unwin, 2001) 5-9. 
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Each of these wide and varied terms have proved to be inadequate as they confine the description 
of the sector to only one emphasised organisational feature – they overlook the many other 
distinctive features of a not-for-profit organisation.28 This thesis does not seek to redefine nor 
rename the sector. Therefore, the generic term ‘not-for-profit’ will be used throughout this thesis. 
Just like there are many labels used to explain not-for-profits, there have been many attempts 
to find a universal and accepted taxonomy (definition and classification) of this sector. 
2.2 Defining the Not-for-Profit Sector 
It is important to understand the space in which the not-for-profit sector resides. It was in the late 
1970s that Jacques Delors described this sector as a ‘phenomenon’.29 Delors found small 
production units that were initiated by community groups or individuals and employed collective 
work practices to meet a genuine need.30 These production units were neither the church nor a 
capitalist enterprise controlled by the state. Named by Delors as a ‘third sector’, these production 
units were initially considered to be a residual group that fell outside the two other well-defined 
sectors, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
                                               
28 Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier, ‘In Search of the Nonprofit Sector I: The Question of Definitions’ (Working 
Paper No. 2, The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, The Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy 
Studies, June 1992) 2. 
29 Sybille Mertens, ‘Nonprofit Organisations and Social Economy: Two Ways of Understanding the Third Sector’ 
(1999) 70(3) Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 501, 501-502. 
30 Sybille Mertens, ‘Nonprofit Organisations and Social Economy: Two Ways of Understanding the Third Sector’ 
(1999) 70(3) Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 501, 502. 
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Figure 1 – The space where the third or the not-for-profit sector exists31 
 
 
 
The acceptance of the third space existing outside of the market (private) and state (public) lead 
to the discovery that this new space hosted a dynamic and diverse range of organisational 
entities.32 These entities, or institutions, were also found to be very different to those in other 
conventional sectors.33 The unique nature of these entities reveals a combination of private 
structure with a public purpose connecting with citizens, by being: 
• flexible and informal; 
• capable of supporting public purposes; and 
• proficient in performing vital functions in partnership with the state and the market, such 
as delivering essential human services in health care.34 
                                               
31 Sybille Mertens, ‘Nonprofit Organisations and Social Economy: Two Ways of Understanding the Third Sector’ 
(1999) 70(3) Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 501, 502. 
32 For example, hospitals, universities, sport clubs, environmental groups, professional organisations, religious 
congregations, job training centres, shelters for women and the homeless, soup kitchens, schools and many other 
entities. Lester Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals 
of Public and Cooperative Economic 167, 168; Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier, ‘In Search of The Nonprofit 
Sector I: The Question of Definitions’ (Working Paper No. 2, The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector 
Project, The Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies, 1992) 1. 
33 Lester Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics 167,168 -169. 
34 Lester Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics 167,168 -169. 
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Furthermore, these entities within this third space empower the disadvantaged by bringing 
unaddressed problems to the public’s attention, building community bonds of trust, and allowing 
individuals to mobilise an initiative in pursuit of a common good.35 The function of these 
production units is outside of the traditional ‘two-model’ approach and should be analysed 
further. 
Taking an analytical look at the not-for-profit sector and its entities will provide an insightful 
understanding about the function of the not-for-profit sector and its institutions. The 
understanding gained from this analysis will subsequently support a clear definition of a not-for-
profit organisation. Knowing what constitutes a not-for-profit organisation means that the task of 
differentiating a not-for-profit from other units (such as government agencies and private 
business) can be done with precision.36 Additionally, the formation of a clear definition of a not-
for-profit organisation was imperative to Lester Salamon’s comparative study. The primary aim 
of this study was to identify and measure the contribution of not-for-profits domestically and 
cross-nationally.37 
Prior to the formation of the universal definition, the comparative analysis needed to be 
capable of identifying a not-for-profit organisation. The study initially found and outlined certain 
common features that numerous not-for-profit institutions possessed.38 Table 1 provides a 
summary of these commonalities. 
                                               
35 Lester Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics 167, 168 -169. 
36 Lester Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics 167, 172–174. 
37 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity Commission, 
January 2010) 4. 
38 Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier, ‘In Search of The Nonprofit Sector I: The Question of Definitions’ (Working 
Paper No. 2, The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, The Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy 
Studies, June1992) 12-13. 
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Table 1 – Distinctive features of not-for-profit institutions39 
Feature Description 
Production 
Function 
Unlike for-profit companies and the state, not-for-profits do not exist or function to 
generate and/or distribute profits, or use force like the state. While it is acceptable for a 
not-for-profit to make a profit, the organisation is not to be the personal source of 
financial gain for its members or directors. 
Public Goods The production of goods and services by not-for-profits is aimed at delivering benefits to 
the broader community and, also, to its members. It is more difficult for a not-for-profit to 
finance the production of such goods and services.40  
Governing 
Structures 
Members or a self-perpetuating board of private citizens have the control of an entity. 
Unlike the state the entity are not governed by public elections. 
Revenue 
Structure 
Not-for-profits receive revenue from a number of sources including donations, 
membership fees and government contracts. 
Staffing 
Structure 
Not-for-profits rely on a combination of volunteer and paid labour.  
Tax 
Treatment 
Not-for-profits receive tax advantages, which include an exemption from many taxes and 
eligibility for tax-deductible gifts. 
Legal 
Treatment The law treats and regulates not-for-profits differently to for-profit companies. 
Salamon considered these distinctive features were not enough to support a clear universal 
definition of a not-for-profit organisation.41 After closely scrutinising a range of definitions, 
Salamon believed that it was important to establish a definition that encompassed all the salient 
features that could be applied cross-nationally.42 Emerging from this stage of Salamon’s analysis 
are five structural-operational features that are the hallmark of a not-for-profit entity.43 Termed 
the ‘structural-operation definition’, Table 2 explains these five key characteristics. 
                                               
39 Lester Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics 167, 172–174. 
40 Part 2.4 of this thesis explains cost inefficiencies which not-for-profit organisations face when producing public 
goods. 
41 Lester Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics 167, 174. 
42 Salamon considered the legal, economic, normative and functional definitions, but found each of them problematic 
for his cross-national comparative study. Lester Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map 
of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 167, 174-175. 
43 Organisations that do not satisfy all of these five characteristics of the structural-operational definition are not not-
for-profit entities. Helmut Anheier, Nonprofit Organisations - Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 
47. 
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Table 2 – The five characteristics of the structural-operation definition44 
Feature Description 
Organised To be termed ‘organised’ an entity must display a degree of organisational structure or 
boundaries. For an organisation to have any real or meaningful identity there must be 
regularity to the organisation’s operation demonstrated by regular meetings, rules of 
procedures or some other degree of organisational performance. Excluded from this 
specific characteristic are ad hoc and temporary gatherings of people such as, friendship 
circles and families.45  
Private The entity is separate from, or is no part of the government apparatus at a national or 
local level and does not exercise any government authority.46 It is important that an 
organisation has and maintains a separate institutional identity to any unit of the state.47 
Self-governing The entity is capable, through its own mechanisms of control and autonomy to be self-
governing. This is illustrated by the entity’s management to have the ability to change 
their by-laws and their internal structure, alter their missions or goals and capable of 
dissolving the entity without the permission of another authority.48  
Non 
Distribution of 
Profit 
Where an entity has accumulated a surplus or a profit, in any given year, it is strictly 
forbidden to distribute this profit to its members, owners, founders or governing board. 
Any profit attained by the entity must be redistributed or re-invested in the entity’s 
mission or objectives.49  
Non-
Compulsory or 
Voluntary 
An individual’s participation must be voluntary, not enforced, nor a requirement by law, 
or a condition of citizenship. Where it is imperative to an individual’s employment to be 
a member of a professional organisation, this type of organisation is not considered a 
not-for-profit organisation and therefore is excluded from the not-for-profit sector.50 
Once the structural-operation definition was in place, the next stage of the comparative study 
involved developing a classification scheme that used the commonalities of not-for-profit 
organisations. 
                                               
44 United Nations Handbook of National Accounting, Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National 
Accounts (2003) 18. 
45 Helmut Anheier, Nonprofit Organisations – Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 47; United Nations 
Handbook of National Accounting, Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National Accounts 
(2003) 18. 
46 There are not-for-profit organisations that do exercise government authority, which is delegated, determined and 
administered to the organisation by the state; moreover, the not-for-profit organisation does not have sovereign 
authority. United Nations Handbook of Accounts, Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National 
Accounts (2003) 19. 
47 Helmut Anheier, Nonprofit Organisations – Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 47; United Nations 
Handbook of National Accounting, Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National Accounts 
(2003) 19. 
48 United Nations Handbook of National Accounting, Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National 
Accounts (2003) 19-20. 
49 United Nations Handbook of National Accounting, Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National 
Accounts (2003) 18-19. The characteristic of non-distribution of profit is examined further in this thesis. 
50 United Nations Handbook of National Accounting, Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National 
Accounts (2003) 20. 
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2.3 International Classification of Not-for-Profit Organisations 
The aim of the classification scheme is to outline where not-for-profit organisations differ in 
purpose and activity from the other two sectors.51 These components make it simpler to create 
sub-groups that highlight the particular focus of each not-for-profit organisation in the context of 
its country.52 The usefulness of this classification scheme is central to an economic analysis, 
reporting and policy development. Table 3 is a summary of the international classification 
scheme, which is used at an international level, but there are other several classifications in 
existence.53 
Table 3 – International classification of not-for-profit organisations54 
Group Description and Activity 
Group 1 Culture and Recreation 
• Culture and arts 
• Sports 
• Other recreation (service organisations) 
Group 2 Education and Research 
• Primary and secondary education 
• Higher education (university) 
• Other education (vocational, technical or adult) 
• Research 
Group 3 Health 
• Hospitals and rehabilitation 
• Nursing homes 
• Mental health and crisis intervention 
• Other health services (public health and wellness education, 
outpatient services or emergency services) 
Group 4 Social Services 
• Social services 
• Emergency and relief 
• Income support and maintenance 
                                               
51 Helmut Anheier, Nonprofit Organisations – Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 54. 
52 United Nations Handbook of National Accounting, Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions into the System of 
National Accounts (2003) 32. 
53 The United States of America’s national taxonomy of tax-exempt entities is used to classify not-for-profit 
organisations based on an organisation’s major activities. Helmut Anheier, Nonprofit Organisations - Theory, 
Management, Policy (Routledge, 2005) 54. 
54 United Nations Handbook of National Accounting, Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National 
Accounts (2003) 31. 
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Group 5 Environment 
• Environment 
• Animal protection 
Group 6 Development and Housing 
• Economic, social and community development 
• Housing 
• Employment and training 
Group 7 Law, Advocacy and Politics 
• Civic and advocacy organisations 
• Law and legal services 
• Political organisations 
Group 8 Philanthropic Intermediaries and Voluntarism Promotion 
• Grant-making foundations 
• Fundraising organisations 
Group 9 International 
• Development assistance services 
• International disaster and relief organisations 
• International human rights and peace organisations 
Group 10 Religion 
• Promoting of religious beliefs 
• Administering religious services and rituals 
Group 11 Business and Professional Associations and Unions 
• Professional and organisations 
• Business associations 
• Trade unions 
Group 12 Not Elsewhere Classified 
 
This immense collaborative effort sensibly framed a miscellany of features, size, organisations 
and activities for the not-for-profit sector. The international classification scheme has been 
adopted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) to develop a measuring framework to 
capture data on the not-for-profit sector and its organisations.55 Australia’s recent adoption of the 
international classification scheme is an improvement on the previous classification scheme used 
by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). 
The classification model used by the ATO is best described as one-dimensional. The ATO’s 
model is confined to identifying the structure of the organisation (whether the entity is a charity 
                                               
55 Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-
Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) Chapter 2 
 <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/charities_08/report/c02.htm>. 
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or not), albeit for taxation purposes (see Figure 2). Unlike the international classification scheme, 
the ATO does not capture information on the organisation’s missions or activities and, 
furthermore, it overlooks whether it is within the existing taxation system or not.56 Another 
criticism that can be levelled at the ATO’s classification system is that it does not allow for an in-
depth exploration of these organisations or the internal and external influences that may affect 
them.57 Chapter Eight of this thesis outlines the new statutory authority’s shared responsibility 
with the ATO regarding the classification of not-for-profit organisations. 
Figure 2 – Australia’s classification model for not-for-profit organisations58 
 
 
Salamon’s international comparative study broke through some misconceptions of not-for-profits 
by providing a clear definition of them, and used for data gathering. Reports generated from this 
data offer a credible statistical snapshot of the sector’s economic contribution. However, data 
alone cannot provide an absolute explanation as to why the sector and its organisations function 
in the manner that is different to the other two sectors. Economic and socio-political theories 
                                               
56 Organisations are registered for taxation purposes if they: employ staff; accept tax-deductible donations; pay 
income tax; seek exemption from fringe benefit tax or concessional input tax treatment; or are subject to Goods 
and Services Tax (GST). All not-for-profit organisations with an annual turnover of $150,000 or more must be 
registered for GST, and organisations below this turnover threshold may choose to be registered for GST. The 
downside to the ATO’s classification scheme is that small not-for-profit organisations with little revenue or no 
staff are not considered to exist for the purpose of ATO’s recordings. Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of 
the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity Commission, January 2010) 59. 
57 Denise Crossan and Jon Van Til, ‘The Third Sector and Sustainable Social Change: New Frontiers for Research’ 
(Paper Presented at 2nd EMES-ISTR European Conference, Barcelona, Spain 9-12 July 2008) 5. 
58 Australian Taxation Office, ‘Guide for Non-Profit Organisations – Tax Basics for Non-Profit Organisations’ (June 
2011) 5. 
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focus on understanding the origin of the not-for-profit sector and explain the behaviour of not-
for-profit organisations. 
2.4 An Economic Understanding of the Not-for-Profit Sector 
As illustrated in Chapter One, the economic contribution of this sector in Australia is sizable.59 
The not-for-profit sector is a commanding economic player, and economists have strived to 
develop a number of theories hypothesising why not-for-profits exist. As Jacquelyn Thayer-Scott 
remarks, economists define the not-for-profit sector and its activities only within the theoretical 
framework of conventional market economies, and this is prevalent in Professor Burton 
Weisbrod’s research.60 In 1975, Weisbrod applied conventional economic theories of market 
failure and public goods to the not-for-profit sector to find out what causes not-for-profit 
organisations to exist.61 To find the answer question, he astutely drilled down to ask: 
a. what determines that certain goods are to be provided by the government, the 
for-profit, and not-for-profit markets?  
b. are there predictable circumstances in which the not-for-profit sector will 
develop, grow and decline?62 
Basic economic theory states that markets will, under particular conditions, fail and when market 
failure occur; governments only exist to address some of these failures.63 The main example of 
                                               
59 In 2006–2007 it was reported that the not-for-profit sector accounted for 4.1% of Australia’s GDP, and employed 
approximately 890,000 people with a further 4.6 million volunteering their services. Further, about three-quarters 
of volunteers across all not-for-profit organisations contribute to activities that are cultural and recreational in 
nature or to social services. Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research 
Report, Productivity Commission, January 2010) 53. 
60 Jacquelyn Thayer Scott, ‘Defining the Nonprofit Sector’ in Paul B. Reed and Valerie J. Howe ‘Defining and 
Classifying the Nonprofit Sector’ (Research Paper, Statistics Canada and Carleton University, 1999) 47 
<http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.cal/Collection/statcom/75F0048m1/2002207.pdf> 
61 Market failure is where there is a voluntary exchange of goods and services that fails to reach an efficient outcome. 
Where there is a production, goods under these conditions will create a spill over cost. This negatively affects a 
third party associated with the exchange. Consequently, the third party will bear the costs and will not be 
compensated by any corresponding benefit. When there is a negative externality, the market will overproduce 
goods. This occurs when the trading parties fail to account for all additional costs, called the social marginal costs 
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market failure is the production of a public good.64 Economists characterise goods by their 
availability and allocation,65 as well as the properties of ‘non-rivalrousness’ and ‘non-
excludability’.66 Non-rivalrousness means that once a unit of a good or service is produced, it 
may be consumed and enjoyed by an individual without detracting the consumption opportunities 
available to others.67 The second characteristic, non-excludability, denotes that it is impossible to 
exclude a user from enjoying a good or service if the user does not pay for the good or service.68 
A clear example of a public good is national defence.69 National defence is both non-excludable 
and non-rival – private firms, under pure market conditions, will not produce these goods, as they 
cannot cover their costs or make a profit.70 This allows the government to utilise their coercive 
power to provide these goods through taxation and legislation while also aiming to satisfy the 
median voter.71 Determining the level of quality and quantities of public goods is a political 
decision motivated to satisfy the medium voter.72 
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Professor Weisbrod adds to the public goods theory by acknowledging that there will be 
individuals who will consume more of those public goods financed by the government, and there 
will be some who will consume other goods that are imperfect substitutes.73 Thus, individuals 
will turn to the private sector to satisfy their demands. In such circumstances, when will profit-
taking firms arise to satisfy this demand? And could a not-for-profit organisation be capable of 
satisfying that demand? 
Professor Weisbord found that not-for-profit organisations provide public goods from the 
collective action of the individuals. The types of goods provided by both for profit and not-for-
profit organisations are quasi-public goods, not pure public goods. However, it is only not-for-
profit organisations that provide quasi-public goods for collective consumption.74 
Furthermore, Professor Weisbord found that government provides goods mostly of one 
variety, which then causes a residual demand for an alternative to public goods. Professor 
Weisbord reasoned that in satisfying this residual demand, for-profit organisations provide only 
privately financed public goods, such as electricity.75 Regarding not-for-profit organisations, 
Weisbord states that the provision of public goods is a reaction to the failures of both the market 
and of government to provide alternative goods.76 Consequently, not-for-profit organisations 
provide an imperfect substitute of the public good. The level of reaction, according to Professor 
Weisbord, is how not-for-profits emerge, grow, contract and develop as a substitute for state 
intervention.77 
When individuals rely on quasi-public goods from not-for-profits, this results in demand 
heterogeneity. This refers to the demand for public and quasi-public goods across different 
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population groups.78 The demand from each group will vary in the good’s quality and quantity.79 
For instance, education can be delivered through more than one model. Weisbrod also 
hypothesised that where there is greater diversity in a society, there will also be a larger set of 
not-for-profit organisations delivering a diverse set of public goods.80 The delivery of the public 
good can be hampered by the theory of crowding out. 
Crowding-out occurs when government either supports the public good itself, or fund not-for-
profits for the provision of those public goods.81 While crowding out will equate to a dollar-to-
dollar basis, it rests on a trade-off relationship between the state and not-for-profit sector.82 This 
is illustrated when there is an increase in governmental services responding to the demand of a 
non-median voter. This will impact on the level of the not-for-profit’s activities and, 
subsequently, not-for-profit organisations will seek diversity in other revenue-generating 
activities and areas.83 The expansion of not-for-profits, according to Lester Salamon, is not due to 
a government’s failure to provide certain goods or services, but rather the action of individuals. 
Salamon’s independency theory argues that regardless of government and market failure, the 
not-for-profits existence is as the result the voluntary action of people’s social obligation.84 
Further, Salamon is critical of Weisbrod’s theory by asserting that not-for-profit organisations 
and governments are not insulated from each other, but frequently act in a partnership.85 This 
partnership is bound by governmental financial support that underwrites the operation of not-for-
profit organisations.86 The interdependency theory denotes that a number of challenges must be 
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present for the government to be willing to step in and assist with the production of public goods. 
Such limitations are:87 
• Inadequate Resources – Resources are inadequate due to the free rider problem. 88 Quasi-
public goods being subject to the free rider problem exposes those individuals that benefit 
from voluntary action and have little or no incentive to contribute. Therefore, the 
goodwill of a few individuals falls short of what is sufficiently needed to address the 
welfare and societal problems. 
• Philanthropic Particularism – Occurs when a not-for-profit organisation focuses only on 
a sub-group within the organisation, resulting in the duplication of volunteers’ efforts as 
each sub-group demands their own agency or service. 
• Philanthropic Paternalism – When a not-for-profit organisation lacks accountability and 
decisions are made on behalf of donors. This creates situations leading to the not-for-
profit organisation pursuing activities that benefit only the donors’ interests, values, 
activities and needs, rather than the needs of the organisation.  
• Amateurism – Volunteers within the not-for-profit organisation may lack the professional 
skills to deal with wider social problems. 
In conclusion, Salamon’s independency theory maintains that not-for-profit organisations and 
governments rely on each other to deliver public and quasi-public goods, which is in contrast to 
Weisbrod’s public goods theory.89 
Professor Hansmann takes a different approach to explaining the activities of a not-for-profit 
organisation within our economy. He examines the function of not-for-profit organisations 
through the conventional economic theory of contract failure. This refers to a failure that exists in 
the implicit contract between a buyer and a seller, or between a principal and their agent.90 
Professor Hansamann argues that this failure arises for not-for-profit organisations when there is 
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an imbalance in information between the not-for-profit organisation and the donor, or principal 
and agent; this is defined as information asymmetry. 91 
Information asymmetry, under market conditions, demonstrates that there is a strong incentive 
to conceal this knowledge and to use it to one’s advantage.92 Hansmann argues that not-for-profit 
organisations exist as a response to information asymmetry rather than a response to government 
failure. This argument is supported by the existence of mutual insurance and other forms of 
cooperative ownership.93 Information asymmetry commonly occurs in the provision of a complex 
service, such as health care and welfare. For instance, where a principal, or a not-for-profit 
organisation, is unable to check the performance of their agent or donor, the contractual 
relationship allows for an agent to easily exploit the consumer’s trust (principal) by providing 
poor-quality service – or the agents could keep the donation for themselves.94 Hansmann strongly 
believes that not-for-profit organisations are less likely to exploit the information asymmetry than 
a for-profit firm, therefore making not-for-profit organisations trustworthy.95 Another key 
observation made by Hansmann to explain the basic differences in how a not-for-profit functions 
relative to its for-profit counterpart is the non-distribution constraint theory. 
Already recognised as one of the five features of the structural-operational definition, the 
‘non-distribution constraint’ is the fundamental difference between a for-profit and not-for-profit 
firm.96 Hansmann explained that, regardless of the enormous diversity found in the not-for-profit 
sector and the various forms of not-for-profit organisations, they are all constrained from 
distributing its net earnings to any individual who exercises control – such as members, officers, 
directors or trustees.97 Hansmann’s trustworthy theory, combined with his non-distribution 
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constraint principle, clearly illustrates that non-pecuniary preferences serves as the dominant and 
motivating behaviour of not-for-profit-organisations.98 These deep, motivating factors will always 
trump any opportunistic behaviour or adulteration that is found in for-profit firms.99 Hansmann’s 
theories are largely descriptive, which successfully emphasises the predominate features of a not-
for-profit organisation; however, an explanation as to how these features operate in the context of 
the sector is overlooked. 
Ortmann and Schlesinger tested the operation of Hansmann’s theories against the 
contemporary realties faced by not-for-profit organisations, which is an increasing demand for 
their services and goods. This examination revealed Hansmann’s theories has the following 
limitations:100 
• Incentive Compatibility Challenge - The non-distribution constraint principle 
has been found to hinder a not-for-profit organisation’s ability to pursue and 
develop their own incentives;101 
• Adulteration Challenge – The behaviour of individuals that are involved in a 
not-for-profit should not be adulterated, but there is a realisation that 
individuals could take advantage of this perceived trustworthiness;102 and 
• Reputational Ubiquity Challenge – Generally, consumers regard a not-for-
profit organisation to be reliable, whereas consumers view for-profit 
organisations as unreliable.103 
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The two seminal economic theories of Hansmann and Weisbrod explain the existence of the not-
for-profit sector; however, these theories overlook the supply-side of economic theory.104 
Entrepreneurship theories justify the existence of not-for-profits from a supply perspective.105 
Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen state that not-for-profit organisations can be enterprises created by 
social entrepreneurs,106 religious leaders, and others who are not motivated by profits.107 
Pursuant to entrepreneurship theory, a not-for-profit organisation will produce goods or 
services as a means to achieve the organisation’s objective. Rather than relying on the collective 
action of the organisation, it is the social entrepreneur who will drive the primary objective, the 
outputs, and develop the not-for-profit organisation.108 True success for a social entrepreneur is to 
achieve the principal objectives, which equates to the organisation achieving maximising non-
monetary returns and utility maximisation.109 
Another example of entrepreneurship theory is commonly found in organised religious 
groups, which have individuals who are highly motivated to drive a mission. Many religious 
groups are strategically placed in certain areas to provide an array of goods and/or services. For 
instance, religious groups provide education by establishing schools, health care by establishing 
hospitals, and provide other critical support services, such as crisis centres.110 The variety of 
services provided by an organisation highlights that social entrepreneurs actively find 
opportunities to maximise the quantifiable aspects by combining service delivery with their 
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religious ideologies.111 Furthermore, this illustrates that not-for-profit organisations choose a mix 
of services and multiple-products.112 
Where for-profit firms provide a service mix, this is considered to be a managerial decision 
primarily to maximise profits.113 However, the decision for a not-for-profit organisation to offer a 
mix of service is termed a trade-off. A trade-off is found where the not-for-profit organisation’s 
preferred services will not make a sufficient return or revenue to keep that service viable. This 
requires not-for-profit organisations to be dependent on cross-subsidisation.114 Cross-
subsidisation is where a not-for-profit organisation will rely on donations, donated time and 
efforts (labour) of their members, or volunteers to maintain its preferred services as part of 
driving the organisation’s primary mission.115 These cost inefficiencies suggest a logical question: 
how can not-for-profit organisations compete with for-profit organisations in the same industry? 
Property rights theory answers this question by suggesting that for a not-for-profit to continue 
operating, it will heavily rely upon the following conditions:116 
1. Entry barriers – Barriers into a market can be natural or induced by government, but 
ultimately they do not keep out all competitors. Entry barriers may reduce 
competition for profit-maximising firms, meaning some will be unable to meet the 
existing market demand. Not-for-profit organisations will provide services to the 
residual proportion of the market, which the for-profits cannot serve. 
2. Outside support – Not-for-profits receive outside support by way of grants, donations 
and advantage taxation. This kind of support is used to subsidise a not-for-profit’s 
expenditure which will reduce cost inefficiencies. 
3. Scale and scope – Economies of scale and/or economies of scope allows a not-for-
profit organisation to have a higher total cost when compared to a for-profit firm. 
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4. Operating objectives – Reducing cost inefficiencies a not-for-profit organisation 
should adopt operating objectives, which are similar to for-profit firm. 
Despite the cost inefficiencies, a not-for-profit organisation can successfully compete with for-
profit organisations by exploiting quality-choice and trade-offs at a lower than normal return. It is 
found that not-for-profits with operating objectives that coincide with quality and a consumer’s 
price preference may drive for-profits out of the market.117 Another explanation why not-for-
profits compete successfully with for-profits is determined by market fundamentals rather than 
market intervention and regulation.118 Under ordinary cost and demand conditions, for a not-for 
profit to increase its production of non-pecuniary benefits, it will enhance a not-for-profit 
organisation’s competing ability. Not-for-profit organisations have a better understanding of the 
market’s needs and are, therefore, capable of adjusting their operating objectives, which results in 
their increased competitiveness.119 
The contribution that the body of economic theories offers is a standardisation that underpins 
our understanding of how not-for-profits emerge and behave in response to both internal and 
external forces. These theories show that not-for-profits are a strong economic force in the 
marketplace – however, economic theory views not-for-profits strictly as economic players 
within the framework of economic exchange. This view of the not-for-profits overlooks their 
other unique dimensions, which are also examined in this chapter. 
2.5 Not-for-Profit Organisations Through the Lens of Social-Political Theory 
Alongside the economists, political scientists and social theorists have also demonstrated an 
interest in understanding the not-for-profit sector and its organisations; however, the respective 
focuses of these disciplines differ. Social theorists avail to understand the connection between 
individuals who create a network (an association) to achieve a benefit for themselves and 
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others.120 However, political scientists are concerned with understanding the impact or the 
contribution a voluntary association has on democratic practices and institutions.121 Alexis de 
Tocqueville, the classical social theorist who travelled from France to the United States, was the 
first to suggest that a not-for-profit organisation enhanced political democracy. 
Upon Alexis de Tocqueville’s arrival in the United States, he made a number of key 
observations about civil society.122 Relevant to his observations is the historical background of 
France’s treatment of and attitude towards voluntary associations in the nineteenth-century. 
France’s Penal Code of 1810 regulated voluntary associations and provided the government with  
control over an association’s purpose and its operation,123 and imposed conditions upon 
associations as it saw fit.124 Tocqueville held concerns about France’s political sovereignty over 
an individual’s freedom of association.125 
Tocqueville’s famously stated that the state ‘compresses, enervates, extinguishes and 
stupefies people, till each is reduced to a flock of timid and industrious animals of which the 
government is the shepherd.’126 His remarks emanate from his observations that France’s 
republican model of government was becoming totalitarian and centralised, impacting on an 
individual’s freedom to be involved in public life.127 Tocqueville watched France’s so-called 
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model of democracy encourage privatism, which inhibited an individual’s participation in 
politics.128 The political action was judged in terms of an individual’s private advantage over the 
wider public interest.129 According to de Tocqueville, this privatism discouraged the formation of 
political associations, and he held grave concerns about the future of France’s democracy.130 
However, when de Tocqueville travelled to the United States, he observed a different political 
sovereignty to that of the centralised government of France. Tocqueville noticed that America’s 
political structure actively encouraged political participation through citizenship rights and 
education.131 He saw individuals were motivated to form voluntary associations, which permited 
every kind of opinion and grievance to be expressed.132 Building the connection between 
voluntary associations and democracy, Tocqueville observed that creating a voluntary association 
was not an easy task. However, within a democracy, an association will thrive when certain 
conditions are present.133 These conditions, which Tocqueville identified, are: (i) a free press; (ii) 
the freedom to be self-organised; and (iii) the freedom to be self-reliant.134 While identifying 
these predominate conditions, Tocqueville also saw voluntary organisations were independent, 
autonomous, and free from state control.135 Tocqueville’s historical milestone of pointing out the 
connection between voluntary associations and a vibrant democracy has influenced many other 
theorists. 
Civil society theorists argue that a citizen’s involvement with an intermediate organisation 
enhances democracy.136 These intermediate organisations are identified as being smaller than 
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government, but larger than individual families.137 These organisations function as a mediating 
structure between an individual’s private sphere and the state.138 Within this space individuals 
will have a meaningful relationship and a dialogue with the state that they would not necessarily 
have on their own.139 Additionally, an individual’s level of political participation is influenced by 
an organisation’s environment.140 The environment of a not-for-profit organisation is credited for 
building norms of reciprocity, cooperation and trust between members, which generates social 
capital.141 
Sociologist James Coleman describes social capital as the glue that binds the norms of trust 
and reciprocity, and which facilitates cooperative arrangements between members of a not-for-
profit organisation.142 Trust is the essential component of social capital, for it is the moral source 
that underpins the collective action by members to solve a problem.143 Advancing the notion of 
social capital is Robert Putnam, who asserted that social capital also serves as the connection to a 
strong civil society, which builds and drives a successful democratic government.144 A successful 
democracy, according to Putnam, depends on citizens voting, a belief that others will vote, and 
citizens showing their preferences by participating in non-voting activities.145 Civic participation 
or engagement146 is important to democracy, for it allows citizens to influence (or at least try to 
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influence) government activity. 147 However, internal and external forces shape an individual’s 
ability and willingness to participate in a democracy and in an association.148 
Internal forces are considered to be the resources that citizens have at their disposal, such as 
the their time, skill and money.149 In contrast, external forces are the social circumstances in 
which individuals may find themselves. For instance, some individuals will live in a community 
where they are expected to participate.150 Likewise, there are individuals who possess strong 
feelings of community in the area where they live.151 Having a sense of belonging to a community 
provides a network for individuals to become involved in political affairs.152 These networks have 
found to be positive norms of reciprocity, which encourages and reinforces civic participation, 
but it is not always the case.153 Examples of the downside of social capital include the Ku Klux 
Klan and the Oklahoma City Bomber, Timothy McVeigh.154 Social capital enabled McVeigh to 
build a network of friends to form a conspiracy that bound them together by a norm of 
reciprocity.155 Besides informal networks, formal organisations also afford a citizen the 
opportunity to participate through collective action.156 
Sociologist, Roger Lohmann, holds the view that associations have a role in public action. 
Lohmann states that associations allow a specific group of people to come together to speak 
about their common situation and act on it through the power they generate.157 The power 
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generated by this public action encourages the creation of associations.158 However, the level of 
an individual’s participation in voluntary associations (being both social and political) are 
directly linked to an individual’s level of education.159 
It has been shown by Putnam that individuals with a high level of education are likely to be 
more involved in organisations that are concerned with public affairs and politics.160 Conversely, 
it has been found that individuals with a lower level of education are members of voluntary 
organisations, usually religious groups.161 Individuals with a low level of education participate in 
voluntary organisations to gain experiences to develop their civic skills such as, 
communication.162 Putnam explains that education is indicative to an individual’s level of 
participation in civil society mainly because education is the proxy for social status and economic 
differences.163 
When social status and economic differences are combined with the individual’s income, it is 
predicted that well-educated individuals will tend to be trusting164 and be joiners.165 This is partly 
because education, and to some degree the individual’s home life, impart the necessary skills and 
resources for civic participation.166 For example, highly educated people are more likely use their 
communication skills to write to office holders, join a campaign and attend local political 
meetings,167 and are active in voluntary associations.168 Furthermore, it is found that individuals 
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who are civically engaged will be five times more likely to protest than those individuals who are 
not.169 Evidence has emerged that social capital and civic engagement has declined.170 
Robert Putnam has charted the decline of civil participation in the United States of America 
since the 1950s.171 Putnam measures the decline of civic engagement by the level of voter turnout 
and electoral participation, such as protesting.172 Explaining the decline of civic participation in 
the United States, Putnam has identified three factors: (i) personal – characteristics of the 
individual voter; (ii) structural – those characteristics of the American political system; and (iii) 
cultural – characteristics that reflect society and culture in America.173 Each factor will be 
discussed individually. 
(i) Personal 
Personal factors diminishing civic engagement are twofold. First is the deterioration of civic and 
government courses in American high school curricula.174 By taking away traditional classroom-
based civic education, has been found to have a negative impact on an individual’s political 
knowledge175 and quality of participation.176 Since World War II, levels of education have 
improved; however, it has been found that having a better-educated individual does not 
necessarily correlate to high levels of civic engagement.177 
Secondly, an individual’s regular use of newspaper and radio has been identified as a personal 
factor linked to civic participation.178 The decline of individuals reading newspapers, watching 
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the nightly news, and staying informed through traditional means has resulted in a generation of 
individuals that are not as politically attentive or aware as earlier generations.179 
 (ii) Structural 
Structural characteristics are also been recognised as contributors to the decline of civic 
engagement. These have been identified as the media and the nature of electoral system itself. 
The media environment and the role it plays in the electoral process have people becoming 
disengaged with politics, and this has influenced the level of media coverage of elections and 
other political events.180 For instance, the major news networks in America only covered four and 
a half hours of the fall elections in 2000, compared to six hours and twenty minutes in 1992.181 
Despite this disengagement, there are more media outlets, such as cable and the Internet, which 
people can access. However, it is found that only interested persons are motivated to seek out 
political news through these media outlets.182 The media is not alone in contributing to the decline 
of civic participation – there are also the activities that transpire within the electoral system. 
The lack of voter turnout has been blamed on voter fatigue.183 American voters have lost 
interest in the campaigning process and have reported to be fatigued by what seems to be ongoing 
electioneering.184 Another factor influencing poor voting turn out is the lack of political 
mobilisation. This involves targeting particular individuals or a group of individuals to mobilise 
their support.185 Traditionally, voluntary organisations such as the parent-teachers associations, 
fraternal groups, and professional organisations would mobilise their members to vote. However, 
declining membership within these organisations has seen political parties now undertake voter 
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mobilisation.186 Political parties have been found to structure their mobilisation strategy towards 
their ‘faithful’ supporters, which excludes the young, the poor and immigrants.187 Against a 
backdrop of having no civic education in schools, and with particular societal groups excluded 
from the political network, civic participation will remain in free-fall and in a state of disarray. 
Underpinning this state of decline is a number of cultural factors that also impact on the level an 
individual’s civic participation. 
(iii) Cultural 
The factor of interpersonal trust has been previously identified as a link to an individual’s level of 
participation and engagement in civil society.188 Participation is driven not by an individual’s own 
level of trust, but rather the level of personal trust which surrounds the individual.189 Voluntary 
associations are integral to social capital in democratic societies, and they allow individuals to 
participate in a meaningful way to community life.190 
Although Salamon states that there has been a surge in the creation of voluntary associations, 
describing this phenomenon as a ‘global associational revolution’,191 participation in associational 
life is steadily declining. Both Australia and the United States have recorded sharp declines over 
the past forty years in the development of and the level of participation in a not-for-profit 
organisation.192 Australia’s deterioration in associational life is reflected in the average number of 
hours an individual volunteered to a not-for-profit organisation. Data indicates that the median 
hours provided by volunteers in community and welfare services has fallen from 48 hours to 40 
hours between 2000 and 2006.193 In the same period, the largest fall in voluntary hours was 
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recorded for religious organisations, where the medium hours fell from 60 hours to 48 hours.194 
Little is known about what causes the decline of participation in voluntary associations in 
Australia.195 However, substantial research has been undertaken in America to explain the decline 
in associational life and in civic participation. 
Another factor identified as correlating to the demise of social engagement is television 
watching.196 According to Putnam, television viewing has a negative impact on social trust, which 
reduces individuals’ participation in social, recreational and community activities, and connection 
to their neighbourhoods.197 Past generations had strong neighbourhood and local bonds due to 
moral and religious doctrines.198 In contemporary society, individualism has also been identified 
as the dynamic shift in America’s public culture and the main contributor to the decline of civic 
participation. 
The dominant cultural norm of individualism turns civic engagement into a choice for an 
individual rather than a responsibility. 199 Voting, which is non-compulsory in America, sees 
individuals undertaking a cost-benefit analysis on whether or not it is worth it to vote.200 An 
individual’s decision to vote or not is determined by the costs related to the exercise of voting 
against any benefit the individual will receive from the exercise.201 Poor voter turnout, also, 
explains the change in campaigning and policy by the main political parties. 
The Democratic Party (the Democrats) has shown its willingness to shift away from 
traditional class-based politics and engineered its election campaigns to focus on issues of the day 
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and the candidate.202 One of the election issues in the 2008 Presidential Campaign was wealth 
inequalities and economic dislocation. Addressing these inequalities, and to motivate individuals 
to vote for the Democrats, they promised income redistribution through taxation and to increase 
federal spending.203 The success of the Democrats 2008 presidential campaign achieved a renewal 
in civic participation, but their campaign’s real success lies in the well-crafted policy that 
promised gains or benefits for individuals.204 
Finally, it is has been demonstrated that not-for-profit organisations are an integral mediatory 
structure between the community and the state. These associational structures are the mechanisms 
that permit groups of individuals to work collectively and to participate in civil society. Civic 
participation is influenced by social capital, wherein these groups are social networks connected 
by trust and norms of reciprocity. The decline of civic engagement in the United States is largely 
due to the structure of the American political system, the reduction of civic courses in formal 
schooling, and a cultural shift towards individualism. To avoid further erosion of social capital 
and civil society, it is critical that not-for-profit organisations strengthen their position in the civic 
landscape. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Debate surrounding which term is the most appropriate to accurately describe the sector across 
jurisdictions has led to the development of a universal definition and classification of the sector. 
The core of this universal definition and the classification system was to provide clarity that will 
overcome the sometimes-blurred boundaries of other economic units, such as the state, 
households, and for-profit units. The structural-operational definition provides key characteristics 
that are the hallmarks of a not-for-profit organisation, and the classification system developed a 
measuring framework that captures data about not-for-profit organisations’ activities and outputs. 
Understanding the not-for-profit sector and its organisations’ economic theory addresses why 
the sector exists. Economists believe they exist to address market failure, and non-rival goods, 
such as national defence, cannot be produced by a private firm and, therefore, can only be 
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produced by the state through taxation. The state will provide other particular goods with the aim 
of satisfying the medium voter, but when consumers are unsatisfied, they will turn to not-for-
profit organisations. Consumers view not-for-profit organisations are trustworthier than for-
profits and, therefore, are willing to support them. Contributing to a not-for-profit organisation’s 
trustworthiness is the non-distribution constraint principle, which trumps opportunistic behaviour 
found in for-profits. 
Entrepreneurship theory states a not-for-profit organisation will provide a mixture of services. 
Providing a mixture of services is not always viable for these organisations but, despite the cost 
inefficiencies, a not-for-profit can successfully compete with for-profits. The success of a not-for-
profit organisation in these circumstances relies on cross-subsidisation. 
Superfluous to a nation’s gross domestic product, the not-for-profit sector and its organisation 
are important to democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville had observed during his travels to the United 
States that citizens formed voluntary associations, which enhanced political democracy. 
Tocqueville further observed that voluntary associations would thrive in an environment with a 
free press and the freedom to be self-organised and self-reliant. 
Voluntary associations have been found to provide an environment for individuals to build 
norms and general social capital. Putnam asserts that social capital is the connection to building a 
strong democratic government, but this is reliant on citizens voting and other means of civic 
participation. The level at which individuals will engage in civic activities (such as signing 
petitions) is largely influenced by their level of education, resources at their disposal, and their 
social circumstances. 
However, in more recent times, civic participation has declined both in Australia and the 
United States. The factors linked to the decline in civic participation are election fatigue and the 
dominant cultural norm of individualism. This is the challenge for not-for-profit organisations to 
strengthen their place in the civic landscape. 
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CHAPTER 3: History of Incorporated Associations 
in Australia and New Zealand 
 
Our sector has steadily grown in size and influence by harnessing the spirit of 
community and the benevolent instincts of human nature.205 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the creation of the incorporated association model in South Australia, and 
the motivating needs for a simple form of incorporation for charitable institutions. This new 
organisational form was innovative for its time, and the structure of an incorporated association 
was slowly adopted by the other Australian jurisdictions. 
The South Australian model of incorporation has been much celebrated as pioneering; 
however, it is New Zealand’s model of incorporation that has had a lasting impact. Chapter Three 
examines the development of New Zealand’s Incorporated Societies Acts in juxtaposition with 
the South Australian Associations Incorporation Act 1858. This examination found particular 
aspects of New Zealand’s incorporated model were more advanced than South Australia’s, and 
these features will be highlighted in this chapter. Sir John Salmond can be accredited as the 
person responsible for shaping these advances, which the South Australian parliament 
subsequently adopted. Chapter Three briefly discusses the influence Salmond’s juristic theories 
had in developing New Zealand’s model of incorporation. 
3.1 History of Incorporated Associations in Australia 
The introduction of incorporated association legislation originated in South Australia, and the 
state was acclaimed as the leader in the development of association law for all Australian 
jurisdictions.206 The South Australian parliament enacted two momentous pieces of legislation in 
1858: the Real Property Act 1858; and the Associations Incorporation Act 1858.207 The primary 
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aim of the latter statute was to offer a simple and cheap method of incorporating a non-profit 
organisation established for a specific community purpose.208 However, the enactment of the 
Associations Incorporation Act was neither trouble-free nor simple.209 
The need for an appropriate incorporated entity for not-for-profit institutions in Australia was 
due to a number of practical and legal difficulties experienced by not-for-profit associations. As 
is the case today, the courts did not recognise the existence of an association or, more accurately, 
an unincorporated association.210 The only way this issue could be overcome was through either 
incorporating under the company’s legislation of the day, or to create a charitable trust.211 The 
trust deed became a challenge for non-profit associations when it came to managing their real 
property. The property was vested in trustees and not in an association’s name, and every time 
there was a change of a trustee, there was an expense for the association to transfer the 
association’s property to a newly appointed trustee.212 To overcome this core problem, the South 
Australian Parliament undertook the legislative development to incorporate associations to save 
time and money.213 
Captain Bagot MLC first tabled the Bill for the Associations Incorporation Act in the 
Legislative Council on 21 January 1858.214 This Bill proposed a scheme of incorporation through 
the granting of a certificate by the Master of the Court, creating a means for an association to 
hold property in its own name.215 Pursuant to the Bill, incorporation could only extend to certain 
prescribed organisations: 
1. churches; 
2. schools; 
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3. hospitals; 
4. benevolent and charitable institutions; 
5. mechanics’ institutions; and 
6. any other institution that promoted science, the arts, and literature.216 
The Bill is celebrated for its uniqueness, as there was no British precedent on which it could 
directly or indirectly base itself.217 The most significant features of the Bill were: that it allowed 
for existing associations to amend their rules to become incorporated; and, secondly, ensured the 
vesting of personal and real property in a newly formed self-managing corporation.218 
However, the Bill had some limitations as it did not provide for members’ rights, nor confer 
limited liability on members; this, consequently, meant members were personally liable for an 
association’s debts.219 Following the Bill being introduced by Captain Bagot MLC to the 
Legislative Council on 21 January 1858, the Bill lapsed.220 It was re-introduced into the South 
Australian Parliament in September that year by Captain Bagot MLC.221 There were no changes 
to the Bill on its re-introduction.222 During its progress, albeit slow, discussions about the Bill in 
both houses of parliament emphasised the need for not-for-profit institutions to become 
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incorporated for effective and efficient property management – the Bill finally received Royal 
Assent on 24 December 1858.223 
3.2 Troubles for South Australia’s Incorporated Associations Act 
The life of this pioneering Act was short lived, and it was repealed in 1864 by South Australia’s 
Companies Act 1864.224 It is not entirely clear why the Companies Act 1864 (SA) repealed the 
association’s incorporation legislation; however, one explanation provided is that in the 19th 
century there were tensions in the role of colonial legislators either to be innovative law 
reformers or mere transmitters of English law.225 Innovation was placed on hold in South 
Australia with the passing of the Companies Act 1864 (SA), which was a direct reprint of the 
English Act.226 Over time, the repealing of the association’s incorporation legislation has proved 
to be a mistake. 
Within a short period, the Companies Act 1864 (SA) showed that it was too complex and an 
expensive means of incorporation for not-for-profit entities.227 To the credit of the South 
Australian Parliament, it realised that it already had an appropriate and suitable structure for not-
for-profit entities. Subsequently, Captain Bagot’s Act was revived in 1865. However, over time, 
the Act has been amended and consolidated on numerous occasions. Table 4 shows the lifecycle 
of South Australia’s association incorporation legislation.228 
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Table 4 – The lifecycle of South Australia’s Incorporated Association Legislation 
Year Title Notable Features / Amendments 
1858 Associations Incorporation 
Act 1858 (SA) 
• Allows for the incorporation of not-for-profit institutions. 
• Allows an institution to hold property and to apply the property 
to the organisation’s purpose. 
• Internal management of the organisation was at the members’ 
discretion.  
1865 Associations Incorporation 
Act (No 12) 1865 (SA) 
• Referred to as the Revival Act.229 
• No changes. 
1887 Associations Incorporation 
Act 1865 (SA) 
• Associations permitted to mortgage their property.230 
1890 Associations Incorporation 
Act 1890  (SA) 
• Consolidation.231 
• Allowed an incorporated association to change its name.232 
• Removed the requirement for applicants to advertise for 
incorporation.233 
1897 Associations Incorporation 
Act 1890, Amendment Act 
1897 (No. 678) 1879 (SA)  
• Every association incorporated under the Associations Acts of 
1858, 1887 and 1890 was declared to be an association within the 
meaning of section 109 of the Companies Act 1892 (SA).234 
1901 An Act to amend the 
Associations Incorporation 
Act 1890, Amendment Act 
1897 (No. 757) 1901 (SA) 
• Incorporated associations under the 1858 and 1890 Acts were 
declared to be an association under section 189 of the Companies 
Act 1892 (SA).235 
1919 Associations Incorporation 
Act Further Amendment Act 
191 No. 1376 1919 (SA) 
• The definition of association is amended to include the word 
‘promoting’ before the words ‘recreation and amusement’.236 
1929 Associations Incorporation 
Act 1929 (SA) 
• Re-introduced an intention to be incorporated must be 
advertised.237 
• Penalties for seal holders who failed to notify of any changes to 
an association’s name, membership, rules and regulations.238 
• Registrar to cancel registration if an association was found to be 
carrying on trade or if an association is defunct.239  
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1956 Associations Incorporation 
Act 1929 (SA) 
• The Registrar of Companies to hear objections for incorporation 
instead of the Supreme Court.240 
• Appointment of a public officer replaces seal-holders.241 
• Amalgamation and dissolution of associations permitted.242 
• Limited liability provided to members of an association.243 
1985 Associations Incorporation 
Act 1985 (SA) 
• Current legislation. 
• See Part 6 for the Act’s legislative history.244 
From the inception of this Act, it appears that many of its amendments, outlined above, 
correspond to particular aspects of New Zealand’s model of incorporation – this is also evident in 
other Australian jurisdictions.245 
3.3 Other Australian States 
The rest of Australia initially disregarded South Australia’s model of incorporation and went 
about constructing their own efforts to remedy the problems of unincorporated associations. 
Table 5 is a chronology of when Australian jurisdictions enacted incorporated association 
legislation. 
Table 5 – Chronology of incorporated association statutes 
State or Territory Year 
Western Australia 1895 
Australian Capital Territory  1953 
Northern Territory 1963 
Tasmania 1964 
Victoria 1981 
Queensland  1981 
New South Wales  1984 
Despite the importance of this legal structure and its legislation, the states and territories have 
failed to continue along this innovative path.246 This failure ignores the needs and demands that 
not-for-profit organisations face in contemporary Australia, such as the need to create a modern 
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definition of ‘charity’.247 Chapter Six of this thesis identifies and addresses areas within the sector 
that are in urgent need of reform. Many Australian state and territories were slow in 
implementing their own associations legislation; however, when it came to devising their 
incorporation model, they did not necessarily copy South Australia, but took elements from New 
Zealand’s incorporation model. 
3.4 History of New Zealand’s Incorporation Model for Non-Profits 
 In 1895, New Zealand’s parliament passed the Unclassified Societies Registration Act (‘the 
Unclassified Societies Act’).248 Not unlike the South Australian position, the primary object of 
this Act was to address the ‘unsatisfactory position’249 that clubs and other associations found 
themselves in by having no legal status.250 Members of various clubs and associations complained 
that they had no voice or control, and trustees were doing whatever they desired with the 
associations’ monies.251 Less restrictive than the South Australian Act, the Unclassified Societies 
Act 1895 (NZ) allowed any [my emphasis] group or association to be incorporated provided that: 
(i) it was formed for any lawful purpose that was not for a pecuniary gain; and (ii) there was to be 
no less than fifteen members.252 Although the aim of the South Australian and New Zealand 
parliaments was to remedy the troubles connected with the management of an unincorporated 
association’s property, aspects of the New Zealand Act offered more than the South Australian 
model of incorporation in some areas. 
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The incorporation process under the Unclassified Societies Act 1895 (NZ) was simple, as it 
excluded the requirement of advertising and, moreover, provided members with limited 
liability.253 While South Australia removed the need to advertise for incorporation in 1890,254 it 
did not introduce member’s limited liability until 1956. Additional innovative features that the 
South Australian legislation lacked were the ability for an organisation to be voluntarily 
dissolved, and the requirement for an organisation to have a registered office.255 Further, the 
Unclassified Societies Act (NZ) in 1906 was amended to require associations to file a set of rules 
with their application for registration.256 These amendments provided a Schedule outlining 
matters that an association’s rules were required to address: 
a) the Society’s Name; 
b) the Society’s objects, and the mode and purposes that its funds are to 
be applied to; 
c) the qualifications and annual membership subscription; 
d) the method of electing new members; 
e) the manner of making, altering and rescinding rules; 
f) the mode of holding meetings and voting; 
g) the appointment and removal of a management committee, or failure to 
observe any rule, or for misconduct; and 
h) the voluntary dissolution of the organisation (society) and the 
disposition of the society’s property.257 
The requirement for associations to have rules that provide for matters outlined in the statute’s 
Schedule remain a condition across all Australian jurisdictions for registration and 
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incorporation.258 However, over time, the Unclassified Societies Acts of 1895 and 1906 were 
shown to be inadequate and they were repealed and consolidated into the Incorporated Societies 
Act 1908 (NZ). 259 
The aim of the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) was to improve the preceding Act in 
relation to incorporation, management, control and the dissolution of societies.260 For the first 
time in statute, the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) acknowledged that societies can make a 
profit, but a pecuniary gain was prohibited from being distributed to its members.261 The 
significance of this provision, perhaps unknown at the time, is instrumental in distinguishing 
between a for-profit and not-for-profit organisation.262 While the preceding Acts were generous 
towards the range and nature of groups that qualified for incorporation, nevertheless some groups 
found themselves outside the scope of the Act.263 The Victoria Students’ Hostel complained to the 
government of the day when they were not granted with incorporation under the Unclassified 
Societies Acts 1895-1906 (NZ) on the basis that the hostel was considered to be in receipt of a 
pecuniary gain by accepting boarding fees.264 The Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) resolved 
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this problem for the hostel, and a wider range of associations and societies then qualified for 
incorporation.265 
Another innovative feature introduced by the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) was the 
requirement on societies to submit an annual return to the Registrar, and for the organisation’s 
financial statements to be available for public inspection.266 While the annual submission of 
financial reports today is considered a mechanism of good governance, the intent behind this 
obligation was not for fiscal accountability, but rather to afford the Registrar with an opportunity 
to monitor that those organisations were acting within their objectives.267 Perhaps without 
realising it at the time, the drafter of this Act, Sir John Salmond, had laid the original foundations 
for the proper administration and management of not-for-profit organisations. 
3.5 Sir John Salmond’s Model of Incorporation 
Sir John Salmond arrived in New Zealand from the University of Adelaide in March of 1906, and 
in the following year he took the position of Counsel in the Law Drafting Office.268 Salmond’s 
Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) is assessed by Fletcher as an ‘embellishment’ of corporate 
law.269 This view by Fletcher overlooks Salmond’s extensive knowledge of corporate and 
jurisprudential theory, which can be seen in Sir John Salmond’s Incorporated Societies Act.270 
Salmond’s renowned work Jurisprudence271 distinguishes corporations from a natural person 
and he describes a legal person as a product of the law’s attribution ‘by way of fiction’.272 
According to Salmond, groups are legally recognised collectives (including corporations and not-
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for-profit organisations) as having a legal personality provided by the law and the state.273 This 
juristic personality of corporations as seen by Salmond is fictitious and he acknowledged that ‘a 
group of people is a very real thing, but it is only a fictitious person’.274 Although Salmond 
developed his fiction theory before taking the role as Counsel, his fiction theory can be located in 
his Act.275 
Salmond was also of the opinion that the role of the State was to encourage and empower 
groups, regardless of whether the group’s legal personality is real or fiction.276 Furthermore, 
Salmond saw that through the attribution of law, members of a company should have interests, 
rights, and be protected from liability. 277 Reflecting this view, Salmond’s Incorporated Societies 
Act 1908 (NZ) created the legal requirement for incorporated societies to have objects and rules 
that gave a society’s members’ rights and limited liability – moreover, his Act separated a 
society’s obligations from its members.278 Salmond’s Incorporation Societies Act 1090 (NZ) has 
had a wide-reaching influence across the Tasman to Australia. 
When it came time for Queensland, Western Australia and New South Wales to enact their 
own incorporated associations’ legislation, these states closely followed New Zealand’s Act279 
and largely ignored the South Australian model.280 Although South Australia is credited for the 
creation of the incorporated association it is, however, New Zealand’s, and particularly 
Salmond’s model, which has shaped and had a lasting influence on the incorporated association 
model adopted by these states. Nevertheless, in more recent times Salmond’s model has been 
subject to scrutiny as concerns are raised about its suitability in meeting today’s needs for 
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transparent administration.281 Addressing these concerns, New Zealand’s Law Commission is 
undertaking a comprehensive review of their incorporated association structure to see how this 
organisational form can be improved to satisfy the need for transparency.282 
3.6 Conclusion 
The concept of a cheap and simple organisational form for non-profit associations was needed to 
overcome the ills of charitable trusts. South Australia’s parliament developed an organisational 
form that would permit not-for-profit institutions to self-manage their property (without it being 
vested in a trustee). However, despite some limitations in the earlier South Australian model, the 
incorporated association legislation was amended a number of times, and this reflected some 
aspects of the New Zealand model of incorporation. 
New Zealand’s earlier model of incorporation was less restrictive and more advanced than 
South Australia’s model as it offered a simple process of incorporation. It provided members with 
limited liability, introduced a central registry, established the requirement for an association to 
file a set of rules when applying for incorporation, and required the submission an annual report 
for public inspection. These requirements were subsequently introduced into the South Australian 
model and remain in force today across all Australian jurisdictions. Perhaps the most significant 
features of New Zealand’s statute is that it acknowledged societies could make a profit, and that 
they are prohibited from distributing profit to their members. The drafter of this innovative 
incorporated model was Sir John Salmond; his in-depth understanding of jurisprudential and 
corporate theory greatly attributed to the development of the model of incorporation. 
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CHAPTER 4: Legal Forms for Organising Not-for-Profit 
Organisations 
 
Clubs engage in activities which are designed to raise money such as [sic] 
poker machines, liquor sales, bingo games and the like. There may … come a 
time when these other activities take a life on their own, they become an end in 
themselves.283 
4.0 Introduction 
The law, unlike economic and social theories, is not concerned about the space in which not-for-
profit organisations operate, but rather the form of the not-for-profit.284 Compared to the private 
and public sectors, the not-for-profit sector encompasses a larger number of unique entities: 
associations; unincorporated associations; incorporated associations; trading associations; 
charitable trusts; companies limited by guarantee; cooperative societies; and friendly societies – 
each form has subtly different characteristics. This chapter provides a basic understanding of the 
four main entities in the sector: associations; unincorporated and incorporated associations; and 
companies limited by guarantee. To appreciate and understand these entities, each entity’s 
characteristics are briefly outlined. 
4.1 Associations 
4.1.1 Definition 
Often the term ‘association’ in the not-for-profit sector is prefixed with ‘unincorporated’ or 
‘incorporated’. The term ‘association’ describes a combination of people who possess a common 
interest or purpose with a degree of organisation and, moreover, continuity. 285 Having a degree of 
organisation and continuity is sufficient to distinguish an association from an ad hoc group of 
                                               
283 St Mary’s Rugby League Club Ltd v The Commissioner for Taxation (1997) 97 ATC 4528 at 4529–4530. 
284 Kim Weinert, ‘Is a Small Revolution Really too Much to Ask For?’ (Paper presented at the Sydney Law School 
Postgraduate Conference, Law and Social Reality, 29 October 2010) 2. 
285 Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 247, 273. 
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individuals. Further, an association will also have some criteria or clear method for identifying its 
members.286 
Queensland’s legislation defines an association to mean an association, society, body or 
another entity formed and/or to carry on a lawful purpose.287 This provision, and the other 
respective provisions across jurisdictions, do not offer a helpful description of an association. An 
association is best described to be, in a broad sense, a group of individuals (usually two or more 
people) who have agreed (voluntarily) to join together in pursuit of one or more common 
purpose/s.288 Not-for-profit associations will promote, inter alia, religious, educational, literary, 
scientific, artistic, and other benevolent purposes that will benefit the general community, as well 
as members of the association.289 
4.2 Unincorporated Associations 
4.2.1 Definition 
Unincorporated associations are formed when groups of people come together who share a 
common lawful purpose, and agree to further that interest by collective action. However, for legal 
purposes, an unincorporated association is considered to be an aggregate of its members at a 
particular time.290 There are three essential characteristics of an unincorporated association: 
1) the association has members who are free to join or resign at will;291 
2) there must be a contract between the members and the association, inter se;292 and 
3) there must be ‘a matter of history’.293 
                                               
286 Kibby v Registrar of Title [1999] 1 VR 861. 
287 Associations Incorporated Act 1981 (Qld) s 2. Also see, Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 4; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 18(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 2(1); Associations 
Incorporation Act (Vic) s 3(1); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 3; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 3(1); Associations Incorporation Act 2009 s 4(1). The term association is not 
defined in the Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT). 
288 Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 247. 
289 LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 28 (at 3 April 2012) 316 Voluntary Associations, ‘(b) Definition 
and Classification of Not-for-Profit Associations’ [435–10]. 
290 Wilson v J & AG Johnson Ltd (1939) 55 CLR 63, 67. 
291 Conservative and Unionist central Office v Burrell [1980] 3 All ER 42. 
292 John v Rees [1970] Ch 345 affirmed that there is a contractual effect to relationship between members and the 
unincorporated association. 
293 The phrase ‘a matter of history’ refers to a moment in time when a number of persons came together to form the 
association. Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1980] 3 All ER 42, 58. 
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An unincorporated association is formed by the voluntary action of those people who agree to its 
formation and the association’s terms.294 Furthermore, individuals must not gain a direct 
pecuniary advantage from the association.295 
4.2.2 Membership Entry and Rights 
The original members of an unincorporated association must decide on how to regulate the 
admission, suspension, or expulsion of members.296 Such decisions and conventions are agreed by 
the association’s original members and should be stated in the association’s rules.297 The 
unincorporated association can receive a membership fee when an individual becomes a member. 
Membership will continue indefinitely provided the membership fee or subscription fee is paid as 
required by the rules of the association.298 A member of an unincorporated association enjoys the 
use of the association’s property and participation in the association’s activities providing the 
association remains in existence.299 
4.2.3 Legal Standing 
An unincorporated association has no separate legal personality from its members and is not 
recognised in law regardless that ‘to the man on the street’ and to its members the association is 
real.300 This lack of legal status causes many difficulties for members in areas that are addressed 
later in this section. 301 Furthermore, due to the lack of perpetual succession with unincorporated 
associations, the acquiring and disposing of property has shown to be a problematic area. With no 
legal standing, property must be vested in the names of individual members or in trustees rather 
than in the association’s name.302 
                                               
294 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 1996) 2. 
295 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 11. 
296 An association may adopt an admission policy where membership to an association is necessary for an individual 
to carry on a trade or profession, or where the respective anti-discrimination legislation applies. However, 
Queensland’s Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 excludes not-for-profit associations. 
297 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 12. 
298A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 3. 
299 Re St James’ Club (1852) 42 ER 920. 
300 Worthing Rugby Football Club Trustees v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1985] 1 WLR 409, 413 (Gibson J). 
301 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 6. 
302 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 7. 
  58 
4.2.4 Liability 
Not being a separate legal entity, an unincorporated association denotes that all members will be 
jointly liable and will equally share the loss or damage sustained by the unincorporated 
association.303 However, committee members may be indemnified from the unincorporated 
association’s funds for any liability incurred in performing their duties.304 Should an 
unincorporated association not hold the adequate funds to meet the liability, then the individual 
members are personally liable.305 
4.2.5 Sources of Revenue and Gifts 
The viability of an unincorporated association is largely achieved by two methods: through 
membership subscriptions and fees; or through some revenue from public commercial activities, 
such as entertainment or games of chance.306 Members of the unincorporated association, as well 
as members of the public, may provide gifts to the association by donations or by will.307 
Receiving testamentary gifts is problematic for unincorporated associations owing to the lack 
of legal personality. An unincorporated association cannot validly accept a gift by will, as this 
may be a breach of the Rule Against Perpetuities.308 However, the courts are willing to give effect 
to a gift (by inter vivos or by will) where an unincorporated association’s objects are charitable.309 
4.2.6 Rules 
The rules of an association regulate matters such as the purpose or the association, admission and 
expulsion of members, management of the association’s affairs, and property.310 It is not essential 
that an unincorporated association has a written constitution or rules;311 however, the rules of 
                                               
303 Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966; Bradley Egg Farm Ltd v Clifford [1943] 2 All ER 378. 
304 Peckham v Moore [1975] 1 NSWLR 353. 
305 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 39. 
306 An amount prescribed under the association’s rules and constitution. 
307 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 23. 
308 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 22. 
309 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 23–24. 
310 Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1980] 2 All ER 42. 
311 Kibby v Registrar of Titles [1999] 1 VR 861. 
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unincorporated associations are sometimes found to be inadequate;312 for example, failing to 
provide procedures on how to dissolve the association and dispose of property.313 
The rules or constitution of an unincorporated association are a private arrangement between 
members, but is this agreement a legally enforceable contract? Traditionally, under the decision 
of Cameron v Hogan, this private arrangement is held not to be a contractual relationship, but a 
consensual one.314 Therefore, any written rules of the association are for governing the 
association and are not an enforceable contract.315 However, the courts may find the rules of an 
unincorporated association (and incorporated association) to be legally binding where a 
member’s right of a proprietary nature can be enforced, and/or there is an injury to a member’s 
economic interest, such as a restraint of trade.316 
4.2.7 Management Committee and Power 
The rules of an unincorporated association should provide for the management of the 
association’s activities by a committee; however, the members are free to decide on a 
management structure. 317 The association’s rules should detail the management committee’s 
power and duties and allow for the members to challenge decisions that are made outside the 
scope of the association’s objective/s.318 
                                               
312 Ball v Pearsall (1987) 10 NSWLR 700. 
313 See Re Producers’ Defence Fund [1954] VR 246; Abbatt v Treasury Solicitor [1969] 3 All ER 1175; Master 
Grocers’ Association of Victoria v Northern District Grocers Co-Operative Ltd [1983] VR 195. 
314 Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358. 
315 Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358. See also Plenty v Seventh Day Adventist Church of Port Pirie (1986) 40 
SASR 443. 
316 Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358, 370 (Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ); Hawick v Flegg (1958) 74 
WN (NSW) 255. 
317 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 17. 
318 Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1; Clark v University of Melbourne [1978] VR 457. 
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4.3 Incorporated Associations 
4.3.1 Definition 
An incorporated association is one incorporated under either the respective associations 
incorporation act,319 by royal charter, or a special act of parliament.320 The type of association 
eligible for incorporation must: 321 
• be formed for a legal purpose or objective; 
• have at least a certain number of members (as prescribed under the respective 
state and territory legislation);322 and 
• not be for providing financial gain for its members.323 
An incorporated association has the powers of an individual to: enter into contracts; acquire, 
hold, deal with and dispose of property; charge for services and facilities that it may supply; do 
                                               
319 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s2; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 14; Associations 
Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 6; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 3; Associations Incorporation 
Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 1(a); Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 8; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 4; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 8; Association Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s20. 
320 Moreover, incorporation is a process of formal recognition by issuing a certificate of incorporation and a seal. 
State government departments determine the process of incorporation, and their main role is to ensure those 
applying for incorporation meets the legislative criteria and payment of fees. 
321 Not all associations can be incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld). For example, 
section 5 of the Act prohibits: a society registered under the Friendly Societies Act 1991 (Qld); an industrial 
organisation under the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld); school councils or Parents’ and Citizens’ 
Associations created under the Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld); bodies that raise monies by 
subscription and lends that monies to its members; an association by a special Act of Parliament; and an 
association that holds property that its members may divide amongst themselves, dispose of their interest, or 
distribute income or the use of the property amongst its members or member’s nominees. 
322 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 5(1)(a) requires not less than seven members; Associations 
Incorporation 1991 (ACT) s 15(a) and Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, Model 
Rule 7 requires at least five members; Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 6(1)(b) requires five or 
more members; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 5(2)(b)(v) requires at least five members; 
Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 26 requires not less than five members. There are no provisions contained in the 
respective associations’ legislation in the jurisdictions of Tasmania  and South Australia. 
323 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 5. The term ‘financial gain’ is defined by section 4 of the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) to be a gain from trade, charging admission fees to displays, 
exhibitions, contests, sporting fixtures, or other events that promotes its objects, or subscription fees or receiving 
donations. The term ‘financial gain’ is also interchangeable with the term ‘pecuniary gain’. See Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 4; Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 5(1); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 4(4); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 5(a)-(6)(a); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 21(2); Associations Incorporation Refrom Act 2012 (Vic) s 33(1)-(3). Under the 
Northern Territory statute, section 13A(2) prohibits an incorporated association from distribute profits to its 
members; however, this specific provision does not apply to a trading association (which is incorporated under 
the Associations Act 2003 (NT)). 
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other things necessary to be done in carrying out its affairs; and may issue secured and unsecured 
notes, debenture stock for the association.324 
4.3.2 Legal Status 
Incorporating an association creates an artificial legal person that is a body corporate.325 An 
incorporated association becomes, at law, a legal body with a personality, rights and liabilities 
separate from the association’s members.326 An incorporated association has superior legal status 
over an unincorporated association, which has no legal status. An incorporated association is a 
legal entity and, in its own name, has the capacity to sue and to be sued.327 
4.3.3 Membership Entry and Rights 
The rules or constitution of an incorporated association clearly set out: qualifications needed for 
membership; subscription fees; and a member’s rights, privileges and duties.328 Akin to an 
unincorporated association, a member of an incorporated association will not be considered a 
member until payment of a subscription or entrance fee is made pursuant to the association’s 
rules.329 Should a considerable time have lapsed and a person has failed to pay their membership 
fee, then that person is not to be considered a member.330 Once a membership fee or subscription 
                                               
324 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 21, 25; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 22; 
Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 11; Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) ss 8, 9, 19; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 20; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 11; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Vic) s 14; Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) pt 4, dv, s 29; Associations Incorporation 
Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, Model Rule 5 
325 Upon incorporation, the entity will have perpetual succession and a common seal. A.S. Sievers, Associations and 
Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed., 2010) 122. 
326 A.S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 122–
124. 
327 LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 28 (at 3 April 2012) 316 Voluntary Associations, ‘(a) A Name – 
Effect of Incorporation’ [435–85]. 
328 Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 (Qld) reg 7, sch 3 pt 1 regs 3–5; Associations Incorporation Act 
1991 (ACT) sch 1; Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) sch 1; Associations Act 2003 (NT) dv 4 s 21; 
Associations Incorporated Act 1981 (Vic) s 21; Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) ss 48, 49, sch 
1; Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, pt 3;  Incorporated Associations Act 1985 
(SA) 23A; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) sch 1; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 16. 
329 Re New University Club (Duty on Estate) (1887) 18 QBD 720 at 727. See also Associations Incorporation Reform 
Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, Model Rule 12. 
330 Re Sick and Funeral Society of St John’s Sunday School, Golcar [1973] Ch 51. 
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has been paid, the ratification of membership occurs at a general meeting, or at a special meeting 
under the association’s rules.331 
Members may resign from an incorporated association at their will.332 Generally, the 
association’s rules will set out the procedure on how members are to resign.333 Should the rules 
not provide for this procedure then, similar to resigning from an unincorporated association, a 
member must notify the association’s secretary of an intention to resign, either orally or in 
writing.334 Resignation will take effect immediately without the need of the committee’s 
acceptance or a general meeting.335 
4.3.4 Rules 
An association’s rules constitute the terms of the contract between its members and the 
association.336 This section also provides members with the statutory right to apply to the 
Supreme Court for a judicial review of an association’s decision when a member is deprived of a 
right337 conferred by the association’s rules.338 An incorporated association is bound to the rules 
of natural justice when dealing with such matters.339 
                                               
331 Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 (Qld) regs 8–9, sch 4; Associations Incorporation Reform 
Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, Model Rule 11. 
332 LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 28 (at 3 April 2012) 316 Voluntary Associations, ‘(h) Admission 
to Membership’ [435-155]. 
333 A.S. Seivers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 1996) 59. 
334 Finch v Oake [1896] 1 Ch 409. 
335 Finch v Oake [1896] 1 Ch 409. 
336 Verduci v Catanzarita (1981) 53 FLR 156; Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of 
Islamic Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211; Rose v Boxing NSW Inc [2007] NSWSC 20. See also Associations 
Incorporation Refrom Act 2012 (Vic) s 46. 
337 A member’s right under the rules are voting, being eligible to or holding office. Associations Incorporation 
Regulation 1999 (Qld) sch 3, pt 2(2). 
338 The Supreme Court has the power to make orders to have an association’s rules observed, declaring or enforcing 
member’s rights (despite the members having no interest in property), grant relief, or refuse an application and 
order costs. Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 72, 73; Associations Incorporation 1985 (SA) 24(1).  
Within Victoria matters that are to go before the Supreme Court are: a complex question; a matter of general 
importance; or a question of law only dertminative by the Supreme Court.  Therefore all other proceedings are  
before the Magistrates’ Court. Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 220. 
339 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 71(3); Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 50; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 40; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 14B(3); 
Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 39, sch 1; Associations Incorporation Regulation 2010 (NSW) Sch 1; Associations 
Incorporation Regulations 2008 (SA) sch 1; Associations Incorporation Regulations 2009 (Vic) sch 4; 
Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, dv 2 provides a clear procedure and time-
frames for the association to undertaken when the need arises to for an association to undertake disciplinary 
action against a member.  Furthermore, this specific procedure reflects the princples of natural justice.  
Associations Regulations (NT) Sch 1; Associations Incorporation Regulations 1999 (Qld) Pt 3 dv 1. See also 
McClelland v Burning Palms Surf Life Saving Club [2002] NSWSC 470. 
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Model rules for an incorporated association are annexed to the legislation and can usually be 
found in its regulations.340 These model rules have been drafted to provide a structure for an 
association to manage its affairs, appoint a committee, decide membership rights and entry 
requirement, and decide when to meet legislative requirements, such as financial reporting.341 The 
model rules are to be adopted by the association, or altered to suite its needs.342 
4.3.5 Source of Revenue 
Like any other entity, an incorporated association must remain viable to meet its purpose and to 
deliver its services. Similar to unincorporated associations, many incorporated ones rely on the 
same sources of revenue, as well as membership subscriptions and fees.343 However, unlike an 
unincorporated association, an incorporated one is subject to a minimal standard of financial 
accountability.344 
This financial accountability leads to incorporated associations qualifying for government 
grants. Furthermore, being an incorporated association sees the willingness of governments to 
provide financial support over and above an unincorporated association. Many associations give 
the impression they are a highly commercial entity and that they trade for the benefit for the 
                                               
340 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 60 and see sch 4 in the Associations Incorporation Regulations 1999 
(Qld) for a copy of these model rules. 
341 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 48; Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 23; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 22; Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) ss 103, 104;  Associations 
Incorporation 1964 (Tas) s 18; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 30, 33; Associations Act 2003 
(NT) s 23. See also Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, pt 5, dv 1. 
342 When associations decide to amend their rules, it must be done by special resolution and, within three (3) months 
of the special resolution, the associations must apply to the respective state department for approval. The chief 
executive may either grant or refuse the application for an association to amend the model rules. Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 48(2A), (5); Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 18(4); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 19. In the Northern Territory and Victoria, any amendments to an association’s 
rules are to be passed by its members by a special resolution. Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 21(1)(g); Associaitons 
Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 49(4)(b). For Victorian, New South Wales and South Australian 
associations their amended rules will take effect when the Commissioner or the Director-General approves the 
new rules. Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 22(4); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) 
s 50(2);  Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) ss 12,14; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 
24(2). 
343 Members from time to time at an Annual General Meeting will determine an amount prescribed under the 
association’s rules or constitution. Associations Incorporation Regulations 1999 (Qld) sch 4, s 8. 
344 Associations Incorporation Regulations 1999 (Qld) regs 9-12, 46, sch 4; Associations Incorporation Act 2009 
(NSW) ss 42, 46, 50(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 25, 26; Associations Incorporation Act 
1985 (SA) ss 35; Associations Incorporation Regulations 2008 (SA) r 4; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Vic) ss 41,32,43, 47; Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) pt 7; Associations Incorporation 
Regulations 2010 (Vic) regs 10, 11, Sch 4; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 71,72,73,74,79; 
Associations Incorporation Regulations 1991 (ACT) regs 12–13; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 
24, 24B. Some jurisdictions have created tiered financial reporting obligations. Appendix 1 outlines the tiered 
financial reporting obligations and thresholds for associations. 
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association’s business rather than its members. If a profit has been made incidental to the 
association’s activities, the profit must be applied exclusively to achieving the association’s 
objects and the lawful purpose of the association.345 
4.3.6 Liability 
Members of an incorporated association have limited liability, which equates to a member’s 
liability being restricted to the amount of the annual membership fee.346 Limited liability also 
extends to committee members and other members.347 
The application of limited liability is two-fold. First, members are not liable to contribute 
payment towards the association’s debts if it is wound up or insolvent. Secondly, if the 
association has been unsuccessful in litigation, then members are only liable to the amount that 
they have paid in subscription or membership fees.348 Furthermore, a member of an incorporated 
association may be afforded statutory protection.349 
The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) (the CLA) states that a volunteer undertaking community 
work is protected from any civil liability.350 It goes on to state that the association or an office-
holder of the association must coordinate this work in good faith.351 The CLA does not offer 
protection where a volunteer has acted outside the association’s instructions or not in good faith – 
therefore, it is likely that a court would find the individual personally liable.352 
                                               
345 Geoffrey Egert, ‘Legal Capacity of Incorporated Associations and the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld)’ 
(2001) 8 James Cook University Law Review 41. 
346 A. S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 123. 
347 A. S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 123. 
348 Wise v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1903] AC 139. 
349 Volunteer immunity provisions are also found in other state and territory legislation similar to the CLA. However, 
this thesis only analyses the CLA. See Civil Liability (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 8; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW) s 61; Personal Injuries (Liability and Damages) Act 2002 (NT) s 7(1); Volunteers Protection Act 2001 
(SA) s 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 47; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 37; Volunteers (Protection from Liability) 
Act 2002 (WA) s 6(1). Furthermore, the association legislation in Victoria, Western Australia, New South Wales 
and the Northern Territory provides committee members with protection from civil liability.  Associations 
Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 87; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 39D; Associations 
Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 103; Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 82(2). 
350 The CLA does not specify what is meant by ‘any civil liability’ and, therefore, this phrase may refer to any 
actions in torts and contracts brought against the association. Barbara McDonald, ‘Indemnities and the Civil 
Liability Legislation’ (2011) 27(1–2) Journal of Contract Law 58. Furthermore, ‘community work’ is to mean 
work done for a charitable, benevolent, philanthropic, sporting, political, educational, recreational or cultural 
purposes, and is not done for private financial gain. Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 38(c). 
351 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 39. 
352 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 42. 
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However, there are further restrictions to a volunteer’s immunity under the CLA. Volunteers 
will only benefit from the CLA if their community work is undertaken within a community 
organisation as defined by the CLA:353 a corporation; a trustee (or acting in the capacity of 
trustee); a political party;354 a public authority;355 a parent and citizens’ association;356 or any 
entity prescribed under its regulation.357 The entities prescribed in Schedule 2 of the Civil 
Liability Regulation 2003 (Qld) are those that perform duties and services to enhance public 
safety to a person in distress (that is rendering first aid, other aid, or assistance).358 The 
application of these provisions excludes a sizable proportion of the not-for-sector, and volunteers 
that carry on activities outside the prescribed ones in the CLA and its regulations. The 
construction of these provisions offers little incentive to individuals and to organisations to 
undertake community work.359 
4.3.7 Management Committee 
The model rules of an incorporated association provide for the composition of the association’s 
management committee. Figure 3 illustrates a general and common structure of a management 
committee found within an incorporated association.360 
All officer holders of the management committee are appointed or elected to their respective 
positions. How individuals are elected is  provided by the rules of the association.361 Once an 
individual has been elected, there are legislative requirements for a management committee 
                                               
353Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 26. 
354 A political party must be registered and defined under the Electoral Act 1992 (Cth) or the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 (Cth). Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 38(1)(d). 
355 A public or other authority means the Crown, a local government, or any public authority constituted under 
section 24 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). 
356 A parent and citizens’ association must be formed under the Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld); 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 38(1)(f). 
357 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 38(1)(a)–(g). 
358 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 27. A person in distress includes one who is injured or at risk of injury, and a one 
who is suffering, or apparently suffering, from an illness: Section 25 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). See schedule 
2 of Civil Liability Regulation 2003 (Qld) for a list of prescribed entities that are afforded liability protection. 
Some entities listed are: Brisbane City Council; Queensland Ambulance Service; and Royal Lifesaving 
Queensland Incorporated. 
359 Norman Katter, ‘Civil Liability Reform and the Not-for-Profit Sector Australia’ (2005) 11(2) Third Sector Review 
137 <http://eprints.qut.edu.au/5212/2/5212.pdf>. 
360 The Model Rules details the composition of a management committee for a Victorian incorporated association. 
See Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, dv 2. 
361 Styles v Ku-ring-gai Historical Society [2003] NSWSC 926. 
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structure to be in place to control the association’s business and operation.362 However, a person 
can be excluded from being elected or be required to vacate any position/s on the management 
committee if that person has been convicted of certain offenses.363 
The management committee of an incorporated association must have the position of a public 
officer. A public officer is a natural person364 who must reside in the jurisdiction the association is 
incorporated, and the public officer must fulfil its duties on behalf of the association.365 These 
duties are primarily to ensure that the incorporated association meets its legislative 
responsibilities and, to a lesser extent, be a point of contact between the association and the 
respective government department.366 
                                               
362 Re Vassallo [2001] 1 Qd R 91. 
363 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 61A; Associations Act 2003 (NT) ss 30, 40; Associations 
Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 35; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 63; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 30; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 27; Associations Incorporation 
Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 78(2)(c); Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 14(5). Reasons for being excluded 
from holding a position on a management committee are different in each jurisdiction. Appendix 2 provides an 
overview of these exclusions in each jurisdiction. 
364 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 8, 65, 66(1), 69A; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) 
ss 57,58,59; Associations Act 2003 (NT) ss 27, 28; Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 34; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 56; Associations Incorporation Act (Tas) ss  14,15.. In Queensland, 
New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania, a public officer must be over the age of 18. Under the 
respective provisions of the Northern Territory, New South Wales and Tasmania, a public officer must be a 
resident within those jurisdictions. However, in Queensland, a public officer is the also the association’s secretary 
and must reside within 65 kilometres of the Queensland boarder. Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 
69(2)(e). The Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) has removed the requirement for an assocaiton 
to have a public officer.  However, if an association is operating under the old rules then a public officer is now 
the secretary of the association. Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) sch 4, cl 9.   
365 LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 28 (at 3 April 2012) 316 Voluntary Associations, ‘(a) Structure – 
Public Officer’ [435-175]. 
366 The public officer of an incorporated association is responsible to ensure that the association complies with its 
responsibilities under the legislation, such as lodging financial returns and transferring the association’s property. 
Associations Incorporated Act 1981 (Qld) ss 21, 24, 52, 59 (4), 70 (2); Associations Incorporation Act 2009 
(NSW) ss 21, 45, 49; Associations Act 2003 (NT) ss 22(1), 23(4), 54(7); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 
(SA) s 24(3)(b); Associations Incorporation Act (Tas) ss 10, 13, 15, 18, 23; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Vic) ss 8, 9,13, 22, 30; Associations Incorporation Regulations 2009 (Vic) pt 2; Associations Incorporation 
Refrom Regulations 2012 (Vic) reg 47. 
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Figure 3 – Composition of a management committee 
 
4.4 Company Limited by Guarantee 
4.4.1 Definition 
Associations may become registered as a company limited by guarantee under the Corporations 
Act.367 A company limited by guarantee is defined as a company that is formed on the principle of 
having members whose liabilities are restricted to the respective amount that the members 
undertake (or guarantee) to contribute to the property of the company in the event it is wound 
up.368 Moreover, this type of entity does not have the capacity or the power to issue shares.369 
A company limited by guarantee that pursues charitable purposes can omit ‘Limited’ from its 
name.370 The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that a company limited by guarantee must 
apply its income to promoting its charitable objects,371 and prohibits distribution of this income to 
its members.372 
                                               
367 2001(Cth). 
368 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9. 
369 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 124. 
370 The admission of the word ‘Limited’ is by permission of the Australia Securities and Investments Commission 
(‘ASIC’). Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 150. 
371 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 150(1)(a). 
372 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 254SA. 
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4.4.2 Liability 
Similar to a member of an incorporated association, a member’s liability in a company limited by 
guarantee is restricted to the amount of the member’s guarantee.373 This means a member will not 
pay more than the undertaken amount when the company is being wound up.374 Furthermore, as 
discussed in Part 4.3.6, a corporation is an entity covered by the CLA and, therefore, a member of 
a company limited by guarantee is afforded the protection of the CLA. However, a company 
director is not afforded this protection under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
An officer and a company director may have a civil and criminal liability under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).375 Where directors have contravened their general duties under part 
24D, a court may make a civil penalty under Part 9.4 the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Further, 
where directors have breached a duty of solvency, they will be liable to pay compensation to the 
company376 or creditors.377 The court has the power to relieve a director from liability of a civil 
penalty provision by having regard to all the circumstances and where a person acted honestly.378 
Moreover, a director may face criminal liability in relation to contravening the following 
obligations: 
• failure to exercise their duties in good faith in a manner that is reckless or with 
intentional dishonesty;379 
• abuse their position and information in a dishonest manner;380 and 
• failure to cease trading when the company was insolvent.381 
4.4.3 Legal Status 
Once a company is registered under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the company will then 
come into existence.382 The company is a body corporate, which is an incorporated legal entity 
                                               
373 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9. 
374 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 517,518. 
375 Chapter five of this thesis provides an analysis of a company director’s duties. 
376 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317H. 
377 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G(2). 
378 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317S(7). 
379 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 184(1). 
380 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 184(2)–(3). 
381 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G(3). 
382 Registration will take place with ASIC. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 119. 
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with perpetual succession recognised in law.383 Therefore, like an incorporated association, a 
company limited by guarantee has the power to enforce rights by suing or being sued by others, 
incur liabilities, and acquire property in the entity’s name.384 
4.4.4 Membership Entry and Rights 
The company will admit members upon those persons satisfying the conditions for membership, 
which are set out in the company’s constitution.385 The relationship between the members and the 
company is based on the contract in the constitution.386 Furthermore, individuals must be 
prepared to become members of the company and have their names entered onto the register of 
members.387 Unlike an incorporated association legislation that stipulates a minimum number of 
members, this requirement is more relaxed for a company limited by guarantee, which requires 
only one member.388 
4.4.5 Rules 
Generally, a company’s constitution outlines the rules on matters such as the conduct of the 
directors and shareholders, meetings, power of directors, and director’s remuneration.389 Under 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), these rules govern the company’s internal administration and 
management and are referred to as ‘replaceable rules’.390 A company may replace or modify any 
or all of the replaceable rules.391 Many of the replaceable rules, such as those dealing with 
shareholders, are not applicable to a company limited by guarantee. Therefore, it would be 
appropriate for the internal management of a company limited by guarantee to be governed by its 
a constitution and some of the replaceable rules.392 
                                               
383 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 57A. 
384 Lipton, Herzberg and Welsh, Understanding Company Law (Thomas Reuters, 16th ed, 2012) 23. 
385 Harold Ford, Robert Austin and Ian Ramsay,  Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (Butterworths, 11th ed, 
2013) 1021. 
386 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 140(1). 
387 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 231(b). 
388 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 114. 
389 Lipton, Herzberg and Welsh, Understanding Company Law (Thomas Reuters, 16th ed, 2012) 87. 
390 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 141. 
391 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 135(2). 
392 Lipton, Herzberg and Welsh, Understanding Company Law (Thomas Reuters, 16th ed, 2012) 85. 
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4.4.6 Source of Revenue 
A company limited by guarantee is prohibited from raising funds through activities that would 
require disclosure to investors, such as offering shares or debentures.393 This leaves a company 
limited by guarantee to undertake traditional revenue-making sources, such as donations, 
subscriptions, social activities, and government service delivery contracts.394 
4.4.7 Management Committee 
A company limited by guarantee is registered as a public company and, at the very least, it must 
have three directors and one secretary.395 
4.5 Conclusion 
There are a variety of forms that a not-for-profit organisation may choose to pursue altruistic 
missions and values, and the law treats each form differently. Regardless of the form, a not-for-
profit organisation functions on the collective action of its members and/or volunteers. The 
collective action of its members is the most appealing feature of a not-for-profit organisation, and 
members serve their organisation in accordance with its rules and legislative provisions that 
support the achievement of the organisation’s objectives. Furthermore, the law offers volunteers 
some immunity from liability through the CLA. 
                                               
393 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 113(3). 
394 Chapter Eight of this thesis analyses the role of not-for-profit organisations have in delivery services through 
government contracts. 
395 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Registering not-for-profit or charitable organisations 
<http:www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/Registering+not-for-profit+or+charitable+organisations>. 
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CHAPTER 5: Legal Duties as Part of 
the Governance Framework 
 
We do not have to be a Gandhi, or a Martin Luther King Jr., or a Nelson 
Mandela, or a Desmond Tutu, to recognise that we can have aims or priorities 
that differ from the single-minded pursuit of our own well-being.396 
5.0 Introduction 
All forms of not-for-profit organisations are not immune from collapse due to mismanagement.397 
In spite of an altruistic mission at its core, when a not-for-profit organisation does collapse, 
questions are inevitably raised regarding the degree of regulation these organisations can rely on 
in their management structure. In the push for improved regulation and greater governance, there 
is the misconception that officers of a management committee of an incorporated association find 
themselves in the same position as company directors.398 While this is true of officers of a 
company limited by guarantee it is not true otherwise. 
Reliance on, and attraction to, this misconception is largely due to the slim body of case law 
and legislation for incorporated associations, which inadequately clarifies legal duties for its 
management committee.399 This chapter briefly examines the functions of a management 
                                               
396 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Allen Lane, 2009) 18. 
397 For example, Zoe’s Place was placed into voluntary administration and was placed under investigation by the 
Health Quality and Complaints Commission for serious allegations relating to complaints of malpractice. Sophie 
Elsworth, ‘Zoe’s Place in Queensland may Close’, The Australian (online), 18 June 2009  
< http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/zoes-place-in-queensland-may-close/story-0-1225737048892>. See also 
Kim Weinert, ‘Is there a Perfect Environment to Allow a Villain and a Villainess to Thrive?’ in Rachel Franks 
and Susan Meindl (eds), The Real and the Reflected: Heroes and Villains in Existent and Imagined Worlds (Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2012) 49. 
398 Keith Fletcher, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand (Law Book Company, 
1986) 289; Andrew Twaits, ‘The Duties of Officers and Employees in Non-Profit Organisations’ (1998) 10(2) 
Bond Law Review 313; A. S. Sievers, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand (Federation 
Press, 2nd ed, 1996) 21. 
399 There are two obvious reasons why there is a lack of judicial authority for incorporated associations. First, in the 
event a member of a Queensland incorporated association has a grievance regarding the misgivings of the 
management committee, all complaints must be settled by the Supreme Court. Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Qld) s 71(2). Supreme Court actions would be out of reach for an ordinary member (particularly for 
members of a level 1 and level 2 associations) due to high litigation costs and the risks in pursuing litigation, and 
the highly legalistic nature of making an application in this jurisdiction. Moreover, the Supreme Court has the 
discretionary power to dismiss applications if the court believes the matter is trivial. Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Qld) s 73(2)(a); See Re Maggacis [1994] 1 Qd R 59. Furthermore, Queensland’s governing executive 
department (Office of Fair Trading) has no statutory authority to receive, investigate, or settle any complaints or 
disputes relating to the management of an incorporated association. The only powers the executive has over 
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committee as compared to a board of directors, and asserts that a need exists to regulate a 
committee member’s conduct through legal duties. 
Furthermore, Chapter Five compares each of the statutory legal duties of both a corporation 
and an incorporated association, illustrating the differences in the legal duties of a committee 
member as compared to a company director and how the law considers them differently.400 
Precision can be seen to be lacking in  both the common law and the statute law’s approach to 
prescribing legal duties for a committee member. Consequently, to fill this gap, attention is 
turned to equity and the question of whether or not fiduciary principles can provide clarity. 
Australia’s development of fiduciary law in this area has stagnated with the courts expressing 
a reluctance to expand the established categories of fiduciary relationships and, also, to find for a 
breach of these duties within these established fiduciary categories. The application of this law to 
unincorporated and incorporated associations is largely unknown and previously unexamined. 
Chapter Five considers whether committee members of an unincorporated and an incorporated 
association are, in fact, fiduciaries through the established relationship of principal and agent and, 
therefore, subject to fiduciary duties. 
5.1 The Respective Functions of a Board of Directors and a Management 
Committee 
Similarities between the roles of a director and an officer of a management committee can be 
evidenced in that each operate as a collective group of individuals elected or appointed to their 
respective positions. The incorporated association legislation provides that the function of the 
management committee is to control and manage the association’s operation and business; 
collectively, the committee has control of the association’s property.401 However, little is really 
known about how a management committee carries out these legislative functions. With no direct 
                                                                                                                                                        
incorporated association relates to the administration of an incorporated association. Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Qld) pt 6, div 2; Associations Incorporation Regulations 1999 (Qld) reg 14 and pt 5 div 3. 
400 The Australian Charties and Not-for-Profit Commission (Consequantial and Transational) Act 2012 (Cth) turns 
off the statutory duties of care and diligence, good faith and not to misuse positon or information under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for directors of a company limited by guarantee.  Therefore, it is prudent to note 
that this Chapter is concerned with the legal duites of a director within a for-profit entity.   
401 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 60; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 21 and Model Rule 
23; Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 21; Associations Regulations 2004 (Model Constitution) (NT) 
pt 4; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) sch 1 r 4 (Vic); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 29; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 20; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 60. Furthermore, 
an association’s property also includes the association’s funds as well as real property. 
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prescription (either by convention or legislation) on how to achieve these functions and manage 
an association, a management committee has the freedom and the autonomy on how best to 
manage its association. There is, of course, an expectation that a management committee will 
guide the management of the association in accordance with the association’s altruistic mission – 
that is, with integrity, and in a manner free from self-interest and, moreover, impropriety 
The pursuit of profit maximisation for companies provides a more definitive set of functions 
of a board of directors: 
• appointing and rewarding a chief executive officer; 
• setting business goals; 
• formulating strategies; 
• approving business plans (which includes setting annual budgets, make key 
management decisions such as, major capital expenditure, restructuring and 
refinancing and business acquisitions); 
• monitoring the performance and results of the business and management; 
• establishing and review shareholders policies (where relevant); and 
• examining conformance strategies.402 
These tasks, both specific and numerous, clearly dictate that a board of director’s function is to 
achieve and maintain a company’s fiscal capabilities. Accordingly, the economic nature of a 
company’s activities is justification for regulation, and for a company director to be accountable. 
However, the traditional view is that incorporated associations pursue non-economic activities, 
and that the trustworthiness of an incorporated association means the need for regulation is not 
warranted. Without regulation, or a clear set of obligations compelling an officer to undertake the 
proper administration of a not-for-profit organisation, dishonest committee members are free to 
use the incorporated association’s property and resources for private interests and gain.403 
                                               
402 Horald Ford, Robert Austin and Ian Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (Butterworths, 15th ed., 
2013) 225-226. 
403 Kim Weinert, ‘Is There a Perfect Environment for a Villain and Villainess to Survive?’ in Rachel Franks and 
Susan E. Meindi (eds), The Real and Reflected: Heroes and Villains in Existent and Imagined Worlds (Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2012). 
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5.2 Regulation and Accountability of Committee Members 
There are overwhelming social and economic reasons to justify the regulation of not-for-profit 
organisations. While theoretically both an incorporated association and a company are 
accountable to their members, a company achieves this better than an incorporated association. 
Corporation law promotes a culture of transparency and accountability through the concept of 
governance. Basic governance within a corporation provides a framework to protect an 
organisation’s resources, and to effectively manage and control risk.404 The governance 
framework for a company is set by the law and reinforced by regulatory bodies.405 The 
requirements compel a company to maintain robust internal processes and have systems in place, 
such as accurate financial reporting, and timely disclosure of material interests.406 At the centre of 
the governance framework is the board of directors and, specially, attention is on the director’s 
behaviour in governing the organisation. In undertaking their roles, directors must follow specific 
legal duties and obligations, which is an important mechanism of organisational governance.407 
Conversely, the law relating to incorporated associations does very little to encourage a 
management committee to achieve transparency, accountability, governance, or to protect an 
association’s property. 
5.3 The Regulatory Framework 
5.3.1 Statutory Duties 
For management committees of an incorporated organisation the duties are set out in the state 
legilslation.  Directors of a company limited by guarantee are subject to the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth). The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides statutory duties extending to: each 
director; company secretary; any other person who makes or participates in decision-making that 
affects the whole or a substantial part of the company; and anyone else who has the capacity to 
                                               
404 Adrian Cadbury, Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
220. 
405 Alan Calder, Corporate Governance: A Practical Guide to the Legal Frameworks and International Codes of 
Practice (Kogan Page, 2008) 1. 
406 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
407 Ian Ramsay, Corporate Governance and the Duties of Company Directors, Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation, Faculty of Law (University of Melbourne, 1997) 10. 
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significantly affect the company’s financial standing.408 The incorporated associations’ legislation 
does not have a similar statutory provision; however, any statutory duties prescribed under the 
associations legislation are read to apply only to members of a management committee.409 There 
are numerous inconsistences between the statutory duties of a company director and an officer of 
a management committee, and each duty will be individually examined. 
5.3.2 Duty of Care and Diligence  
Section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that directors must discharge their 
duties and use their powers with a degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would 
exercise if they were in the position and in those same circumstances. A similar, clearly 
expressed provision in the legislation for incorporated associations can  be found in Victoria and 
South Australia, where this provision states that an officer of a management committee must act 
at all times with reasonable care and diligence when exercising their powers and in discharging 
their duties of their office.410 The wording of this provision is similar to the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth); however section 39A(4) of the South Asutralian Act and the new Victorian 
legislation does not go as far as section 180(1) because they omit the key phrases: ‘in a like 
position’; and ‘in the corporation’s circumstances’. The exclusion of these  means this provision 
does not import any standard of care and diligence (whether objective or subjective) on an officer 
of a management committee. 
The cases tend not to distinguish clearly between duties of care, diligence and skill.  The duty of 
diligence first appeared in the case of the Charitable Corporation v Sutton (1742) 2 Atk 400 
(citing Coggs v Bernard 1 Salk 26; 91 ER 25) and aspects of this case have been referred to in 
modern cases.  Although it can be argued that the duty of diligence is a sub-set of care, due to the 
loose usage in the cases it is worth considering it separately. 
                                               
408 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1). Section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) defines the term ‘director’ to 
also include de facto and shadow directors. 
409 See Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) pt 4, dv 1; Associations Incorporation Act 1995 (SA) pt 4, dv 1; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) pt v; Associations Incorporation Act 1997 (WA) pt v; Associations 
Act 2003 (NT) pt 4, dv 1; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) pt 4. 
410 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39A; Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 84; 
Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, Model Rule 45(3) 
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5.3.3 The Duty of Skill 
The elements of skill and a standard of skill are not specified in either section 39A(4) of 
Associations Incorporation Act 1995 (SA) or section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
However, over time, the courts have inferred that directors are subject to an objective standard 
that obliges directors to: 
• reasonably understand the company’s affairs insofar that a director is capable of 
reaching an informed opinion of the company’s financial position;411 
• be capable to keep abreast of the company’s affairs;412 and 
• to keep sufficient abreast of the company’s affairs to act appropriately in the event the 
company is unable to pay its debts in due course, and the director is to reasonably 
expect the company cannot pay its debt.413 
The payment of debts is addressed by three states in their respective association’s legislation: 
New South Wales, Northern Territory, and South Australia. These provisions refer to a member 
of the management committee, or a person who took part in the management of the association, 
who at the time of, or immediately before, incurring a debt had reasonable grounds to accept that 
the association would be capable of paying the incurred debt when it became due.414 Furthermore, 
the states’ legislation provides a statutory defence if an officer can prove the debt was incurred 
outside of their consent and authority.415 Additionally, officers will not be liable if, at the time the 
debt was incurred, they had reasonable cause to accept that the association could not pay all its 
debts when they became due.416 These provisions imply that a committee member must have 
knowledge and a basic understanding of the association’s finances. Company directors are 
required to possess a level of skill to be able to understand the company’s affairs and its financial 
statements.417 
                                               
411 Statewide Tobacco Services v Morley (1990) 2 ACSR 405. 
412 Re Australasian Venzolana Pty Ltd (1962) 4 FLR 60. 
413 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 115. 
414 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 68; Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 90; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1985 (SA) s 9AD. 
415 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 68(3); Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 90(2); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 49AD(2). 
416 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 68(3); Associations Act 2003 (NT) 90(2); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 49AD(2). 
417 Harold Ford, Robert Austin and Ian Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (Butterworths, 15th ed, 2013) 
501. 
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5.3.4 Duty of Solvency 
Under the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), a company director has a duty to 
prevent insolvent trading.418 New South Wales and the Northern Territory also place a positive 
duty to prevent insolvency upon committee members, similar to that of company directors. 
Furthermore, the legislation of these states has defence and penalty provisions that reflect 
sections 588H (defence) and 588J (penalty and recovery of the debt) of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth). 
While these respective provisions for the prevention of insolvency employ different terms, there 
is a defence available for a director and a committee member if both are able to prove that they 
had reasonable grounds, or a reasonable presumption, to expect the association or company could 
meet its debts at a time, or shortly after, the debt was incurred.419 Looking specifically at the key 
term ‘reasonable grounds to expect’, which is contained in both pieces of legislation, it implies 
that there was a possibility that the debt could be paid. 420 Therefore, there must have reasonable 
grounds of being confident that the company is solvent.421 Further, committee members in New 
South Wales and the Northern Territory could successfully argue that an officer of a management 
committee had reasonable grounds to expect the association was solvent. 
5.3.5 Duty of Diligence 
For a company director, ‘their duty of care is their obligation to exercise reasonable prudence.’422 
A director in exercising this duty must not be seen to be passive in attending board meetings.423 
The common law expects company directors to attend all meetings unless there are exceptional 
circumstances that prevent them from attending.424 However, for a committee member of an 
incorporated association, the requirement to attend meetings is less stringent than that of a 
corporation, and is largely subject to association’s Model Rules. Queensland’s Model Rules set 
                                               
418 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G. 
419 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588H(2); Associations Incorporation 2009 (NSW) s 68(3); Associations Act 2003 
(NT) s 90(2). 
420 Tourprint International Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bott (1999) 17 ACLC 1543. 
421 Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ASCR 699. 
422 Re Property Force Consultants Pty Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 1501, 1061. 
423 Vrisakis v ASIC (1993) 9 WAR 395. 
424 Vrisakis v ASIC (1993) 9 WAR 395. 
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out the required number of members, and who from the management committee must be present, 
to conduct meetings425 – but these Rules places no specific obligation on individual members as 
to their rate of attendance. Conversely, the chair of meetings must be the association’s president 
of the association, which gives the implication that there is a higher requirement on the president 
to attend meetings more than other committee members.426 Furthermore, McPherson J in Ward v 
Eltherington held that an officer could not avoid liability by being absent from all committee 
meetings.427  
Additionally, a director’s inattention at board meetings is a cause for concern.428 The concept 
of attendance, as it applies to a company director, has been stated as taking the reasonable steps 
to guide and monitor the company with attention to:429 
1. acquire a rudimentary understanding of the company’s business; 
2. be informed about the company’s activities; 
3. generally monitor the company’s affairs and policies; and 
4. be familiar with the financial status of the company by undertaking regular review of the 
company’s financial statements.430 
For incorporated associations, there are no guiding principles or statutory provisions appliciable 
to committee members on the obligation of being attentive at meetings. As the statutory power 
and responsiblity is given to committee members to manage an association, there is a reasonable 
expectation that a committee member would be conscientious of the association’s activities, 
policies, affairs and its financial standing. 
                                               
425 Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 (Qld) pt 3, div 1, Model Rule 23(5). Queensland’s Model Rules 
require that for a management committee to be held, more than 50 per cent of elected members to the committee 
must be present. Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 (Qld) pt 3, div 1, Model Rule 24. 
426 Associations Incorporation Regulation 1964 (Tas) Model Rule 15; Associations Incorporation Regulation 1984 
(NSW) Model Rule 8; Associations (Model Constitution) Regulations 2005 (NT) model rule 35; Associations 
Incorporation Regulations 1998 (Vic) Model Rule 14; Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 (Qld) reg 
23(9) and Model Rule 14. Associations can determine their own committee meeting procedure and the numbers 
for a quorum. These provisions also provide for the incorporated association to have alternatives for a chair 
should the president be unable to attend. Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 23A(1)(c)(v); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 16, sch 1; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) sch 1. 
427 [1982] Qd R 561. 
428 Ashurst v Mason (1875) LR 20 Eq 225. 
429 Daniels t/as Deloitte Haskins Sells v AWA Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 438. 
430 Francis v United Jersey Bank (1981) 432A 2d 414; Daniel t/as Deloitte Haskins Sells v QWA Ltd (1995) ACRS, 
666-667. 
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5.3.6 Reliance and Delegation 
Both a company director and a committee member could find themselves in circumstances where 
they need to rely on advice (expert or otherwise) and delegate roles to others within the 
corporation or association. The management committee has the legislative ability to delegate any 
or all of their functions and powers to a subcommittee of the association.431 A company’s board 
of directors also have the statutory authority to delegate their powers.432 Excluding the Northern 
Territory, the delegation power for an incorporated association is largely confined to sub-
committees, whereas directors can delegate their own powers to other directors, employees, or to 
any other persons. 
The associations’ legislation does not specify whether a management committee is ultimately 
responsible for the actions of the delegate, whereas the Commonwealth statute provides that a 
director who delegated power is responsible for the delegate.433 It is unclear whether such a 
responsibility falls onto the management committee and/or the individual. The issue of whether 
or not the rules of agency are applicable in this instance will be discussed further in this chapter. 
Boards of directors have the power to rely on and seek advice from certain people.434 
Information and professional advice is often sought and relied on by directors, and they would 
have reasonable grounds for having confidence in the following people: 
• An employee of the corporation – grounds for confidence: the information given is 
reliable and competent in relation to matters concerned; or 
• A professional advisor or expert – grounds for confidence: the information given is 
regarded to be within the person’s professional or expert competence; or 
                                               
431 Associations (Model Constitution) Regulations 2004 (NT) reg 25; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 28; 
Associations Incorporation Regulation 2010 (NSW) sch 1, Model Rule 21; Associations Incorporation 
Regulation 1999 (Qld) reg 27; Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, Model Rule 43. 
South Australia, Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have no express provisions that allows 
for the management committee to delegate powers to a sub-committee. Alternatively, a management committee 
maybe capable of creating and delegating to a sub-committee as the legislation in these jurisdictions provides for 
the ability of the association to alter the constitution or rules, and this would see the creation of sub-committees. 
The altered rules may go so far as to state the sub-committee’s purpose, responsibility and powers. 
432 Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) s 198D. 
433 Directors will not be liable if they believed, on reasonable grounds, that the delegate would exercise their power, 
which is in line with the duties of the company’s directors, as required by law, the company’s constitution, and in 
good faith – providing the director made proper inquiry that the delegate was reliable and competent. Law 
Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) s 190 (1)-(2). 
434 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 189. 
  80 
• Another director or officer – grounds for confidence: matters that are within the 
director’s or officer’s authority; or 
• A committee of directors – grounds for confidence: matters within the committee’s 
authority, and on which the director did not serve in relation to such matters.435 
To determine whether or not a director or an offoicer holder within a Victorian incorporated 
association has performed a duty of care and diligence under the general law and statute, it must 
be shown that the director’s reliance was in good faith.436 For a director’s reliance to be 
reasonable, a director should: make an independent assessment of the information or advice; have 
their own knowledge of the corporation’s operation; have knowledge of the company’s and the 
corporation’s complex structure;437 and, that their reliance on the information or advice can be 
said to be reasonable.438 
Section 189 provides a safe harbour for directors to rely on the information or advice from 
others without verification.439 This presumption is rebuttable if a director knew, or by the exercise 
of their ordinary care should have known, that any facts or issues would not be reasonable.440 The 
general law will also look at the transaction’s risk and its nature, and the steps taken by the 
director as to the reasonableness of the reliance.441 
The legislative requirement for directors to undertake an independent assessment of the 
information or advice requires directors to do more than listen. They must assess the information 
or advice provided, and employ their skill and judgment.442 The criticism aimed at this legislative 
requirement is that it encourages directors to act alone instead of working as a collective, which is 
how a board should operate.443 
 Section 588H and the Victorian Act provide a defence for directors and Victorian office 
holders within an incorporated association if they can prove that they relied on information about 
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the company’s affairs provided to them from a competent person.444 However, directors cannot 
rely upon this defence if they have failed in their duty to prevent the company’s insolvent trading, 
or by inadequately performing their general law and statutory duties.445 A director’s failings 
would be a lack of participation in the company’s affairs,446 or the unreasonable reliance on other 
directors to look after the affairs of the company. 447 Should a director not give the sufficient 
information to a person needing to perform the task that that director wishes to rely upon, then a 
section 588H defence would not be available.448 
The statutory reliance for committee members of incorporated associations is only  available 
in South Australia and in Victoria. Section 39AB449 is almost an exact reflection of section 189 of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the only point of difference being that a South Australian 
association may rely on a sub-committee of association’s members, whereas a company a 
director and an officer holder within a Victorian incorporated association can rely on information 
or advice from others, such as an expert, an employee, and other directors.450 The provisions on 
reliance for associations in South Australia and Victoria are straightforward, but for all the other 
Australian jurisdictions there is statutory silence. 
Despite this silence, it is arguably open to a management committee, in those jurisdictions 
without reliance provisions, to search out and rely on information and professional/expert advice 
to assist them in the proper administration of the association – and, moreover, to protect the 
association’s property. 
5.3.7 The Duty of Acting in Good Faith, in the Best Interest and for Proper Purpose 
This all-encompassing statutory duty focuses on different elements of ‘acting in good faith, in the 
interest of the company for proper purpose’. Section 181 and section 85 of the Associations 
Incorporation Refrom Act 2012 (Vic) requires that directors and other officers must exercise their 
powers and discharge their duties in good faith, in the best interest of the corporation and the 
                                               
444 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 86(2)(a)(i)-(iv). 
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association, and for a proper purpose.451 The duties to act in good faith and in the interest of the 
company are viewed as a fundamental civil obligation for a director.452 How the courts test a 
contravention of this section is by objective standards based on what a comparable person, with 
the same knowledge and skills as the director, would have done in the same circumstances.453 The 
rules regarding best interest and proper purpose are discussed in detail below. 
5.3.7.1 Best Interest 
The best interest of the company may be defined by the company’s constitution, which 
would affect a director’s duties,454 and is generally linked to the best interests of the 
shareholders as a general body.455 In circumstances where different classes of shareholders 
have diverging interests, a director must act fairly between the different classes.456 These 
classes of shareholders under the corporation’s constitution allow the board to take into 
account the interests of one group over another member group or, creditor.457 For an 
incorporated association, the management committee could be required to advance its 
objective that it is non-commercial. 
Overall, incorporated associations must pursue their altruistic objectives, which serve as 
an association’s best interest. Similar to a company, an incorporated association allows for 
different groups of members, such as financial, associate, or social members. Financial or 
active members confer voting rights, whereas social or associate members do not have 
voting rights and are confined to the enjoyment of the association’s facilities. Unlike a 
company director, a management committee is not required to take into account the 
                                               
451 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). See also Associaitons Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4, Model 
Rule 45(4)(b). 
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interests of one group of members over another group.458 The caution here for management 
committees and the board of directors is that a departure from the rules or constitution may 
result in their treatment towards members being seen as oppressive and unfairly prejudicial 
or discriminatory to a specific group or class of members.459 
5.3.7.2 Proper Purpose 
The element of proper purpose under section 181(1)(d) of the Corporations Act460 requires 
directors and other officers to exercise their powers and discharge their duties for a proper 
purpose.461 For a company director, this is conferred by contract and legislation to exercise 
their powers for the expressed or implied purpose.462 The ‘proper purpose’ doctrine for a 
company director is a set of principles, which determines if a director has acted for an 
improper purpose:463  
• the fiduciary powers of directors are to be exercised for the purpose for which they 
are given, not collateral purposes; 
• the substantial purpose of directors was improper or collateral to the director’s 
duties;464 
• the acts performed by a director were for the benefit of the company;465 and 
• the court will apply the ‘but for’ test to determine what the director’s relevant purpose 
was (i.e. the court will consider if a director would still have acted in the same manner 
had the collateral purpose not existed).466 
The element of proper purpose for a committee member would be to achieve the 
association’s objectives conferred upon them by the association’s rules and respective 
legislation. The absence of any provisions contained in the association’s legislation across 
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the jurisdictions, knowing whether or not there is a duty to act for proper purpose upon a 
management committee, is unclear. 
5.3.8 The Duty Not to Improperly Use a Position or Information 
This duty requires  a company director, an officer and an employee not to improperly use a 
position.  For a company director this duty is a civil obligation under 182(1) of the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) and they must not improperly use their position to: 
a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or 
b) cause detriment to the corporation. 
This provision overlaps with section 183(1), which states that a corporation’s director, officer or 
employee are prohibited to obtain information by virtue of their positions, and they must not use 
that information for a personal gain or an advantage for someone else, or to cause detriment to 
the corporation.467 
 Some incorporated associations have provisions for the duty not to misuse a position or 
information. However, the legislative framework varies between jurisdictions. In New South 
Wales, Australian Capital Territory and Victoria there is statutory duty not to improperly use 
information or a position, and these provisions apply to committee members and former 
committee members.468 However, in South Australia and the Northern Territory, this duty applies 
to officers, former officers and employees – which is the same under the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth). Officers of incorporated associations in the Australian Capital Territory only have a duty 
not to improperly use their position.469 
The provisions for misuse of information and position for incorporated associations in each 
jurisdiction uses the phrase ‘to gain, directly or indirectly, any pecuniary benefit or material 
advantage for himself or herself or any other person, or so as to cause a dettiment to the 
association.’ 470 This phrase for incorporated associations is similar to the phrase that applies to 
corporations. For corporations, this phrase is found in section 184(2)(a), which is a criminal 
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provision. Apart from New South Wales, the statutes for incorporated associations have not 
separated these provisions into civil obligations or criminal offenses like the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth). 
The duties of a committee member differ between jurisdictions. The sections concerning the 
improper use of position for management committees in the Northern Territory, Victoria, South 
Australian and the Australian Capital Territory directly reflect section 182(1) for corporations, 
that is: not to improperly use their positions.471 The other two jurisdictions, New South Wales and 
Victoria, have approached the improper use element in another way. Victoria’s legislation states 
that members of the management committee must not knowingly or recklessly make improper 
use of their position in the association.472 The words ‘knowingly’ or ‘recklessly’ imports that a 
committee member who contravenes this provision is conscious of the impropriety. The Victorian 
provision for the improper use of a position by a committee member follows the ruling in R v 
Byrnes,473 thus making the state of mind relevant when testing a contravention objectively. 
New South Wales has taken a different approach to the improper use of a committee 
member’s position. Under section 33, committee members are guilty if they use their position 
with intention of directly or indirectly gaining an advantage for themselves or others, or if they 
cause detriment to the association.474 The New South Wales provision follows the criminal 
offense of section 184(2)(a) within the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). However, New South 
Wales’ provision does not contain the element of impropriety like the other jurisdictions and the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Rather, this provision itself is concerned with intent and 
dishonesty. The consequences for breaching section 33475 replicates the same penalties for 
contravening section 184(2),476 which is imprisonment, a pecuniary penalty, or both.477 The New 
                                               
471 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 33(3); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 
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South Wales provision closely resembles the fiduciary duty to act honestly, but it is the selection 
of the word ‘dishonesty’ that should be discussed further.478 
Regardless of what term is employed – ‘improper’, or ‘dishonest use of a position’ – its reach 
and effect are alike. However, for New South Wales the application of section 33479 is narrower 
than the respective provisions for corporations and the jurisdictions of South Australia, the 
Northern Territory, and the Australian Capital Territory.480 Being found guilty of breaching this 
provision turns, and depends only, on the committee member’s awareness of the wrongdoing. 
This narrow provision fails to provide for circumstances where committee members have 
purportedly acted honestly, reasonably, and without any intention of harm or an advantage, but 
have misused their position.481 
5.3.9 Duty Not to Improperly Use Information 
Section 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) states that a director, an officer, an employee 
who obtains information must not improperly use that information to gain an advantage for 
themselves or someone else,482 or cause detriment to the company.483 The main concept in this 
provision is the term ‘information’. Information is referred as the type of information that the law 
of equity would restrict the director from using for a personal profit.484 Furthermore, a finding of 
improper use of information could be where a director has failed to consider the general interests 
of a creditor that caused detriment to the company.485 Breaching either of the impropriety 
provisions will attract civil486 and/or criminal penalties.487 
Similarly, the statutory provisions relating to the misuse of position for incorporated 
associations are expressed as the improper use or dishonest use of information. There are only 
                                               
478 Phipps v Boardman [1967] 2 AC 46. 
479 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW). 
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four jurisdictions that have express provisions within the incorporated associations’ legislative 
framework: Victoria; South Australia; New South Wales; and the Northern Territory. The 
application of these provisions regarding the misuse of information varies between each 
jurisdiction. South Australia and the Northern Territory have provisions similar to, and are as 
wide as, those provisions found in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); these apply to a current or 
former officer and employee of the incorporated association.488 However, in New South Wales 
and Victoria, the improper use of information only applies to current and former committee 
members of the management committee and not to employees.489 
The Australian Capital Territory has similar provisions that overlap between the use of a 
position and information for members of a management committee. Three out of the four 
jurisdictions prohibit the misuse of information if it is ‘acquired by virtue of their position’.490 
This phrase is not expressed in the Corporation Act 2001 (Cth), but it is one factor from a list in 
establishing a breach of section 183.491 Santow J in Forkserve Pty Ltd v Jack listed a total of 
seven factors needed to prove that an officer of a corporation breached section 183 of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 492 – each one of these is directly embraced into the incorporated 
associations’ statute for the jurisdictions of South Australia, the Northern Territory and 
Victoria.493 
5.3.10 Duty to Disclose a Personal Interest 
The statutory provisions regarding interested directors and members of a management committee 
stem largely from the conflict rule. The conflict rule, in general, prohibits directors placing 
themselves in a position where their personal interest or duty will conflict with their duty to the 
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company.494 However, applying this rule in its strictest form creates practical difficulties in a 
commercial setting, such as prohibiting a director from holding a board position, being a nominee 
director or a director being a shareholder. The courts have acknowledged these difficulties and 
have accepted that a director can act with a personal interest. However, this is prohibited if the 
personal interest is not a bona fide concern for the benefit of the whole company or fairness 
between members.495 
For corporations, section 191(1) states that a director of a company with a material interest in 
a matter that relates to the affairs of the company must give notice to other directors of that 
interest unless section 191(2) says otherwise.496 There is strict liability by a director to notify 
other directors of a material interest when a conflict arises.497 Further, this provision applies to all 
directors, regardless of whether the company’s constitution permits a director to be interested in a 
transaction with the company.498 The heart of this provision is that companies cannot allow 
themselves to diminish the general prohibition on conflicts by the company’s constitution. 
The term ‘material personal interest’ is not a term defined by the Corporations Act, and the 
common law is consulted as to its meaning.499 Specifically, the word ‘material’ requires an 
assessment of what a director personally expects and the matter being considered.500 This 
assessment looks at the nature of the interest and the director’s capacity to influence the vote and 
decision/s by the board and whether the conflict of interest is of a real and substantial kind.501 
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Further, section 191(1) refers to an indirect or direct interest.502 A direct interest is self-
explanatory, but an indirect interest often involves a third party. For instance, an indirect interest 
is when a director’s relative holds an interest and, therefore, would benefit from a matter before 
the company’s board. In this instance, it would be necessary to determine if there is a material 
personal interest.503 
There is a list of exceptions under section 191(2), which does not require a director to provide 
disclosure or notice of an interest.504 From this list, only one feature is focused on, as pointed out,  
some of the incorporated association’s legislation has adopted a similar exception for a 
committee members. Subsequently, a director does not have to give notice to disclose an interest 
if the interest arises because the director is a member of the company held in common with other 
members of the company.505 
Finally, the procedure on how a director’s interest is disclosed to the board is set out in 
section 191(3).506 This provision stipulates that a director must, in their notice to the board, 
outline sufficient details of the nature of the interest, the extent of the interest, and the relation of 
the interest to the company’s affairs.507 The notice of disclosure must be given to the board as 
soon as practicable after the director becomes aware of the interest. Accordingly, the notice must 
be detailed in the company’s minutes. 
For a company, section 194 is a replaceable rule.508 Section 194 states that if a director of a 
proprietary company has a material personal interest that relates to the affairs of the company, 
and the director discloses the nature and the extent of the interest in relation to the affairs of the 
company at a director’s meeting then it is in accordance with section 191.509 Where a director’s 
interest does not need to be disclosed under section 191, that director can vote on matters relating 
to the interest and the interested transactions.510 The vote may proceed and the director can retain 
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the benefit from the transaction providing the transaction was entered into before the disclosure 
was made. Further, the company cannot avoid the transaction because the interest exists. 
The provisions in Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Australian Capital Territory 
and Northern Territory deal with the disclosure of an officer’s personal interest. Section 31(1) of 
the Northern Territory’s Associations Act 2003 states that a member of a committee who has a 
direct or indirect pecuniary interest in a contract or proposed contract with the association, must 
disclose the nature and the extent of the interest to the committee. The committee member must 
disclose this interest as soon as the member becomes aware and, further, the interests must be 
disclosed at the association’s Annual General Meeting.511 This Northern Territory provision is 
clear as to how and when a committee member is required to disclose a pecuniary interest. The 
jurisdictions of Victoria, Australian Capital Territory, South Australia and Western Australia 
have the same wording in their disclosure provisions.512 
These state provisions are constructed differently from that of the Corporations Act.513 The 
requirement of disclosure for incorporated associations only occurs if there is a direct or indirect 
pecuniary interest for a contract or a proposed contract; whereas, for a company director, there 
needs to be a material personal interest in a matter relating to the affairs of the company that 
could affect the board’s deliberation. Circumstances where company directors must disclose their 
interests are wider than those for committee members. For instance, a company director may be 
required to disclose an interest relating to a transaction or in holding a specific position within 
another company; whereas, for a committee member, the requirement for disclosure only needs to 
be a mere interest, and it need only be disclosed to the management committee. Disclosure 
provisions for incorporated associations are restrictive, and this raises concerns that incorporated 
associations’ legislation does not actively encourage sophisticated transparency in disclosing 
information. 
Parallel to section 191(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), incorporated associations in 
Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia, and the Northern Territory have provisions where 
management committee members do not have to disclose their interests. Unlike section 191(2), 
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the exceptions for incorporated associations are fewer and more obscure than for corporations. 
Specifically, committee members in the Northern Territory, Western Australia, South Australia 
and Victoria are not required to disclose their interest to the association if: 
a. they are employees of the association; or 
b. a member of a class of members for whose benefit the association is 
established; or 
c. the committee member’s pecuniary interest is in common with all or a 
substantial proportion of the members of the association.514 
Incorporated associations’ statutes provide that committee members with an interest in a contract 
or proposed contract are not permitted to vote or take part in the decision. However, an interested 
committee member can be present and take part in the committee’s deliberations.515 The obvious 
concern here is that the legislation allows for a committee member to wield his or her influence 
and power over other members to vote for in a manner that will benefit his or her interest.516 
However, in Western Australia and Victoria, there are stricter provisions compared to the other 
jurisdictions. An interested committee member in both of the jurdisdications are  forbidden to 
take part in any deliberations or decisions of the committee,517 but the legislation in Western 
Australia is silent in regards to allowing a committee member to vote on a decision in relation to 
an interested contract.518 It can be said that a committee member participating in the deliberations 
undermines the aims of a disclosure regime. 
Additionally, the timing and recording of a disclosed interest by committee members appears 
to be consistent across the jurisdictions that have disclosure provisions. These provisions require 
an interested committee member to disclose the nature and extent of his or her interest to the 
                                               
514 Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 31(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 29B(2); Associations 
Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) ss 80(3)-(4), 81(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 31(2); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 21(2). The Australian Capital Territory disclosure provision applies 
to committee members, but only if they are also employees of the association. Associations Incorporation Act 
1991 (ACT) s 65(3). 
515 Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 32; ; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 65(2); Associations 
Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 31(5)-(6); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 31. 
516 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 21(1). 
517 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 22; Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 81(1). 
518 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 22.  Section 81(1)(b) prohibits a committee member within a 
Victorian incorporated association to vote in a matter being considered by the committee where the committee 
member has a material personal interest. Assocications Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic). See also 
Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) sch 4. Model Rule 65(2)(b). 
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management committee as soon as they have become aware of the interest.519 Further,  most  of 
these jurisdictions (apart from Victoria) require the interested committee member to disclose their 
interests at the next annual general meeting of the association.520 The provision relating to 
recording an interest by a management committee member exists only in Victoria, Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory, where the interest of a committee member must be recorded 
in the minutes of the management committee.521 Transparency or disclosure under these 
provisions takes a ‘bare foot’ approach to disclosure. Disclosure at an association’s annual 
general meeting may transpire months after an interest has become a conflict, and only then 
would the wider membership of the association become aware of the interest. This statutory 
regime does very little to encourage transparency or sharing of information, and this creates the 
risk of an ill-informed membership base and a perception of a tainted management committee. 
New South Wales and Queensland’s disclosure regime is widely different from the other 
jurisdictions. Section 31 of New South Wales’ associations legislation provides that if a 
committee member has a direct or indirect interest in a matter being considered, or about to be 
considered, and the interest appears to raise conflict with the proper performance of the 
committee member’s duties, then the committee member must disclose the nature of the interest 
at a committee meeting.522 This provision brings clarity to the duty of disclosing an interest and 
neatly folds in the duty to avoid a conflict, which is absent from the other jurisdictions. Unlike 
the other jurisdictions, the disclosure of an interest in New South Wales is broader in all matters, 
like transactions, agreements and other things, and not only contracts or proposed contracts.523 
This provision encourages timely and efficient disclosure of a direct or indirect interest being 
considered, or about to be considered, by a management committee. 
Pursuant to section 31(6), the committee must determine for itself whether the interested 
member can be present during the committee’s deliberation, or allow the interested member to 
                                               
519 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 21(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 31(1)(a); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 29B(1)(a); Associations Incorporation Refrom Act 2012 (Vic) s 
80(1); Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 32(1)(a). 
520 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 21(1)(b);; Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 31(1)(b). 
521 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 21(4); Associations (Model Constitution) Regulations 2004 (NT) reg 
43; Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 80(6). 
522 Incorporated Associations Act 2009 (NSW). 
523 This interpretation of ‘matters’ lends itself from section 191(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
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take part in the committee’s determination/decision regarding the relevant matter.524 However, 
before the management can agree to allow the interested member to vote or be present during 
deliberations, the interested member must give sufficient disclosure of the nature of the 
interest.525 This would see that a real discussion with the management committee would revolve 
around whether or not the interested party’s decision would infringe upon his or her proper 
performance of their duties. 
Furthermore, New South Wales is more astute in recording a member’s interest. The 
legislation states that the committee must keep a book for that very purpose and must record all 
particulars of the disclosure.526 This book must be open at all reasonable hours for any member of 
the association to inspect; the book must be kept at the same address as the register of committee 
members, and must be open to all members to inspect the book that they know exists.527 New 
South Wales’ disclosure provisions may be considered as exemplary for incorporated 
associations, and other jurisdictions should take note. 
Queensland’s provision regarding disclosure of an interest could, out of all the jurisdictions, 
be judged as sub-standard. Regulation 23(8) provides that a member of a management committee 
must not vote on a question about a contract or proposed contract if the member has an interest in 
the contract or proposed contract – and, if the member does vote, the vote cannot be counted.528 
However, this provision is silent on whether a member with an interest is permitted to be present 
during deliberations. 
Further, unlike other jurisdictions, Queensland’s provision does not outline any procedural 
requirements to guide an interested officer to disclose the nature and the extent of his or her 
interest. Without a procedural requirement as to when or where a interest is to be disclosed, it 
would be tempting for a committee member not to disclose an interest, especially when that 
person may benefit indirectly from this undisclosed interest – the provision implies disclosure for 
a direct interest, which is very narrow. 
                                               
524 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW). 
525 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 31(2). 
526 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 32(3). 
527 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 32(3),(4). 
528 Associations Incorporation Regulations 1999 (Qld). 
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Another point of concern is that if the interested officer does not abstain from the vote, how 
would this affect the validity of the contract? Unlike the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and 
associations in other jurisdictions, Queensland’s regulation does not express whether or not a 
contravention of the regulation would affect the validity of the contract. This conflict rule is 
contained in all associations’ model rules. The lack of a disclosure requirement by the 
association’s rules would inevitably lead to situations where an interested member may have a 
court render the contract unenforceable.529 
Moreover, Queensland’s provision for disclosure is contained within the subordinate 
legislation. This, unfortunately, does not provide any Queensland incorporated association with 
any legal duties that regulates the behaviour of a committee member under the Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld).530 The construction of the provision at its core does not deal 
adequately with transparency for members – it is a poor mechanism that does not afford a 
management committee the opportunity for a discussion of the issue. 
Despite the known shortcomings of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), it does provide a solid 
framework for directors’ duties compared with the associations legislation. Table 6 succinctly 
shows the statutory legal duties for committee members across all jurisdictions are deficient and 
lag behind the Corporations Act.531 However, the jurisdictions of South Australia, Northern 
Territory, New South Wales and Victoria can be seen to have made improvements with legal 
duties and obligations for an officer of a management committee. 
Table 6 – Statutory duties of an incorporated association compared to a company532 
Duty SA VIC ACT NSW QLD NT WA TAS Company 
Care, skill and 
diligence ✔ ✔       ✔ 
Proper use of 
position and 
information 
✔ ✔  ✔  ✔   ✔ 
Pay debts ✔   ✔  ✔   ✔ 
Reliance ✔ ✔       ✔ 
                                               
529 Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189. 
530 Section 87 imposes a duty on the association’s secretary to register the association’s interest in land. Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld). 
531 2001 (Cth). 
532 Table 6 is adopted from the modified from an article by Charles Parkinson entitled ‘Duties of Committee 
Members under the Associations Incorporation Acts’ (2004) 30(1) Monash University Law Review 75. 
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Delegation      ✔   ✔ 
Disclosure of 
material interest  ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Good faith  ✔       ✔ 
Proper purpose  ✔       ✔ 
5.4 Filling the Gaps in the Statutory Framework 
There is a well-established body of common law and statutory duties that prohibit company 
directors from abusing their powers and, moreover, their position. For committee members, it is 
difficult to pinpoint a body of case law that applies specifically to not-for-profit associations. 
There have been encouraging developments in Victoria, South Australia and the Northern 
Territory to impose a positive statutory duties on committee members; however, for incorporated 
associations operating in jurisdictions without these statutory duty provisions, are there any rules 
that governs a committee member’s conduct? The judgment of Owen J in the matter Haselhurst v 
Wright is examined to answer this question.533 
Owen J was asked to grant an injunction on the grounds that the directors of a building 
society breached their fiduciary and common law duties.534 Before there could be a decision 
regarding the injunction, Owen J needed to look at a preliminary legal issue: if there was a 
breach, it first must be established whether a duty existed. Investigating whether or not there were 
legal duties owed by the building society’s officers, Owen J examined the building society’s 
governing legislation. Similar to incorporated associations, building societies have their own 
special legislation and are not touched by the corporations’ law, and the building societies’ 
legislation offered no assistance.535 Owen J simply noted that the duties owed by the building 
society’s officers ‘are to be found in the common law’. However, Owen J’s statement is 
problematic on two grounds. First, there is no precedent that applies or develops common law 
duties for the management committee of an incorporated association.536 Secondly, Owen J does 
                                               
533 (1991) 4 ACSR 527. 
534 Haselhurst v Wright (1991) 4 ACSR 527 [35]. 
535 Section 1A of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) expressly states that incorporated associations 
registered in Queensland are an excluded from section 5F of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Other state and 
territory legislation have similar provisions in their associations’ legislation. However, if an incorporated entity is 
limited by guarantee, then the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) will apply. 
536 Johnson J in the decision of Lai v Tiao (No 2) [2009] WASC 22, 84 acknowledged that there is no authority that 
establishes an officer of incorporated associations owes common law duties. 
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not advance his statement by failing to recognise or pinpoint a substantive common law duty with 
which an officer of the building society is obliged to comply. The application of common law 
duties to officers of a management committee has shown to be improbable due to the leading 
decision of Cameron v Hogan.537 
Cameron v Hogan established a long-standing policy that the courts  refrain from interfering 
with the internal management and affairs of a voluntary association.538 This negative and long-
standing policy has allowed the courts to regard many actions involving voluntary associations as 
non-justiciable.539 However, the courts in more recent times have shown some willingness to 
intervene, but only where an association has infringed the rules of natural justice and a member’s 
economic interests, livelihood or reputation.540 Despite the courts slowly moving away from the 
strict policy position of Cameron v Hogan, would the courts go further and impose general law 
duties and obligations upon an officer of a management committee?541 Most likely not – the 
courts have shown further unease to speak with an authoritative voice on matters involving 
voluntary associations, and where it seems convenient, the courts will resort to the policy of 
Cameron v Hogan to dismiss a claim.542 Incremental advances by the courts may, in the future, 
reach a point where the judiciary will no longer consider issues involving voluntary associations 
as novel or insignificant, and the courts maybe more reticent in developing the common law 
duties specifically for voluntary associations.543 Returning again to Owen’s J judgment, he held 
                                               
537 (1934) 51 CLR 358. 
538 (1934) 51 CLR 358. The reasons behind the High Court’s policy of non-intervention are: rooted in nineteenth 
century view of the limits of judicial intervention; a respect for the association’s privacy; and a fear that trivial 
and vexatious disputes will be encouraged which subsequently will open the ‘floodgates’ to litigation. John 
Forbes, Judicial Review of Political Parties’ (Research Paper No 21, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of 
Australia, 1995-1996) 3. 
539 See Carberry v Drice as Representative of Brisbane Junior Rugby Union [2011] QSC 16; Islamic Council of 
South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of Islamic Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211; Metropolitan Petar v 
Mitreski [2003] NSWSC 1007; Skelton v Australian Rugby Union Ltd [2003] QSC 193; Rush v WA Amateur 
Football Club League (Inc) [2001] WASC 154; Clarke v ALP (SA Branch) [1999] SASC 415; Plenty v Seventh 
Day Adventist Church of Port Pirie (1986) 43 SASR 121; Heale v Philips [1959] QdR 489; Abbott v National 
Coursing Association of South Australia [1941] SASR 140. 
540 See Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353; Nurses Memorial Centre of South Australia v Beaumont (1987) 44 
SASR 455; Carter v NSW Netball Association [2004] NSWSC 737; Dixon v Australian Society of Accountants 
(1989) 87 ACTR 1. 
541 (1934) 51 CLR 358. 
542 (1934) 51 CLR 358. Carberry v Drice as Representative of Brisbane Junior Rugby Union [2011] QSC 16; Islamic 
Council of South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of Islamic Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211. Chapter 
Seven of this thesis analyses a range of legal duties for not-for-profit organisations in the United Kingdom. 
543 The increased activity by parliament legislating regarding not-for-profit organisations may subsequently result in 
the courts’ role to interpreting and giving effect to what parliament has legislated. Chapters Eight and Nine of this 
thesis analyses the federal government’s legislative intentions for the not-for-profit sector and its organisations. 
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that fiduciary duties were owed by the society’s directors to the body corporate, and the society’s 
directors are to act in the society’s best interest (as a whole) and to avoid being motivated by self-
interest.544 
5.5 Fiduciary Duties and Obligations 
5.5.1 Is an Officer of a Management Committee a Fiduciary? 
The ruling in Haselhurst v Wright is confined to a building society, and Owen J does not 
elaborate his finding as to why these specific directors are fiduciaries.545 This shortfall in this 
decision makes it difficult to conclude with any certainty as to whether officers of an 
incorporated association are also fiduciaries. Yet, the important aspect from Owen’s J comment is 
that fiduciary duties are ‘owed to the body corporate’.546 As it is known an incorporated 
association is a body corporate with perpetual succession and, for that reason, it is sound to 
conclude that under Owen’s J finding this could be applied to an officer of a management 
committee and, therefore, conclude an officer of a management committee are fiduciaries and 
owe fiduciary duties to its association.547  
5.5.2 The Fiduciary Doctrine 
There are a number of established legal relationships that gives rise to fiduciary obligations and 
duties. These well-known, established categories are: trustee and beneficiary; principle and agent; 
employee and employer; solicitor and client; and director and company and partners.548 While 
these fiduciary categories are not closed, the task still remains difficult to identify a fiduciary in 
novel relationships due to the judiciary not establishing a strict formula to identify a fiduciary.549 
                                               
544 Haselhurst v Wright (1991) 4 ACSR 527 [40],[45]. 
545 (1991) 4 ACSR 527. 
546 (1991) 4 ACSR 527. 
547 The respective state legislative provisions which confirms an incorporated association (upon registration) to be a 
body corporate are: Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 21; Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) 
s 8; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 22; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 38(2); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 11(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 20(3); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 10(a); Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 11(a). 
548 Paul Latimer, Australian Business Law (CCH, 30th ed, 2011) 744; P Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in TG 
Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989) 1, 33–41. 
549 Virginia Surety Company Inc & Anor v Dumbrell & Ors [2011] VSC 602; Denis Ong, Trusts Law in Australia 
(Federation Press, 3rd ed., 2007) 540. Attesting to the slow development of the fiduciary principle is Mason J who 
remarks that ‘the fiduciary relationship is a concept in search of a principle’. Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Themes and 
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Outside the established category of a charitable trustee and beneficiary, the task of identifying 
a fiduciary relationship existing in the not-for-profit context is not as obvious. Both Seivers and 
Latimer state that a committee member of an unincorporated association may (my emphasis) have 
fiduciary obligations to members.550 This carte blanche statement, in the same way as Owen J, is 
made without explanation or justification. While on the surface it may seem obvious, however, it 
is not easy to denote that a committee member is a fiduciary. The fundamental question always 
asked when trying to establish a fiduciary relationship is: what is a fiduciary? This question too 
cannot always be simply answered. 
5.5.3 What is a Fiduciary? 
The general approach taken by the Australian courts in identifying a fiduciary is founded in a 
legal relationship551 that is outside the parties’ legal obligations in contract and torts.552 The 
parties’ legal relationship will be of a particular nature, which exhibits trust and confidence, 
where the fiduciary will undertake to, or agree, to act for or on behalf of another person.553 Acting 
on behalf of another provides the fiduciary with discretion to exercise power that will affect the 
interest of somebody who, within this relationship, is in a position of disadvantage and 
venerability.554 This description of a fiduciary relationship outlines particular characteristics that 
can easily be applied to an officer of an unincorporated and incorporated association. The 
application of these features can be seen when an individual takes on the role of an officer of the 
management committee: they undertake to act for the interests of the association. Further, by 
acting on behalf of the association, an officer has the power and the discretion (by virtue of his or 
her position) to make decisions that will affect the association and its members. Further, an 
officer is trusted to make decisions that will benefit the association and its members. However, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Prospects’ in PD Finn (ed.), Essays in Equity (1985) 246. Adding to the tempered vagueness of fiduciary is 
expressed by Jacobson J that is, ‘the term ‘fiduciary relationship’ defies definition’. Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No 4) [2007] 
FCA 963 at 270. 
550 A. S. Seivers, Associations and Clubs Laws in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 17; 
Paul Latimer, Australian Business Law (CCH, 30th ed, 2011) 744. 
551 See Hospital Products Limited v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41; Maguire v Makaronis 
(1997) 188 CLR 449; Estate Realties Ltd v Wignall [1991] 3 NZLR 482. 
552 Peter Radan and Cameron Stewart, Principles of Australian Equity and Trusts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 
181. 
553 Hospital Products Limited v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, 96 (Mason J). 
554 Hospital Products Limited v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, 96, 142 (Mason and 
Dawson JJ). 
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this arrangement places members in vulnerable position where an officer can abuse the power 
and position.555 Hence, it is very easy to see why Sievers and Latimer concluded that officers of 
unincorporated and incorporated associations are fiduciaries and, therefore, owe fiduciary duties. 
However, doubt remains over whether the last characteristic of vulnerability is truly present in the 
relationship between an officer and the association’s members. 
There are possibilities where members of the association and its property are vulnerable  to 
abuse by an officer of the management committee. Giving rise to this possibility is the statutory 
power of control and power vested in the management committee to operate and conduct the 
association’s business.556 This unqualified power allows an/the officer/s of a management 
committee to make decisions about the association’s affairs and property without the need for the 
membership base to be involved or consulted in the decision-making process.557 However, to 
counterbalance this exclusive power, the association’s rules provide members with voting 
rights.558 Each member of an association has one vote, and the rules provide that a majority of 
members present can decide on matters by way of a resolution at a general meeting.559 This 
facilitates a democratic method of decision-making that ensures the administration of the 
association is being conducted in a proper manner.  
                                               
555 The feature of trust is impulsive due to the notion that not-for-profit organisations are more trustworthy than for-
profits as a consequence of information asymmetry, contract failure, and the perception that an officer is 
wholesome and selfless when perusing and undertaking the association’s unadulterated and altruistic purposes. D. 
Young, ‘Alternative Models of Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations: Theoretical and International 
Perspectives’ (2000) 29 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 149, 154; Lester Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil 
Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 
167, 168-169. Refer to Chapter Two of this thesis for a further explanation of information asymmetries, contract 
failure, and the trustworthy theory. 
556 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 60(1). 
557 For example, in Queensland the management committee must decide whether there is a need for the association to 
take out public liability insurance and the amount of public liability insurance. This decision by the management 
committee in regards to not taking out public liability insurance is to be reported at the association’s annual 
general meetings. Associations Incorporation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Qld) ss 70, 70A. 
558 Associations Incorporation Regulations 1999 reg 38(2); Associations Incorporation Regulations 2010 (NSW) reg 
22(2); Associations Incorporation Regulations 1991 (ACT) reg 20(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) 
s 29(5); Associations Incorporation Regulations 2009 (Vic) reg 16(1); Associations Incorporation (Model Rules) 
Regulations 2007 (Tas) reg 18(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1988 (WA) 1987 s 24; Associations (Model 
Constitution) Regulations 2004 (NT) reg 40(1). There is no provision within the Associations Incorporation Act 
1985 (SA) nor its accompany regulations which expressly states that a member has one vote. However, the 
publication entitled An Example of Rules for Incorporated Associations produced by the Government of South 
Australia, Consumers and Business Services states that a member of an incorporated association has only one 
vote. South Australia Government, An Example of Rules for Incorporated Associations (undated) 
<http://www.ocba.sa.gov.au/assets/files/02_association_rules.pdf> 12. 
559 Association Incorporation Regulations 1999 (Qld) sch 4, reg 38. 
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However, where members do not have voting rights, the management of the organisation is 
centralised amongst an exclusive few individuals, and this will create a private sphere. Within 
this private sphere, all the decisions regarding the management of the association will be made. 
How decisions are made and how individuals conduct themselves within this sanctum is out of 
view without the need to be answerable to the membership base.560 Acting independently to the 
rest of the association, this private sphere will become insular, allowing an individual to act bona 
fide in self-interest. The management of the association falls upon the shoulders of a few, and 
these few individuals will become highly involved in the association and possess the necessary 
knowledge on how to manage it. Members will come to trust and blindly accept any information 
provided by these individuals. This will allow the dominant personalities to orchestrate the 
numbers amongst the membership base to support their agenda – this can occur regardless of 
whether members have voting rights or not.561 The private sphere that emerges in this instance is 
because these few individuals have a monopoly in the management of the organisation. Worst of 
all, the structure of associations allows such individuals to self-regulate, which will permit any 
acts of self-interest or other misdeeds to be hidden from the membership base and, consequently, 
members would be in a vunerable situation. However, the finding of a fiduciary relationship in a 
novel situation remains an impossible task, despite the presence of vunerability.562 
The courts are highly reluctant to impose a higher standard of conduct prescribed under equity 
to those in a ‘relative equal position’.563 Further, reluctance by the court to impose fiduciary 
obligations will bring about uncertainty in a commercial context.564 While the relationship 
between an officer and member is not commercial in nature the relationship, it is, however, 
contractual; it this aspect of the parties’ relationship that the courts would focus upon.565 
                                               
560 Kim Weinert, ‘Is there a Perfect Environment for a Villian and Villaniness to Survive?’ in Rachel Franks and 
Susan E. Meindi (eds), The Real and Reflected: Heroes and Villains in Existent and Imagined Worlds (Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2012) 53. 
561 McClelland v Burning Palms Surf Lifesaving Club [2002] NSWCA 470. 
562 Hospital Products Ltd V United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41. 
563 Anthony Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World’ 
(1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 238, 238. 
564 Steven White, ‘Commercial Relationships and the Burgeoning Fiduciary Principle’ (2000) 9(1) Griffith Law 
Review 98, 99. Dawson J expressed that confusion and uncertainty will occur in commercial dealings if the 
fiduciary principle was imposed. Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 
[494]. 
565 The rules of an incorporated association operate as a contract between the association and its members. 
McClelland v Burning Palms Surf Life Saving Club [2002] NSWSC 470. 
  101 
The finding that an officer of an organisation is a fiduciary seems unlikely. Identifying the 
core of an officer’s relationship to another member and to the association itself is rooted in 
contract and, moreover, this contract places each officer and member on an equal footing. The 
courts would prefer to elicit an officer’s and a member’s obligations from contract and not draw 
upon stricter equity principles that may alter the operation of the contract.566 Although courts 
seem impervious to a plea of a fiduciary relationship, they will, however, afford the opportunity 
for a party to argue for a finding of a fiduciary relationship.567 
The opportunity to argue that an officer of a not-for-profit organisation was a fiduciary 
happened in the Canadian case of London Humane Society (Re).568 Here it was found that an 
officer of a not-for-profit organisation is a fiduciary due to their discretion over the organisation’s 
property – the interest remained vested in the organisation, not the members.569 Therefore, an 
officer of a not-for-profit organisation is in a fiduciary relationship with organisation itself, 570 and 
the public.571 These findings by the Canadian courts are not surprising. Compared with Australia, 
the development of fiduciary law in Canada has been progressive, and the fiduciary doctrine has 
been widened to include relationships where there are non-economic interests.572 Furthermore, the 
analysis of a fiduciary relationship is prescriptive, which subsequently has created a ‘catch-all’ 
situation, unlike Australia’s approach, which is prospective.573 However, it remains to be seen 
whether the Australian judiciary would be amenable to view an officer of an incorporated 
association as a fiduciary. 
The law confers some nominal statutory duties, but no rules to govern the conduct of an 
officer who has control of an association’s funds and property. This is unacceptable and, 
therefore, a different view of an officer of a voluntary association is needed to find and recognise 
                                               
566 Hospital Products Ltd V United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41[97] (Mason J). 
567 Virginia Surety Company Inc & Anor v Dumbrell & Ors [2011] VSC 602 [35]. 
568 (2010) ONSC 5775. 
569 (2010) ONSC 5775. 
570 London Humane Society (Re) (2010) ONSC 5775. 
571 The court found that the fiduciary relationship between an officer and the public is largely due to the public 
making donations to the organisation. Pathak v Hindu Sabha (2004) O.J No. 1981. 
572 Frame v Smith (1987) 42 DLR (4th) 81. 
573 Norberg v Wynrib (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449; Leonard Rotman, ‘Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in Need of 
Understanding’ (1996) 34(4) Alberta Law Review 821, 833. 
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some rules of obligations that are applicable to an officer of an association. This alternative view 
would be to see an officer as an ‘agent’ of the association. 
5.5.4 Principal Agent Relationship 
Viewing an officer as an agent the law would subject that person’s conduct to certain duties and 
obligations. The decision and policy of Cameron v Hogan has repeatedly been shown to be a 
barrier for the courts to adequately deal with grievances involving a not-for-profit organisation – 
as surprising as it may seem, Cameron v Hogan can be helpful in identifying an officer as an 
agent.574 The majority stated in Cameron that officers may be agents for the members of the 
association and, furthermore, stated that upon there being no doctrine of agency, an association’s 
members are joint principals who can hold an officer and the committee responsible.575 
The incorporated association legislation offers some guidance in knowing whether an officer 
of a management committee is an agent; however, there remains inconsistency across most of the 
jurisdictions. Queensland is the only jurisdiction that expressly states every member of the 
management committee, and any manager appointed by the management committee, are deemed 
to be agents of the association.576 However, the remaining jurisdictions do not provide such 
clarity. 
New South Wales’ incorporated association’s legislation notes that any people who hold 
themselves out to be an agent of the association can make the assumption that this person is duly 
appointed and has the authority to be an agent.577 This provision is a direct reflection of the 
indoor management rule found in section 129 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Furthermore, 
section 126 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) the New South Wales’ Act states that an agent 
has an association’s expressed and implied authority to make, vary, ratify or discharge a contract 
on behalf of the association.578 These provisions in the New South Wales’ statute are wide, and 
                                               
574 In more recent times, the lower courts have shown their preparedness to hear disputes regarding the members of 
an incorporated association. While these decisions found there to be a breach of natural justice, the courts did not 
find a member’s contractual interests and rights were infringed. See Rose v Boxing NSW Inc [2007] NSWSC 20 
and Goodwin v VVMC Club Australia (NSW Chapter) [2008] NSWSC 154. Both of these judgments found that 
the association had inadequately dealt with a dispute with a member and ordered compensation. 
575 Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 (Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ); Kelly v National Society of 
Operative Printers (1916) 113 L.T 1055. 
576 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 60(2). 
577 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 24(4). 
578 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 21(1). 
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they do not specify how and who within the association can be appointed as an agent. The danger 
of these provisions is that any person purporting to be an agent may bind an association to a 
contract or transaction that the association may not know about, want, or is within the purpose of 
the association. These provisions strongly imply that an association’s agent is entrusted to 
undertake dealings in good faith. While under the general law an unruly agent may be personally 
liable for their actions, the legislation does not provide any liability provisions for agents or 
individual purporting to be agents. However, the other states provide stricter provisions relating 
to an agent’s conduct. 
Respective legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Western Australia, South Australia 
and Victoria states that an agent may execute documents and deeds under the association’s 
common seal. 579 These jurisdictions require an agent to be appointed in writing and the agent’s 
authority continues only for a period specified in the instrument that confers the agent’s authority 
– and, if no period is stated, revocation or termination of the agent’s authority by way of notice.580 
These provisions can be assessed to be applicable only to the association appointing a specific 
individual to undertake a one-off task, such as purchasing property. Nothing within these 
jurisdictions suggests a member or an officer of the management committee is automatically an 
agent. The jurisdictions of the Tasmania and the Northern Territory contain no provisions that 
allow for the appointment of an agent to act on the association’s behalf. 
These gaps in the legislation raise two queries. First, whether officers of a management 
committee are agents for the association in the jurisdictions of South and Western Australia, 
Victoria, Tasmania and the Northern Territory; and, secondly, whether is it probable that 
associations in Tasmania and the Northern Territory have the power to appoint an agent. The last 
relies on the legal instrument that provides an association with a juristic personality. This, 
subsequently, allows an association to have the legal capacity to exercise powers carry out the 
organisation’s business, which endows an association the ability to enter into contracts.581 This 
                                               
579 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 55(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (SA) s 55(1); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 19(7); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 39; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 13(1)(f). 
580 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (SA) s 55(2),(3); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 19(8); 
Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 39(3). 
581 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 25; Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) ss 19, 21; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 42; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 19; Associations 
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juristic personality allows an association to appoint an agent by contract or in writing to act on 
behalf of the association. However, with regards to the first query (whether an officer is an agent 
in the remaining jurisdictions) remains unclear and, therefore, attention is turned to the general 
law. 
The Cameron v Hogan decision provides a clear answer to the query – the majority stated that 
an officer may be an agent for the association and its members.582 Their Honours failed to explain 
why an officer is an agent and, in the absence of any judicial reasoning, it maybe presumed that a 
finding of agency arises out of necessity to carry out transactions and the association’s activities – 
regardless of whether the association is incorporated or unincorporated. 
Nevertheless, there is some difficulty determining whether an individual committee member 
of an unincorporated association is an agent due to the law not recognising this particular form as 
a juristic entity and, furthermore, any transaction or contract involving an unincorporated 
association needs to be in the officer’s own name.583 However, these concerns are overcome by 
the decision of Kelly v National Society of Operative Printers.584 Here, the majority found that an 
officer of an unincorporated body is an agent.585 An officer acting as an agent of either 
incorporated or unincorporated associations will not receive remuneration, nor will the agent be 
subject to an enforceable contract of agency. Therefore, in the absence of an enforceable contract, 
an officer would be found to be a gratuitous agent.586 Once an agency relationship has been 
established, it must be determined what is the agent’s authority.587 
5.5.5 An Agent’s Authority 
The scope of an agent’s authority is important when considering whether that agent has acted 
outside his or her authority and, consequently, would lose the right of indemnity for their actions. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 20; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 26; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1987 (WA) ss 14, 20; Associations Act 2003 (NT) pt 4. 
582 Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 (Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ). 
583 Freeman v McManus [1958] VR 15; Carlton Cricket and Football Social Club v Joseph [1970] VR 487. 
584 (1916) 113 L.T. 1005. 
585 (1916) 113 L.T. 1005, 1058, 1062 (Swinfen Eady L.J, Phillimore L.J and Bankes L.J). 
586 Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co of Europe Ltd v Orion Marine Insurance Underwriting Agency Ltd [1995] 3 
All ER 174, 185. 
587 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v ECGD [2001] 1 AC 486. 
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The types of authority are: (a) actual authority, implied and expressed; (b) ostensible authority; 
and (c) retrospective authority.588 
The type of authority conferred upon an agent derives from the source that creates the agency 
and principle relationship. As already established, an officer of an incorporated association is an 
agent under the respective association legislation that provides an agent (officer) with actual 
authority. The agent being conferred with the authority to perform particular acts in the name of 
the association creates this actual authority. Furthermore, an officer’s actual authority may be 
implied by the agent’s conduct, the circumstances, or activities that are incidental to the 
association’s activities.589 The rules governing an agent’s apparent authority (regardless whether 
it is expressed or implied) the doctrine of ultra vires may be a consequence for an officer who has 
acted outside his or her authority. 
The doctrine of ultra vires has been disposed of by the association legislation. Under the 
associations’ statute, the ultra vires rule has been altered regarding the power of an officer to 
enter into a binding agreement with the association – it shall not be invalid where the association 
did not have the power or the capacity to do such an act or to execute the document.590 Where an 
association lacks the power to execute a transaction, the courts are willing to remedy this through 
the rules of constructive trust – especially where unincorporated associations are involved.591 
Despite the doctrine of ultra vires being set aside by statute, the conduct of an agent of an 
incorporated association will remain subject to the recognised general law duties of an agent. 
5.5.6 Duties of an Agent 
The principal and agent relationship gives rise to certain and onerous duties for an agent.592 
McCardie J in Armstrong v Jackson stated that these particular and onerous duties are due to the 
agent’s position of confidentiality, and situations that can lend themselves to abuse or to be taken 
                                               
588 Simon Fisher, Agency Law (Butterworths, 2000) 32-39. 
589 Verdi Club Inc v National Australia Bank (1991) 104 FLR 344; Roderick Munday, Agency Law and Principles 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 48-51. 
590 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 26; Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 20; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 56; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 17; Associations Incorporation 
Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 35; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 27; Associations Incorporation Act 
1987 (WA) s 15. Constructive notice will not be discussed, as it is not in the scope of this thesis. 
591 Worthing Rugby Football Club v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1985] 1 WLR 409. Chapter Four of this thesis 
outlines the pragmatic difficulties of an unincorporated association due to its poor legal standing. 
592 Armstrong v Jackson [1917] 2 KB 822, 826 (McCardie J). 
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advantage of and, therefore, requires the agent’s conduct to be of a high standard.593 The essence 
of McCardie’s J judgement illustrates that there is a fiduciary dimension to the principal agent 
relationship and that strict equitable principles apply.594 Gibbs CJ and Mason J in Hospital 
Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp also support this position by recognising that the 
principal agency relationship is a fiduciary relationship.595 Further, to the strict equitable 
obligations owed by an agent to the principle that arises from the special position of trust, there 
are also an agent’s contractual duties.596 
The respective incorporated association legislation allows an officer to operate as an agent of 
the association; however, neither the statute nor the association’s rules provide an agent with any 
rules, duties or obligations specific to an agent.597 Therefore, it is plausible to find an officer as a 
gratuitous agent due to the absence of remuneration and an enforceable contract.598 Establishing 
that an officer is a gratuitous agent poses the question: does that officer owe the association the 
fiduciary duties of an agent or a lesser duty of care?599 
Where an officer is a gratuitous agent (appointed by statute), it is reasonable for an 
association to rely and trust on that agent’s skill and judgement. However, the members must also 
have confidence that an agent’s performance will be carried out in in accordance with the 
fiduciary duties of an agent.600 The fiduciary duties owed by an agent are as follows: 
1.  no conflict rule –officers must not be in conflict with the association and they should 
not take advantage if a conflict arises;601 
2. no profit rule – an officer must not receive a profit at the expense of the association;602 
                                               
593 [1917] 2 KB 822, 826. 
594 Armstrong v Jackson [1917] 2 KB 822, 825-826 (McCardie J). 
595 (1984) 156 CLR 41 [68], [96] (Gibbs CJ and Mason J). 
596 Rothschild v Brookman (1831) 5 Bli (NS) 165, 197; O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd [1985] QB 
428, 451; Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1996] 1 QB 716. 
597 Many incorporated associations rely and operate on the efforts of volunteers who occupy positions on the 
management committee, and it would be a fair assessment that these volunteers generally would not have any 
knowledge or understanding of an agent’s duties. Therefore, the respective incorporated associations legislation 
should outline these obligations. 
598 An association’s rules can be read to have the effect of a contract. Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v 
Australian Federation of Islamic Council Inc [2009] NSWSC 211; Liddle v Central Australian Legal Aid Service 
Inc [1999] NTSC 35. 
599 Chaudhry v Prabakhar [1989] 1 WLR 29. 
600 Bristol & West BS v Mathew [1998] Ch 1, 18 (Millett LJ). 
601 Western Areas Exploration Pty Ltd v Streeter (No 3) [2009] WASC 213, 48. 
602 Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554. 
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3. duty of loyalty – an officer must make all the relevant information available to the 
association;603 and 
4. duty of confidentiality – any information obtained by the officer for the association must 
not be used by that officer for a private advantage.604 
Conversely, the required level of care a gratuitous agent owes a principal is declared to be what 
might be reasonably excepted in the circumstances and, furthermore, judged objectively.605 This 
means that an agent’s actual degree of skill and experience, or the skill and experience that the 
agent has laid on themselves.606 
The strictness of these fiduciary duties for officers raises the old argument that it would be 
unreasonable to expect volunteers to satisfy this high standard on the basis that individuals are 
acting out of prevailing social mores. The courts would give strong consideration to this 
argument, and would more than likely find that the lower common law duty applies. Where 
officers do not hold themselves out to have a special skill or knowledge, the court has held that, 
in the circumstances, a gratuitous agent will be held to the standard of care of a competent agent 
when carrying out the business of the association.607 The court held there are no grounds to 
exempt a gratuitous agent from a duty of care when they are entrusted to carry out a task.608 
Hence, officers of incorporated and an unincorporated associations acting as an agent for them 
can be a fiduciary – but it is more than likely a court will hold an agent to a minimal standard of 
care and not to strict fiduciary obligations. 
5.6 Conclusion 
There are some similarities between the roles and functions of a company director and an officer 
of a management committee. Both operate as a collective group of individuals who are in control 
of and manage their respective entity’s property and carry out the operation and business. There 
is very little known about how a management committee carries out these functions. There is, of 
course, a desired presumption and expectation that a management committee of an association 
                                               
603 Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71. 
604 Morison v Moat (1851) 68 ER 492, 898. 
605 Chaudhry v Prabakhar [1989] 1 WLR 29 (Stocker and Stuart-Smith LJJ). 
606 Chaudhry v Prabakhar [1989] 1 WLR 29. 
607 Norwest Refrigeration Services Pty Ltd v Bain Dawes (WA) Pty Ltd (1984) 157 CLR 149, 168-70 (Brennan J). 
608 Norwest Refrigeration Services Pty Ltd v Bain Dawes (WA) Pty Ltd (1984) 157 CLR 149, 169 (Brennan J). 
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manages in accordance with the association’s altruistic mission. However, the altruistic mission 
can no longer be a shield to deflect the need for better accountability and transparency of not-for-
profit organisations. 
There are overwhelming social and economic reasons to justify the call for better 
transparency and accountability through a governance framework within not-for-profit 
organisations. Unfortunately, the law relating to incorporated associations does very little to 
encourage a management committee to achieve transparency and accountability, or to promote a 
governance framework that protects an association’s property and controls risk. Legal duties and 
obligations are important mechanisms of organisational governance, and an examination of legal 
duties for incorporated associations reveals a number of shortcomings. 
Chapter Five first analysed an officer’s statutory duties across state and territory jurisdictions. 
This analysis illustrated that New South Wales, South Australia and the Northern Territory have 
more statutory duties compared to the other jurisdictions. Furthermore, these jurisdictions have 
made advances and improvements by introducing some statutory duties. Table 6 succinctly shows 
the statutory duties of committee members across all Australian jurisdictions, and demonstrates 
inconsistences in statutory duties for officers of a management committee. Where there are 
significant gaps in the legislation, the general law is considered. 
The general law has proved unhelpful in ascertaining whether an officer of a management 
committee is subject to common law duties. There are no common law duties due to the long-
standing decision of Cameron v Hogan,609 which set the precedent that, in the absence of a 
proprietary right or interest in the property of the association, any issue regarding the internal 
management of a voluntary association is non-justiciable. Despite incremental advances by the 
courts to intervene in some matters involving the internal management of voluntary associations, 
the courts have, however, been reluctant to develop common law duties for officers of a 
voluntary association. Chapter Five shows that, in a number of cases, it has been held that an 
officer owes some general law duties. Where the common law has shown to be scant, the 
fiduciary law has been shown to be of some assistance. 
                                               
609 (1934) 51 CLR 358. 
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However, for fiduciary duties to be owed, it must be established that an officer is a fiduciary 
and that an officer has a fiduciary relationship with the association. The established fiduciary 
categories do not include an officer of a management committee or a voluntary association. 
The courts do not wish to hold an individual to stricter or a higher standard of conduct 
especially where the parties are in a relatively equal position by showing that an officer and a 
member of an association are in an equal position. With very few statutory, common law and 
fiduciary duties affecting the conduct of an officer an alternative view of the role of the officer is 
needed. 
Identifying an officer as an agent will, in fact, subject that officer’s conduct to strict fiduciary 
duties in particular circumstances. The circumstances in which an agent owes fiduciary duties 
were clearly stated by Lord Denning MR Broadman v Phillips [1965] Ch 992 at 1018-19 when 
he said: 
… if an agent uses property, with which he has been entrusted by his principal, 
so as to make a profit for himself out of it, without his principal’s consent, then 
he is accountable to his principal … So, also, if he uses a position of authority, 
to which has been appointed by his principal, so as to gain money by means of 
it for himself, then also he is accountable to his principal for it … Likewise with 
information or knowledge which he has been employed by his principal to 
collect or discover, or which he has otherwise acquired, for the use of the 
principal, then again if he turns it to his own use, so as to make a profit by 
means of it for himself, he is accountable … for such information or knowledge 
is the property of his principal, just as much an invention is … 
Notwithstanding the negative impact of Cameron v Hogan,610 it was stated by the majority (Rich, 
Evatt, and McTiernan, JJ) that an officer may be an agent, and members of an unincorporated 
association are joint principals. Furthermore, the English Court of Appeal decision of Kelly v 
National Society of Operative Printers, cited by the majority in Cameron v Hogan,611 found that 
an officer of an unincorporated association maybe an agent.612 The respective associations’ 
legislation also gives some additional support to the concept that an officer is an agent of the 
                                               
610 (1934) 51 CLR 358. 
611 (1934) 51 CLR 358, 373. 
612 (1916) 113 L.T 1055, 1058, 1060, 1062. 
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association with actual authority. While the respective legislation does not identify the type of 
agent the common law would most likely view an officer to be a gratuitous agent when dealing 
with third parties. The standard of care for a gratuitous agent will take into account the agent’s 
actual degree of skill, judgment and experience that they hold themselves out to have. 
Furthermore, the courts have shown little tolerance to exempt a gratuitous agent from liability 
and, therefore, in the circumstances, a gratuitous agent has been held to a minimal standard of 
care opposed to that expected of a competent agent. This, however, is reflective of torts law and 
not fiduciary principle as such. 
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CHAPTER 6: Future Movements within 
Our Not-for-Profit Sector 
 
… a community needs to nurture their not-for-profit sector, which in turn 
nurtures our nation.613 
6.0 Introduction 
Before 1999, the Australian parliament showed very little interest in understanding the needs of 
the not-for-profit sector. However, over the past decade, the federal government’s interest in the 
not-for-profit sector has grown. Through the commissioning of a number of parliamentary 
inquiries and reports, the not-for-profit sector is earmarked for reform. This chapter will highlight 
the background that prompted the key reports from the Productivity Commission614 and a Senate 
inquiry.615 Both reports conceded that the current regulatory environment for all forms of not-for-
profit organisations is not effective and recommended a number of key reforms. Chapter Six 
outlines the common themes of reform in the areas of regulation and governance that have 
emerged from these two reports. 
6.1 Federal Parliamentary Inquiries and Governmental Reports 
The federal parliament has commissioned a number of inquiries and reviews into the not-for-
profit sector (see Table 7 for a chronology of the federal parliamentary inquiries and reports). The 
aim of each inquiry was not only to improve our policy makers’ knowledge and understanding of 
the sector, but also to gather ideas on how to best reform our not-for-profit sector. The reform 
discussion and agenda initially focused on financial reporting and accountability but, over time, 
the discussion widened to include: fundraising; taxation; government partnerships; funding; 
contracting and tendering; regulation; and how best to measure the sector’s outputs. No doubt all 
aspects of these discussions are important; however, this thesis will concentrate on the core 
                                               
613 ‘Simon McKeon named Australian of the Year’, ABC News (online) 26 January 2011 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/starcs/2011/01/25/3121659.htm>. 
614 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010). 
615 Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-
for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) Chapter 2. 
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themes of governance being regulation and financial reporting from the Senate’s Disclosure 
Inquiry and the Productivity Commission’s report. 
Table 7 – Chronology of recent federal parliamentary inquiries, reports, studies and reviews616 
Title Committee/Department Date 
Inquiry Report: Inquiry into the Definition of 
Charities and Related Organisations  
The Senate- Senate Standing 
Committee on Economics June 2011 
Discussion Paper: Financial Reporting by 
Unlisted Public Companies The Treasury June 2007 
Inquiry Report: Inquiry into the Disclosure 
Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations  
The Senate- Standing Committee on 
Economics 
December 
2008 
Report to the Treasurer – Australia’s Future Tax 
System The Treasury 
December 
2009 
Report: Tax Laws Amendment (Public Benefit 
Test) Bill 2010 
The Senate- Economics Legislation 
Committee 
September 
2010 
Report: Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector Productivity Commission January 2010 
Consultation Report: National Compact between 
the Australian Government and Third Sector Australian Government 
February 
2010 
Consultation Paper: Scoping Study for a National 
Not-for-Profit Regulator  The Treasury 
January 
2011 
6.2 Disclosure Regime for Charities and Not-for-Profit Inquiry 
6.2.1 Background to the Disclosure Inquiry 
Seven years after the 2001 inquiry into the definition of charity, the Howard government took no 
action to reform the not-for-profit sector,617 despite the federal government agreeing ‘in principle’ 
to implement the twenty-seven recommendations.618 This inaction by the government prompted 
then-senators Allison and Murray to initiate a motion for another inquiry into the sector. Senator 
Allison’s motion highlighted the need for a second inquiry based on the findings from CHOICE’s 
on-line article relating to charities.619 
                                               
616 See Appendix 3 for a summary of recommendations from the Report into Disclosure Regimes for Not-for-Profit 
Organisations. 
617 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 18 June 2008, 2729 (Senator Lyn Allison). 
618 The Hon. Peter Costello MP, ‘Government Response to Charities Definition Inquiry’ (Media Release, No. 049, 29 
August 2002) 1. 
619 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 18 June 2008, 2729 (Senator Lyn Allison). The Australian Consumers’ 
Association (CHOICE is the association’s public name) is a company limited by guarantee with no share capital. 
CHOICE diffuses information and advice to all consumers (and its members) about the standard, quality, 
properties and price of goods and services. Australian Consumers’ Association, Constitutional Objects (May 
2012) <http://www.choice.com.au/about-us/governance.aspx>. 
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Sometime in late 2007, CHOICE surveyed 240 of its subscribers, asking what they thought 
were important in a charity.620 CHOICE found that: 
• 81 per cent did not know what proportion of their donation reached their favourite 
charity’s beneficiaries (after fundraising costs and overheads were deducted); 
• 94 per cent of the survey’s respondents thought it was important to have information 
about a charity’s administration and fundraising costs; 
• 97 per cent surveyed thought it was important to have information about the 
effectiveness of a charity’s work; and 
• 90 per cent surveyed found it almost impossible to compare charities and, also, to 
know whether their donation was being used to its best effect.621 
CHOICE approached eleven unnamed large domestic and overseas charities to participate in this 
survey but only nine charities responded. The participating charitable organisations in CHOICE’s 
survey weres confined only to the charities’ financial information. The method or framework that 
CHOICE used to compare the financial information of these participating charities was not 
disclosed. CHOICE reported that it was an impossible task to adequately compare the financial 
information of these participating charities due to each charity’s financial information being 
structured in different ways.622 
Responding to CHOICE’s findings, the senators moved that an inquiry be referred to the 
Senate’s Economics Committee to report on how to best improve governance and management of 
all not-for-profit organisations.623 The grounds outlined by the senators in their motion was to 
satisfy the wants of the donors’ access to financial information rather than acknowledging the 
core issue, which is the declining public confidence and trust in the sector and organisations. 
                                               
620 CHOICE’s survey does not disclose how many CHOICE subscribers were asked to participate in this survey, nor 
does CHOICE disclose the make-up of the respondents such as, the number of women respondent, age-groups of 
respondents, etc. 
621 Alan Dooley, ‘Guide to Donating to Charities – How Much of Your Donation is Gobbled up by Fundraising Fees 
and Expenses? 01. The Act of Giving CHOICE Guide and Review to Donating to Charities’ 
<http://www.choice.com.au/reviews-and-tests/money/investing/advice/charities.aspx>. 
622 Alan Dooley, ‘Guide to Donating to Charities – How Much of Your Donation is Gobbled up by Fundraising Fees 
and Expenses? 03. Survey of Charities CHOICE Guide and Review to Donating to Charities 
<http:www.choice.com.au/reviews-and-
tests/money/investing/advice/charities/pages/survey%20of%charities.aspx>. 
623 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 18 June 2008, 2729 (Senator Lyn Allison). 
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6.2.2 Terms of Reference 
The terms of reference for the Senate’s Economic Committee (‘the Committee’) were framed to 
directly address the donors’ want for information transparency. The Committee was tasked to 
explore models of regulation that would improve governance and management, and to examine 
other measures that would improve governance standards, accountability and transparency within 
not-for-profit organisations.624 The fiscal issues surrounding these organisations are significant; 
however, the scope of this inquiry should have been widened to search for reasons why public 
confidence and trust in the sector was declining, and find ways to re-build trust in the sector. 
6.2.3 Report’s Findings 
The specific terms of reference resolved the Committee to having a limited scope to explore other 
issues that impact on the non-for-profit sector’s effectiveness, and the Committee acknowledged 
this.625 It examined and provided recommendations on matters of fundraising, tax concessions 
and legal structures. The Committee did not considered legal duties or obligations as part of a 
governance framework for not-for-profit organisations, but it focused on financial reporting and 
models of regulation as the means to achieve transparency and accountability within the sector. 
6.2.4 Regulation 
The Committee acknowledged the overwhelming support from the sector to have better 
regulation.626 The issue for the Committee was to determine whether or not the not-for-profit 
sector should remain self-regulated, which, within the sector, has traditionally been the preferred 
model of regulation, due largely to the element of trustworthiness.627 The advantage of self-
regulation is that it permits not-for-profits the freedom to decide for themselves how to 
effectively manage their organisations in a democratic way.628 The main feature of self-regulation 
                                               
624 Standing Committee on Economics Report, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-
for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 5. 
625 Standing Committee on Economics Report, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-
for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 8. 
626 Standing Committee on Economics Report, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-
for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 37. 
627 Jenny Harrow, ‘Chasing Shadows? Perspectives on Self-Regulation in UK Charity Fundraising’ (2006) 21 Public 
Policy and Administration 86, 88. 
628 Fundraising Institute, Submission No. 107 to Standing Committee on Economics, Inquiry into the Disclosure 
Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations, 6 December 2008. 
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is a voluntary Code of Conduct that permits an organisation to define their own standards systems 
of governance and financial control, and establish ethics and principles for their members to 
follow.629 The Committee expressed their preference for  a Code of Conduct by noting it could 
have a place in ‘a new system of regulation’.630 However, the Committee favoured a move away 
from self-regulation and strongly recommended the establishment of a national independent 
regulator for all forms of not-for-profit organisations.631 
The Committee showed that it had grasped the importance of needing a single national 
regulator.632 The want for a national regulator derives from the Committee finding that the states-
based system of regulation was complicated, making it difficult for not-for-profit organisations to 
function efficiently – particularly for those operating in more than one jurisdiction.633 The 
complicated state-based regulation of not-for-profit organisations emanates from the tensions 
between the legislative powers vested in the states and those vested in the Commonwealth.634 The 
Committee found that it would be prudent to create a new specialist federal legal structure 
through the referral of state and territory powers.635 The Committee believed that the creation of a 
new legal structure would simplify and provide ‘solid regulation’.636 
                                               
629 Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations (4 December 2008) 37–38. 
630 Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations (4 December 2008) 40. 
631 See Recommendation 3. Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for 
Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 45. 
632 The Commission accepted the advice of Professor Mark Lyons who insightfully stated that, without a regulator: 
governments will have a lack of knowledge about the sector; personal enrichment is more likely; not-for-profit 
organisations could be used to hide criminal activity; and the public would be less likely to inform authorities of 
charity abuse. Professor Mark Lyons, Submission No 112 to Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of 
Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations, 6 December 2008; Standing 
Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations (4 December 2008) 42. 
633 Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations (4 December 2008) 40. 
634 Within the not-for-profit context, the states and territories have the legislative power over incorporated 
associations, and a state’s Attorney General has control over charities. Whereas, the Commonwealth has 
legislative power over companies limited by guarantee. Not-for-profit organisations that operate across 
jurisdictions complained to the committee that not only is there poor regulation, but it is also difficult knowing 
and satisfying each jurisdiction’s requirements. Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, 
Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 68-70. 
635 See Regulation 7. Standing Committee on Economic, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities 
and Not-for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 77. 
636 Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations (4 December 2008) 77. 
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Having made the determination to create a single national regulator, the Committee turned its 
attention on the regulator’s function. The Committee examined the regulatory models of New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, and clearly stated that those international models should not be 
copied.637 This resistance by the Committee derives from its own vision of how an Australian 
regulator of not-for-profit organisations should be. The Committee recommended that the new 
regulator be:638 
• A register – All not-for-profit organisations would be required to be registered with the 
regulator. The regulator will issue the organisation with a unique identifying number, or 
allow the organisation to use its Australian Business Number (‘ABN’).639 
• A public interface – The regulator would develop and maintain specific information about 
a not-for-profit organisation, which the public would have access to. 
• A data collector – To collect and analyse annual data provided by not-for-profit 
organisations, which can be transferred to the ABS. 
• An educator – To educate the public about the role of not-for-profit organisations. 
• An investigator – To handle complaints relating to the operation of not-for-profit 
organisations. 
• A leader – To develop best-practice standards for the operation of not-for-profit 
organisations. 
Despite the Committee’s desire for a regulatory model to be different from the one in the United 
Kingdom, these six functions can be found in the United Kingdom’s Charity Commission. 
Chapter Seven of this thesis examines the United Kingdom’s model of regulation. However, a 
point of difference between the two models is that the Committee’s model would aim to serve the 
public’s needs over the sector’s needs. The United Kingdom’s model of regulation not only 
protects the public’s interest, but also serves to protect the integrity of individual not-for-profit 
                                               
637 Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations (4 December 2008) 51–55. 
638 See Recommendations 4, 5 and 6. Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure 
Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 59–60 
639 The Committee held the view that this particular function would be unique to an Australian model of regulation, 
but this is not so. The United Kingdom’s Charity Commission performs this particular function. Chapter Seven 
discusses the functions of the United Kingdom’s Charity Commission. Standing Committee on Economics, 
Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 
58. 
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organisations and, moreover, the sector.640 In fairness to the Committee, the United Kingdom has 
had substantial time to develop and refine their model, and Australia is playing catch-up to make 
the sector relevant in contemporary society.641 
6.2.5 Financial Reporting 
Considering the issue of transparency, the Committee examined the current financial reporting 
requirements of not-for-profit organisations. It was dissatisfied with the significant reporting 
burden that not-for-profit organisations face, as well as the different requirements between 
jurisdictions.642 Although the Committee was satisfied with the level of financial transparency 
relating to not-for-profits securing government grants,643 the reporting systems needed 
improvement. The Committee recommended a tiered reporting system based on an organisation’s 
total annual revenue.644 This recommendation would see the implantation of a Standard Chart of 
Accounts developed by the Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Non-profit Studies, 
Queensland University of Technology.645 
A Standard Chart of Accounts pertains to financial, numerical and narratives reporting which 
would better inform a donor about an organisation’s financial activities, and also achieve 
transparency.646 Despite the Committee endorsing the use of the Standard Chart of Accounts, it 
did express reservations about its applicability to some forms of these organisations.647 The 
Committee believed that transparency could be achieved without standard accounts by requiring 
                                               
640 Charity Commission, ‘Strategic Plan 2012-2015, Vision, Mission and Values’ 2–3 <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Library/about_us/strategic_plan_2015.pdf>. 
641 Apart from England and Wales, regulatory frameworks for not-for-profit organisations can be found in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and New Zealand. Kerry O’Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study 
(Routledge, 2007) pt IV. 
642 Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations (4 December 2008) 103. 
643 Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations (4 December 2008) 103. 
644 See Recommendation 11. Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for 
Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 105. 
645 See Recommendation 12. Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for 
Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 111–112. 
646 Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations (4 December 2008) 111. 
647 Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit 
Organisations (4 December 2008) 111 
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organisations to disclose certain elements by narrative and numeric reporting.648 The Committee 
did not identify what these elements were, or the manner in which organisations of all forms and 
levels would disclose such information. Notwithstanding these concerns, the Committee 
suggested, as a matter of priority, that the federal government must further consult with the sector 
to implement a Standard Chart of Accounts.649 The federal government did not support all of the 
Committee’s recommendations in its report;650 however, it did acknowledge the need for a single 
national regulator and a standard chart of accounts,651 but held off making any further 
commitments to the Committee’s report until the findings from the Productivity Commission and 
the Henry Tax Review were released.652 
6.3 The Productivity Commission’s Report 
6.3.1 Background to the Productivity Commission’s Report 
It is commonly known that when the government of the day requests the Productivity 
Commission to furnish them with a report, the government is planning to take steps towards 
policy reform. In March 2009, the federal government requested the Productivity Commission to 
examine the contribution that the not-for-profit sector makes to Australian society.653 The 
commissioning of the report may also be seen more as action on their election commitment to 
have ‘a strong and productive non-profit sector’.654 
                                               
648 See recommendation 13. Standing Committee on Economics, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-
Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 112. 
649 See recommendation 12. Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for 
Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 112. 
650 The only recommendation, which the government agreed with, was to develop ‘in principle’ standard definitions 
and terminology for the sector. What the standard terms and definitions will be is dependent on the findings of 
the Productivity Commission and the Henry Review. Commonwealth Government, ‘Commonwealth Government 
Response to the Standing Committee on Economics Senate Inquiry into Disclosure regimes for Charities and 
Not-for-Profit Organisations’, 1 
<http://www.aph.gov/senate/committee/economics_ctte/charities_08/gov_response.pdf>. 
651 See recommendations 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13. Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, 
Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 
652 Commonwealth Government, ‘Commonwealth Government Response to the Standing Committee on Economics 
Senate Inquiry into Disclosure regimes for Charities and Not-for-Profit Organisations’, 1–4 
<http://www.aph.gov/senate/committee/economics_ctte/charities_08/gov_response.pdf>. 
653 The Hon. Julia Gillard MP, The Hon. Chris Bowen MP and Senator Ursula Stephens MP, ‘Productivity 
Commission to Review the Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Joint Media Release, No. 17, 17 March 
2009) 1. 
654 The Hon. Julia Gillard MP, ‘Strengthening the Non-Profit – Julia Gillard and Labor – Let’s Move Australia 
Forward’ (Media Release, No. unknown, undated) <http://www.alp.org.au/getattachment/88a7eb81-8b47-4315-
ad6e-c1c13c1963656/historic-reforms-to-australia-s-not-for-profits-wsec/>. 
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6.3.2 Terms of Reference 
Specifically, the Commission was tasked to, inter se: 
1. improve on how to measure and consider measuring alternatives that will capture the not-
for-profit sector’s contribution to Australian society; 
2. improve the use of measurements to shape government policy and programs; 
3. identify unnecessary burdens or impediments on community organisations, including 
unnecessary or ineffective regulatory requirements and governance arrangements, while 
having regard to the need to maintain transparency and accountability; 
4. consider options for improving the delivery of government-funded services by 
community organisations, including funding, contractual and reporting arrangements 
with government; 
5. examine the changing relationships between government, business and community 
organisations; and 
6. consider a broad definition of the not-for-profit sector to encompass most categories of 
not-for-profit organisations, including Australian-based international aid and 
development agencies.655 
The main aim of the Productivity Commission’s Report was to clearly exceed what other 
parliamentary inquiries tried to achieve. Where the previous parliamentary inquiries offered 
solutions confined to a selective type of problem, the Productivity Commission promised to be 
more encompassing by examining the many not-for-profit forms and the wide variety of activities 
that not-for-profit organisations undertake and, furthermore, provide action to remove obstacles 
to improve the sector’s efficiency.656 Importantly, the Productivity Commission’s Report was to 
provide the federal government with the necessary evidence-base to justify their reform policy. 
The reform recommended by the Productivity Commission was targeted at the whole not-for-
profit sector, but specifically in the following areas: 
• smarter regulation; 
• improving accountability and governance; 
                                               
655 The Hon. Julia Gillard MP, The Hon. Chris Bowen MP, and Senator The Hon. Ursula Stephens, MP ‘Productivity 
Commission to Review the Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Joint Media Release, No. 017, 17 March 
2009) 2-3. 
656 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) Terms of Reference IV-XXVI. 
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• improving data capture through advancing the current measuring 
frameworks; and 
• facilitating development, innovation and relationship building.657 
See Appendix 4 for a comprehensive summary of the Productivity Commission’s Report’s 
recommendations. 
6.3.3 The Productivity Commission’s Findings 
To avoid repetition, the targeted areas of regulation, accountability and governance in the 
Productivity Commission’s report do not greatly advance those solutions offered by the 
Disclosure Inquiry. However, the Commission’s recommendations did not necessarily reflect 
those of the Inquiry – particularly in the areas of financial reporting and regulation. 
6.3.4 Regulation 
The need for sound regulation was a key area of reform marked ‘urgent’.658 The Productivity 
Commission generally echoed the submissions and findings from the previous inquiries: that the 
current regulatory environment is unacceptable and complex.659 Adding their voice to this issue, 
the Productivity Commission criticised the state and territory governments for failing to improve 
the quality of regulation.660 The Commission considers the area of regulation to be made up of the 
following sub-matters: i) reporting requirements; ii) a regulator; iii) fundraising; iv) a new legal 
form; v) harmonisation of laws; and vi) tax status.661 Similar to other inquiries, the Commission 
failed to consider legal duties as part of the governance framework. 
                                               
657 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) LV. 
658 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) xxxvi. 
659 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 116. 
660 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 115. 
661 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 113-114. 
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6.3.5 A National Regulator 
Recommendations from previous inquiries supported the notion of a single national regulator for 
the not-for-profit sector, and the Productivity Committee agreed.662 However, agreement on the 
shape and function of a national regulator is a point of debate. There was overwhelming support 
by the sector’s stakeholders that a national regulator should reflect the form and function of the 
Charity Commission in the United Kingdom.663 However, the Productivity Commission’s notion 
of a national registry did not necessarily reflect the desire of the sector’s stakeholders. The 
Commission prefers a national registry to a national regulator.664 
The Productivity Commission proposed that this statutory body be called the Registrar for 
Community and Charitable Purpose Organisation and would be established within the Australian 
Securities Investments Commission (ASIC).665 This new statutory body would be responsible for 
regulating companies limited by guarantee and indigenous corporations only.666 The function of 
the Registrar for Community and Charitable Purpose Organisations would be limited to 
registration, financial reporting, endorsing tax concessions and fundraising compliance.667 The 
Productivity Commission in justifying the creation of this statutory body thought that it would 
underpin public trust and increase public confidence in the entire not-for-profit sector.668 
Increasing public confidence in the sector should be a priority for our policy makers, and a 
national registry is viewed as a step towards restoring public confidence by confirming an 
organisation’s status to be a not-for-profit. However, this proposed framework is too narrow and 
thin on two grounds. First, the registrar will be a public record for only two forms of not-for-
                                               
662 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 117. 
663Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity Commission, 
January 2010) 116. 
664 The Productivity Committee is of the view that a regulator will not assist in the development of the not-for-profit 
sector. Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 117. 
665 See Recommendation 6.5. Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research 
Report, Productivity Commission, January 2010) 149. 
666 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 111, 379. 
667 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 111. 
668 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 111. 
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profit organisations and ignores other forms.669 Secondly, the proposed model has not been 
constructed to facilitate transparency or to monitor the effectiveness of the not-for-profit sector 
and its organisations. Should the Registrar for Community and Charitable Purpose Organisations 
be given supervisory and regulatory powers, it would advance the public’s confidence in the 
sector and achieve transparency. 
6.3.6 Corporate and Financial Reporting Requirements 
Along with the previous parliamentary inquiries, the Productivity Commission acknowledges 
financial reporting requirements across the different not-for-profit forms and jurisdictions are 
inconsistent.670 The Commission rightly called for the adoption of a national Standard Chart of 
Accounts to address this issue.671 Further, the creation of a national Standard Chart of Accounts 
would encourage proportionate financial reporting regulation for all the legal forms of not-for-
profits.672 
Standardising the reporting system will provide the foundation for a single national portal.673 
This portal will allow lodgement and access to corporate and financial information about 
companies limited by guarantee only. Access to this database will be for conducting a financial 
and corporate health checks for government contracting, and for the general public to be provided 
with valuable and meaningful information about the sector and organisations.674 State and 
territories would be called upon to harmonise their associations incorporated legislation to allow 
                                               
669 State and territory governments have registries for incorporated associations; however, the other forms of not-for-
profit organisations, such as unincorporated associations, foundations and cooperatives; have been ignored by the 
Productivity Commission and its recommendation for a national registry. 
670 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 129. 
671 Standard Chart of Accounts is a standard of business reporting that aims to remove unnecessary and duplicated 
information from government forms by creating a common reporting language that is based on international 
standards and best practice. The approach taken by the Standard Chart of Accounts is to provide a common 
approach to capture accounting information for use of not-for-profit organisations and government agencies. The 
Standard of Accounts has been designed specifically for small to medium sized not-for-profit organisations that 
do not have an accounting department or a sophisticated accounting system. See Recommendation 6.5. 
Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 134. 
672 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 133. 
673 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 135. 
674 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 135. 
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the portal to link into the state’s information systems.675 Establishing a national portal would seek 
to achieve the ‘report once, use often’ principle.676 
Complementary to the introduction of a Standard Chart of Accounts, the Productivity 
Commission recommends the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to be amended.677 Behind this 
recommendation is the Commission’s finding that the rigours of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
and the Australian Accounting Standards are burdensome for small organisations with limited 
resources.678 The Productivity Commission suggested that the government create a separate 
chapter in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for not-for-profit companies limited by guarantee.679 
This separate chapter will outline the principles of proportionality in relation to reporting, fees 
and charges, and provide clearer rules on how to dispose of assets in the event of dissolution and 
prohibit payment of dividends to members of a company limited by guarantee.680 
6.4 Conclusion 
Australia’s federal parliament had shown little interest in understanding the needs of the not-for-
profit sector. However, in more recent times, it has commissioned numerous reports and inquiries 
to understand and reform the not-for-profit sector. From each inquiry a diverse range of issues 
affecting the not-for-profit sector and organisations has emerged, such as taxation, fundraising, 
measuring frameworks, government contracts and relations. At the core of these inquiries and 
reports is the lack of public confidence in the sector and the desire for not-for-profit organisations 
to be transparent in a manner akin to for-profit organisations. The Disclosure Inquiry and the 
Productivity Commission agreed that immediate action is needed to improve regulation by 
streamlining financial reporting obligations and introducing a statutory regulator – however, the 
Committee ignored the role that legal duties and obligations play in a governance framework. 
                                               
675 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 135. 
676 See Recommendation 6.6. Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research 
Report, Productivity Commission, January 2010) 135. 
677 See Recommendation 6.1. Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research 
Report, Productivity Commission, January 2010) 128. 
678 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 118, 120. 
679 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 113. 
680 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 134–135. 
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How the sector is to be regulated by a statutory federal agency, and how to implement financial 
reporting obligations for not-for-profit organisations have shown to be points of debate. 
The Productivity Committee recommends that a national statutory body called the Registrar 
for Community and Charitable Purpose Organisations be established within the Australian 
Securities Investments Commission. The Registrar would be responsible only for companies 
limited by guarantee and indigenous corporations. On the other hand, the Committee of the 
Disclosure Inquiry recommended a national regulator be an independent statutory authority, 
which would be responsible for all forms of not-for-profit organisations and, furthermore, have 
investigative and regulative powers over the sector. The suggested model, called the Registrar for 
Community and Charitable Purpose Organisations, is devoid of these powers and serves the 
function of a registry for only two forms of not-for-profit organisations. Regardless of the shape 
that the national statutory body, there is an aim to improve governance of the sector through 
financial reporting obligations for not-for-profit sector. 
The Productivity Commission and the Committee found inconsistencies across jurisdictions 
in the area of financial reporting. These inconsistences were found to be caused by the tensions in 
the legislative powers vested in the states and the Commonwealth. The Committee recommended 
the formation of a new legal structure that would overcome these tensions. However, the 
Productivity Commission rejected the idea of a new legal structure and recommended that state 
incorporated association legislation relating to financial reporting be harmonised, and to allow a 
not-for-profit organisation to migrate into another form within the federal jurisdiction with ease. 
The harmonisation of state laws would include the introduction of a national Standard of 
Accounts and a tiered reporting system. The standardisation of financial reporting system would 
lead to the creation of a national portal, which would allow members of the public and 
governments to conduct a ‘corporate health check’ on individual organisations. The Committee 
and the Productivity Commission, in making their recommendations, examined the regulatory 
arrangements in the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding the overwhelming support to implement a 
model similar to the United Kingdom’s Charity Commission, the Committee and the Productivity 
Commission rejected this suggestion. 
The Productivity Commission and the Committee, in rejecting the United Kingdom’s model, 
are pursuing their own vision. However, the basic recommendations made by the Committee and 
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the Productivity Commission, in relation to regulation and financial reporting, can also be found 
in the United Kingdom’s Charity Commission. 
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CHAPTER 7: The United Kingdom’s Attempt 
to Develop World’s Best Practice 
for Not-for-Profits 
 
All developed countries, and many developing ones too, recognise the value of 
charitable and not-for-profit activity and the need to regulate it.’681 
7.0 Introduction 
In mid 2001, the Blair Government initiated a major review of the United Kingdom’s not-for-
profit sector. The Strategy Unit was given the mandate by the prime minister to review the entire 
not-for-profit sector and to propose legal reforms that would modernise the not-for-profit sector 
in England and Wales.682 The Strategy Unit delivered its report in September 2002, and proposed 
wide-ranging reforms to improve and modernise the legal and regulatory frameworks of the not-
for-profit sector. The Blair government adopted and implemented all of the Strategy Unit’s 
recommendations and, as such, the British regulatory model for not-for-profits has earned the 
status and recognition as world’s best practice.683 Chapter Seven provides a brief historical 
overview of charity legislation in the United Kingdom, highlighting the different, and modern, 
not-for-profit organisational forms; it also examines the make-up and the valuable role the 
Charity Commission (the Commission) plays in regulating the not-for-profit sector and its 
organisations. 
7.1 A Brief History of the United Kingdom’s Charity Legislation 
The protection and enforcement of charitable trusts was once the responsibility of the Attorney 
General684 until King James, by decree, statutorily assigned the role to an administrative body.685 
                                               
681 David Locke, ‘Is Australia ready to change the way we treat our Not-for-Profit Sector? A view from the UK’ 
(Speech delivered at the unnamed forum, Melbourne and Brisbane, June 2010) 4 <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.ak/About_us/About_the_Commission/Speeches/david_speech_0610.aspx>. 
682 Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (UK), ‘Prime Minister Announces Voluntary Sector Review’ (Press Release, 3 
July 2001) <http://www.strategy.gov.uk/output/Page3887.asp>. 
683 The Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, Tax Laws Amendment (Public 
Benefit Test) Bill 2010, (September 2010) 4.34, 39. 
684 The parens patriae jurisdiction of the Crown with respect to charities was devolved from the Lord Chancellor and 
vested in the Attorney General. Ludlow Corp. v Greenhoe (1827) 1 Bli. NS 17. Charitable trusts in Australia 
remain under the supervision of the states’ Attorneys General, except in the Northern Territory. See Attorney-
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This administrative body ended in 1803, and the government was, subsequently, given the 
responsibility to regulate and solve the problems of the day, which were: delay by charities 
lodging returns (sworn on oath to Parliament); abuse of charitable trusts; to reduce the expense of 
judicial action to remedy these troubles.686 The findings from the Brougham Inquiry of 1819–37 
showed that the courts and the role of the Attorney General were inefficient in detecting the 
misuse of charitable funds, and this inquiry held that a better approach would be to establish a 
permanent Commission to supervise charities. 687 
The suggestion of a Commission was endorsed by parliament in the Charitable Trusts Act 
1858.688 Over time, the Commission was provided with wide statutory power to supervise and 
support charities,689 and to be the official custodian.690 The modernisation of the not-for-profit 
sector in the United Kingdom and the Commission can be found in the Charities Act 1993 (UK) 
and the Charities Act 2006 (UK), which will be discussed further in this chapter. 
As already mentioned, Prime Minister Blair commissioned a review of charity law and 
regulation in 2001.691 All the recommendations from this review were accepted by the 
government and implemented through legislation or administrative action.692 The Charities Act 
2006 (UK) was created to: 
• modernise and restate charitable purposes; 
• impose an express obligation on charities and trustees to ensure that they provided a 
public benefit; 
                                                                                                                                                        
General Act 2009 (Qld) s 7(e); Charitable Trusts Act 1993 (NSW) pt 4; Charitable Trusts Act 1993 (ACT) pt 2; 
Charities Act 1978 (Vic) pt 2; Trustee Act 1936 (SA) s 84E; Variation of Trusts Act 1994 (Tas) s 7; Charitable 
Trusts Act 1962 (WA) s 20. 
685 Kerry O’Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study (Routledge, 2007) 69. 
686 Kerry O’Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study (Routledge, 2007) 69. 
687 Over four hundred charities were prosecuted, thereby prompting the need for an inquiry. Kerry O’Halloran, 
Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study (Routledge, 2007) 70. 
688 The Charitable Trust Act 1853 was amended in 1855 and 1860 and then consolidated in 1858. Kerry O’Halloran, 
Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study (Routledge, 2007) 70. 
689 Strengthening the Commission’s role and authority, the legislation followed the recommendation of the 
Woodfield Report. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Charities: A Framework for the Future, 
Whitepaper, Cmd 694 (May 1989); Kerry O’Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study 
(Routledge, 2007) 197. 
690 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 2. 
691 The Strategy Unit published the report entitled ‘Private Action, Public Benefit – A View of Charities and the 
Wider Not-for-Profit Sector’, which was open to public consultation from September 2002 to January 2003. 
Explanatory Notes to the Charities Act 2006, para 8; Cabinet Office, ‘Private Action, Public Benefit – A View of 
Charities and the Wider Not-for-Profit Sector’ (September 2002). 
692 Explanatory Notes to the Charities Act 2006 (UK), para 10. 
  129 
• amend the composition and function of the Commission; 
• establish the Charity Tribunal; and 
• improve the range of legal forms available to charities and social enterprise.693 
Section 73 of the Charities Act 2006 (UK) requires the Minister for the Cabinet Office to institute 
a review of this Act within five years after Royal Assent – this gives the impression that this area 
of law is forever changing. Recently, Lord Hodgson was appointed by the Cabinet Office to 
review the Charities Act 2006 (UK).694 Lord Hodgson’s review will assess whether or not 
changes are needed to improve the legal and regulatory framework for charities and to determine 
the effectiveness of the 2006 Act.695 Lord Hodgson is not expected to submit his full report to 
Parliament until summer 2012,696 but this review has already seen changes to the Charities 
Acts.697 
The Charities Act 2011 (UK) repeals the Recreational Charities Act 1958 (UK) and 
consolidates the Charities Act 1993 (UK) and some provisions of the Charities Act 2006 (UK).698 
The 2011 Act has not made substantive changes to the law, nor does it introduces new policy.699 
Although the Charities Act 2011 (UK) received Royal Assent on 14 December 2011, the Act did 
not come into force until March 2012. This thesis will provide statutory provisions from the 
preceding charities’ legislation as well as the 2011 Act. 
7.2 Overview of Legal Entities in England and Wales 
To appreciate the extent of reforms undertaken within the United Kingdom’s not-for-profit 
sector, it is necessary to examine the legal entities individually. 
                                               
693 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) Introduction, 
xvii. 
694 HL Deb 23 November 2011, vol 23, col 1110. 
695 Cabinet Office, ‘Review of the Charities Act 2006 – Terms of Reference’ 
<http//:www.cabinetoffice.gov.auk/resource-library/review-charities-act-2006-%E2%80%93-terms-
reference.pdf> 1. 
696 The Hon Nick Hurd, Minister for Civil Society, ‘Review of Charity Law’ (Media Release, CAB 224-11, 8 
November 2011) <http://cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/review-charitylaw> 1. 
697 Charities Act 1992 (UK) c 10; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50. 
698 Charity Commission, ‘Charities Act 2011 – New Legislation receives Royal Assent’ <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/rss/updates/charities_act_2011.aspx>. 
699 Charities (Pre-consolidation Bill Amendments Order) 2011 (UK) SI 2011/1396 para 7.4 
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7.2.1 Charity 
A charity within the English system is an institution (in the form of a trust) that has been 
established for a charitable purpose only.700 Howener this has now been given a broad ambit. A 
trust’s charitable purpose must fall within any of the following descriptions: 
a) the prevention of relief of poverty; 
b) the advancement of education; 
c) the advancement of religion;701 
d) the advancement of health, or the saving of the lives; 702 
e) the advancement of citizenship or community development;703 
f) the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science; 
g) the advancement of amateur sport;704 
h) the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation, or the 
promotion of religious or racial harmony, or equality and diversity; 
i) the advancement of environmental protection or improvement; 
j) the relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial 
hardship or other disadvantage;705 
k) the advancement of animal welfare; 
l) the promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown, or of the 
efficiency of the policy, fire and rescue services, or ambulance services; or 706 
m) any other purpose that is recognised as charitable purpose under existing charity 
law,707 or by virtue of section 1 of the Recreational Charities Act.708 
                                               
700 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 1(1); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 1(1). 
701 Religion includes: (i) a belief in more than one God; and (ii) a religion that does not involve belief in a God. 
Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 2 (3)(a); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 3(2)(a). 
702 The ‘advancement of health’ includes the prevention or relief of sickness, disease or human suffering. Charities 
Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 2(3)(b); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 3(2)(b). 
703 ‘Citizenship’ or ‘community development’ includes: (i) rural or urban regeneration; and (ii) the promotion of 
civic responsibility, volunteering, the voluntary sector of the effectiveness or efficiency of charities. Charities Act 
2006 (UK) c 50, s 3(3)(c); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 3(2)(c). 
704 ‘Sport’ means sports or games that promote health by involving physical or mental skill or exertion. Charities Act 
2006 (UK) c 50, s 2(3)(d); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 3(2)(d). However, a registered sporting club under 
schedule 18 of the Finance Act 2002 (UK) c 23 and established for a charitable purpose cannot be a charity. 
Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 5(3)-(4); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 3(2)(d). 
705 This purpose includes relief given by the provision of accommodation or care to persons mentioned in this 
paragraph. Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 2(3)(e); Charities Act 2011 c 25, s 3(2)(e). 
706 ‘Fire and rescue services’ means services provided by fire and rescue authorities under Part 2 of the Fire and 
Rescue Services Act 2004 (UK). Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 2(3)(f); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 3(2)(f). 
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The phrase ‘any other purpose’ in sub-paragraph (m) is to mean that an organisation will be a 
charitable if it can show that its purpose are analogous to, or within the spirit of, any purpose 
outlined in sub-paragraphs (a) to (l).709 
This list expands the traditional four heads of charitable purpose taken from the 1601 Statute 
of Elizabeth and long-standing case law.710 The expansion of charitable purposes also provides 
clarity to borderline cases.711 On a policy level, the new descriptions modernise charities to be 
more relevant to the needs of the twenty-first century, such as environmental protection and 
issues of human rights.712 However, despite expanding the parameters of charitable purposes, 
charities are still required to demonstrate a public benefit.713 
The public benefit test under section 3 requires a charity to demonstrate its aims are for the 
public benefit.714 Underpinning the public benefit test are two key principles of: (i) there being 
and identifiable benefit; and (ii) the benefit must be to the public, or a sector of the public, which 
an organisation must also satisfy to achieve charitable status. Table 8 outlines the principles and 
the sub-principles of the public benefit test. 
Determining charitable status for organisations is a decision made by the Commission.715 The 
Commission in making their assessment of the ‘two-stage test’ (the purpose test and the public 
benefit test)716 has indicated that it will not deviate from the long-standing charity law.717 The 
                                                                                                                                                        
707 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 2(2); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 3(3). The ‘old law’ means the law relating 
to charity in England and Wales, which was in force before 1 April 2008. Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 
3(3)(4). 
708 Section 1 provides that a trust will be charitable if it provides, or assist in the provision of, facilities for recreation 
or other leisure-time occupation, and if the facilities are provided in the interests of social welfare. Recreational 
Charities Act 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz 2; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 5. A ‘registered sporting club’ established for 
charitable purposes is treated as not being a charity. Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 6. 
709 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 2(4)(b)-(c); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 3(m)(ii)-(iii). 
710 The traditional heads of charitable purposes are: 1) the relief of poverty; 2) the advancement of education; 3) the 
advancement of religion; and 4) other purposes beneficial to the community. Charitable Uses Act 1601 43 Eliz 1, 
c 4. 
711 Strategy Report, Private Action, Public Benefit – A Review of Charities and the Wider Not-for Profit Sector, 
September 2002, 36 < http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/strat%20data.pdf>. 
712 Prior to these reforms, it was inconceivable under the Statute of Elizabeth and for the courts to treat an 
organisation such as Greenpeace as a charity. The expansion of charitable purpose is significant because it has 
made charities more relevant to today and the future. 
713 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 2(1)(b); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 4(1). 
714 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 3(1)-(2); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 4. 
715 Refer to7.3.4 of this thesis for a details about the Commission’s functions. 
716 The charitable purpose test and the public benefit test will be refereed to as the ‘two-stage test’. 
717 Charity Commission, ‘Analysis of the law underpinning Charities and Public Benefit’ (December 2008) < 
http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/guidance/lawpb1208.pdf > Preface; Alison MacLennan, 
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onus remains on individual organisations to demonstrate to the Commission how their 
organisation’s activities satisfy the two-stage test. The Commission in making its determination 
will also consider other extrinsic factors, such as the modern social and economic conditions in 
which the organisation intends to operate.718 
7.2.2 Composition of a Charity 
Membership 
The make-up of a charity is simple. A charity may have or not have a membership base, and 
members can be classed as voting or non-voting members. Voting members of a charity may 
either be corporate or individual members. Corporate members may include companies, local 
authorities, or any other public body or corporation where a nominated representative holds a 
right to vote at the charity’s annual general meeting. A voting member may be a representative of 
another not-for-profit organisation or unincorporated charity. Individuals acting in the capacity of 
a trustee, director, or any other role on the governing body of the charity, are not classified as 
members.719 
Trustees 
Charity trustees are individuals who have the responsibility and the general control to manage 
and administer the organisation.720 Trustees can also be known as directors, board members, 
governors, committee members, and a connected person. Many trustees are volunteers, and it is 
not uncommon for professional trustees to be involved with charities.721 Furthermore, there are 
also nominative and ex-officio trustees. A nominative trustee is appointed by another 
                                                                                                                                                        
Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 13-14; Charity Commission, 
Decision of the Charity Commissioners For England and Wales Made on the 30 January 2003, Application for 
Registration of the Wolf Trust (Formerly Known as Wild Bite) para, 4.2–5.5, 2 < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Library/start/wolftrustdecision.pdf >. 
718 Charity Commission, ‘Analysis of the Law Underpinning Charities and Public Benefit’ (December 2008) 
http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/guidance/lawpb1208.pdf; Charity Commission, Decision of the 
Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, Application for Registration of the Wolf Trust (Formerly known 
as Wild Bite), 30 January 2003, para 2, <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Library/start/wolftrustdecision.pdf >; Charity Commission, Application for Registration of 
Good News for Israel Decision made on 5 February 2004, para 2.1, 1 < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Library/start/gnfidecision.pdf>. 
719 Charity Commission, ‘RS7 – Membership Charities’ (March 2004) <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/publications/rs7.aspx>5-7. 
720 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 50, s 97; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 177. 
721 Charity Commission, ‘CC3 – The Essential Trustee: What you Need to Know’ (February 2008) 
<http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/cc3.aspx> 4. 
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organisation, and an ex-officio trustee is one by virtue of their office – for example, a vicar of a 
parish.722 Regardless of the individual’s title or appointment, all trustees have the same 
responsibilities and duties. 
7.2.3 A Trustee’s Duties and Responsibilities 
When individuals take on the role of a trustee they accept the responsibility of directing the 
charity’s affairs that will deliver outcomes that benefits the public.723 To remain true to the 
charitable purpose, trustees must ensure that they and their charities comply with all United 
Kingdom’s laws (specifically, charity law) and any other requirements of the Charity 
Commission.724 Additionally, a trustee is expected to meet a number of general and specific legal 
duties. 
Generally, trustees have a duty of prudence and a duty of care. To satisfy the duty of prudence 
they must ensure their charity is and remains solvent, and to reasonably use charitable funds and 
assets only to further the charity’s purpose and interests.725 Trustees must take special care when 
investing or borrowing funds for their charities.726 Furthermore, they must avoid undertaking 
activities that might place their charity’s funds, property, assets or reputation at undue risk.727 
With respect to duty of care, the trustees must use reasonable care and skill to ensure their 
charity is well run and efficient by employing their personal skills and experience.728 Where a 
material risk is present, trustees would breach their duty of care if they do not consider seeking 
                                               
722 Charity Commission, ‘A Guide to Conflicts for Charity Trustees’ (February 2011) 
<http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Charity_requirements_guidance/Charity_governance/conflicts.aspx> 9-
10. 
723 Charity Commission, ‘CC3 – The Essential Trustee: What you Need to Know’ (February 2008) 
<http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/cc3.aspx>, 7. 
724 Counter-terrorism laws also have an impact on charities and trustees. Charity Commission, ‘Charity Law Duties 
and Responsibilities, Compliance Toolkit: Protecting Charities from Harm, Chapter 1: Charities and Terrorism 
Module 8’ <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/our_regulatory_activity/counter_terrorism_work/tkch1mod8.aspx> 1. 
725 Charity Commission, ‘CC3a – The Essential Trustee: An Introduction’ (January 2007) < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Publications/cc3a.aspx> 2. 
726 Charity Commission, ‘CC3a – The Essential Trustee: An Introduction’ (January 2007) < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Publications/cc3a.aspx> 2. 
727 Charity Commission, ‘CC3a – The Essential Trustee: An Introduction’ (January 2007) < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Publications/cc3a.aspx>, 2. 
728 Charity Commission, ‘CC3a – The Essential Trustee: An Introduction’ (January 2007) < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Publications/cc3a.aspx>, 2. 
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external professional advice regarding the specific risk.729 To further satisfy this duty, trustees 
must not engage in conduct that would amount to misconduct in the administration of their 
charities, and that would subsequently harm the public confidence in them. Additionally, trustees 
must fulfil specific duties that relate to the running of their charity. 
To avoid improper behaviour, trustees have a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. No trustee 
should be in receipt of an unauthorised benefit and, therefore a trustee should not be in a position 
where his or her personal interests and the duty to the charity are in conflict.730 However, trustees 
may keep a potential benefit if the conflict is transparent. To uphold a trustee’s duty of trust and 
loyalty, and to be seen as transparent, the conflict must be properly and openly managed. To 
manage a conflict of interest adequately, a trustee must declare his or her interest at the 
commencement of the Trustees’ meeting, retreat from taking part in the discussion during the 
meeting, and outline the interest in the charity’s register of interest.731 
Complying with the requirements of the Charity Commission is another specific duty of a 
trustee. The Commission requires a charity to be registered and to provide Annual Returns and 
Trustees' Annual Reports and Accounts to the Commission.732 A trustee has a duty to ensure that 
the charity’s accounting records are kept sufficiently, which shows and explains all the charity’s 
transactions.733 Records of financial transactions undertaken by the charity provide the basis for a 
trustee’s annual statement and report.734 
Pursuant to the Trustee Act,735 a trustee has wide statutory powers to facilitate proper 
administration of trusts and to safeguards the interests of beneficiaries.736 For trustees to achieve 
                                               
729 Charity Commission, ‘CC3a – The Essential Trustee: An Introduction’ (January 2007) < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Publications/cc3a.aspx> 2-3. 
730 Charity Commission, ‘CC3a – The Essential Trustee: An Introduction’ (January 2007) < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Publications/cc3a.aspx> 2. 
731 Charity Commission, ‘A Guide to Conflicts of Interest for Charity Trustees’ (February 2011) < 
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Charity_requirements_guidance/Charity_governance/Good_governance/c
onflicts.aspx> 2-9. 
732 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 3B(1); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 30(1). 
733 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 41; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 130. 
734 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 42; The Charities (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008 (UK) SI 2009/1942 
reg 8; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 131-132; Charity Commission, ‘CC15b – Charity Reporting and 
Accounting: The Essentials’ (April 2009) < http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Publications/cc15b.aspx> 5. 
A Trustees’ Annual Report is only necessary if the registered charity has a gross income that exceeds £10,000.00. 
Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 45. 
735 2000 (UK) c 29. 
736 Explanatory Notes, Trustee Act 2000 (UK) c 29, 4–5, 1. 
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this, section 1 defines a statutory duty of care for them. 737 To comply with section 1, trustees 
must show their skill and care is reasonable in the circumstances, thus making allowances for a 
trustee’s special knowledge, experience or professional status.738 This duty of care is applicable 
where trustees are exercising their investment power for the following activities: 
• investing trust property; 
• investing or reviewing investments; 
•  acquiring or managing land; 
•  appointing or reviewing the appointment of an agent, nominee or custodian; 
•  compounding liabilities; 
•  insuring trust property; and 
•  dealing with reversionary interests, valuations and audits.739 
Where a trust instrument does not provide a trustee with the power to invest, a default power of 
investment is provided in section 3.740 The statutory power to invest a trust’s assets is considered 
to be the same if an individual trustee owned the assets rather than holding them on trust.741 
Without diminishing the obligations of trustees, they are under an express duty to have regard to 
the best interests of the trust’s beneficiaries.742 Therefore, these duties and obligations require a 
trustee (or more so the individual) to dedicate enough of his or her time to meet their legal duties 
and responsibilities. 
7.2.4 Charitable Incorporated Organisations 
Another innovative reform under the Charities Act 2006 (UK) was the creation of a new 
incorporated charitable form, the charitable incorporated organisation.743 The charitable 
incorporated organisation (CIO) provides the benefit of incorporation by creating a legal 
                                               
737 Trustee Act 2000 (UK) c 29. 
738 Trustee Act 2000 (UK) c 29, s 1(1)(a)–(b). 
739 Trustee Act 2000 (UK) c 29, s 2, sch 1. Dealing with reversionary interests, valuations and audits occur under 
section 22(1) or (3) Trustee Act 1925 (UK). 
740 Trustee Act 2000 (UK) c 29. 
741 Trustee Act 2000 (UK) c 29, s 3–7. 
742 Trustee Act 2000 (UK) c 29, s 8; Explanatory Notes, Trustee Act 2000 (UK), 6,2. 
743 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 43; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 204. 
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personality for a charity, and provides trustees with limited liability744 – designed to avoid 
duplication of the registration process and reporting requirements for charitable companies.745 A 
CIO could easily be considered (prime facie) to be the same as an incorporated association, but 
such a simple thought can be misleading. 
7.2.5 Composition of a Charitable Incorporated Organisation 
The similarities between a CIO and an incorporated association are few. Both entities are bodies 
corporate that have limited liability and a constitution.746 The respective constitutions are similar 
in that the CIO document makes provisions for: 
• a membership base;747 
• eligibility criteria for membership; 
• the appointment and eligibility (including conditions) of an appointment of 
a charity trustee; and 
• directions about the application of property upon dissolution of the CIO.748 
This last prescribed feature is not outlined in an incorporated association’s constitution, and must 
resort to the relevant legislation for guidance on the issue.749 
The Commission will decide whether a non-profit organisation is eligible to become a CIO, 
and the Commission registers a CIO as a charity. 750 To be registered as a charity and to gain 
charitable status, the Commission must be satisfied that the CIO meets the two-stage test.751 
                                               
744 Charity Commission, ‘Charities Act 2006 – What Trustees Need to Know’ < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Charity_requirements_guidance/ccpubs3.aspx> 15-16. 
745 A charitable company (limited by guarantee) is required to be registered and meet reporting requirements under 
company law with Companies House. Hubert Picarda QC, ‘Harmonising Nonprofit Law in the EU’ in Klaus 
Hopt and Thomas Von Hippel (eds), International Corporate Law and Financial Market Regulation – 
Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organisations (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 185. 
Further, a charitable company, a community interested company, and a registered society under the Industrial 
and Provident Societies Act 1965 (UK) are encouraged to convert to the CIO structure. Charities Act 2006 (UK) 
c 50, s 69G(1), 69J, sch 7; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 228. 
746 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 69A; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, sch 7; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 205. 
Members of a CIO are not liable to contribute to assets of the CIO if it is wound up. Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 
10, s 69A(6)(a); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 205(3). 
747 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 69A(5); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 206(2). 
748 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 69B(2); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 206(2)(c). 
749 See Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 4(9); Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 65; 
Associations Incorporation Act (ACT) 1991 s 92; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 22; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 46; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 30; Associations Incorporation 
(Amendment) Act 2000 (Vic) s 33A; Associations Incorporation Amendment Act 2010 (Vic) s 23; Associations 
Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 23. 
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Membership 
Divergence between the two forms is seen when comparing the qualification to become 
incorporated and the membership requirements. An incorporated association requires a prescribed 
number of members to be eligible for incorporation, whereas a CIO needs only one  member.752 
Individuals on the executive or management committee of an incorporated association are 
required to be a member of the association, whereas a trustee of a CIO is not required to be a 
member of the CIO.753 
7.2.6 CIO Trustees’ Duties and Members’ Duties 
All trustees of a CIO performing their functions and exercising their powers must do so with care 
and skill that is reasonable in the circumstances.754 Where a trustee is exercising reasonable skill 
and care, regard will be given to the trustee’s special knowledge or experience that the trustee 
purports to have.755 
Furthermore, an individual in the position of a trustee must not benefit personally (either 
directly or indirectly) from any arrangement or transaction entered into by the CIO.756 A trustee is 
required to disclose any material interest before the CIO enters into the transaction, or 
arrangement.757 Regarding a member’s duty, section 220 requires all members of a CIO to 
exercise their powers in good faith, where it is likely to further the purposes of the CIO.758 
                                                                                                                                                        
750 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, sch 7, s 69E(1); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 209(1). 
751 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 3; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 208; Alison Maclennan, Blackstone’s Guide to 
The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 54. 
752 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, sch 7, s 69A(5); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 205(2)(c). See 4.3.3 for an outline 
of the statutory requirements for membership to an incorporated association. 
753 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 69B(6); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 206(6)(b). It is common in England for 
charities and CIOs to appoint professional trustees rather than rely on the membership base to appoint a trustee. 
754 Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 221(2). 
755 Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 221(2)(a). 
756 Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 222(1)-(2). 
757 Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 222(1). 
758 Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25. 
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7.2.7 Charitable Unincorporated Associations/Charities 
A charitable unincorporated association (CUA) is described as a group of people that co-operate 
and play out certain administrative roles to further their organisation.759 A CUA can either be a 
trust or association, but it cannot be a company with a legal personality.760 Similar to the other 
forms of not-for-profit organisations in the United Kingdom, a CUA must be registered with the 
Commission, which encourages organisations to consider the CUA structure.761 The structure of a 
CUA is encouraged where an organisation: 
• has a membership base; 
• the membership base represents the views of local residents, local councils and other 
bodies that need to be represented through a membership base, or are users of 
facilities; 
• the organisation’s object is to be carried out wholly or partly by the members; 
• trustees are elected by the members; 
• elected trustees hold office for a fixed period of time (e.g. a year); 
• is a local branch of a national charity; or 
• is small in terms of assets (income less than £5,000).762 
Despite the requirement for a CUA to be registered with the Commission, this does not suggest 
that a CUA becomes a body corporate upon registration.763 Through registration, a CUA falls 
under the Commission’s supervision. The Commission plays an important role in facilitating the 
powers of a UCA’s trustee. A trustee of a UCA has the power to conduct the following:764 
                                               
759 Charity Commission, ‘CC22 – Choosing and Preparing a Governing Document’ 
<http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/cc22.aspx#9> 6. 
760 An ACU cannot enter into contracts in their own names. Charity Commission, ‘Glossary, Charities Act 2006 – 
What Trustees Need to Know’ < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Charity_requirements_guidance/ccpubs3.aspx> 46. 
761 Where a CUA is an exempted charity there is no requirement to be registered with the Commission. Charity 
Commission, ‘CC22 – Choosing and Preparing a Governing Document’ 
<http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/cc22.aspx#9>, 6. 
762 Charity Commission, ‘CC22 – Choosing and Preparing a Governing Document’ 
<http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/cc22.aspx#9> 7. 
763 Pursuant to sections 50 and 52 of the Charities Act 1993 (UK) trustees may apply to the Commission for a 
certificate of incorporation as a body corporate. Once the Commission grants the certificate, the charity becomes 
a body corporate. Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 50(3)(a); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 251(1). 
764 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, ch, 10; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, ch 13. 
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• transfer property and permanent endowment;765 
• resolve and replace a UCA’s purposes;766 
• modify the administration procedures of a UCA;767 and 
• spend available capital.768 
Despite the Commission supervising UCAs, the known legal uncertainties and troubles with the 
unincorporated form still remain. 
7.2.8 Community Interest Companies 
The community interest company (CIC) was created in 2005 for organisations that did not want 
to be a charity, but wished to pursue altruistic activities. At the time of creation, the CIC structure 
was earmarked to be an effective legal form for social enterprises.769 Specifically, the design 
behind the CIC structure allows for people who would like to establish or conduct a business that 
trades with a social purpose, or for a community benefit. Common activities carried out by a CIC 
are community medical practices, environment projects, childcare, arts and education projects.770 
Like any other not-for-profit organisation, a CIC cannot be formed or used for the personal gain 
of an individual or a group of people, such as investors – nor can they be formed to support 
political purposes.771 However, if the organisation has a charitable status, it may apply to 
registered as a CIC subsidiary company with Companies House.772 
                                               
765 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 74, 74B; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 40; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 
268. 
766 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 74C; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 40; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 275. 
767 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 74D; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 40; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 280. 
768 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 75, 75A–75B; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 40; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, 
s 281. Larger unincorporated charities (annual income of over £1,000, or market value of the permanent 
endowment over £10,000) must obtain the Commission’s consent to spend the endowment. 
769 Sara Burgess, The Regulator of Community Interest Companies 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%201%20-
%20October%202009%20(version%204%20final).pdf> 2. 
770 Community Interest Company Regulator, ‘Chapter 4: Creating a CIC’ (20 October 2009) 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/CIC%20%20ch%204%20 
Oct%202009%20version%209%20final.pdf>. 
771 Community Interest Company Regulator, ‘Chapter 7: Community Interest Companies’ 
<http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/about/gbhtml/gp1.shtml#ch7>. 
772 Community Interest Company Regulator, ‘About Us: Community Interest Companies (CICs)’ 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/aboutUs.shtml>. 
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A CIC enjoys limited liability, and this structure can be incorporated as a new company, or an 
existing one that can be converted.773 The forms that a CIC may take are: a company limited by 
guarantee; a private company limited by shares; or a public company limited by shares.774 Before 
obtaining company status, the CIC regulator must be satisfied the company has satisfied the asset 
lock test and the community interest test.775 
There is an inter-relationship between the asset lock test and the community interest test.776 
For a company to satisfy the community interest test, ‘a reasonable person might consider its 
activities are being carried on for the benefit of the community.’777 The asset lock test ensures that 
the company’s assets generated from its activities (including any profits or surplus) are used for 
the benefit of the community. The company’s articles of association must state ‘the company 
shall not transfer any of its assets for full consideration (market value)’.778 
A CIC is allowed to pay dividends to shareholders, but this depends on the company’s article, 
which the company adopts from The Community Interest Company (Amendment) Regulations 
2009 (UK). A CIC with share capital that adopts Schedule 2’s articles of association is allowed to 
pay dividends to an asset-locked body, and a dividend payment is only made with the consent of 
the Regulator. 779 Alternatively, if a CIC with share capital has Schedule 3 as its articles of 
association, dividends maybe paid to shareholders who are not asset-locked bodies.780 A dividend 
                                               
773 A limited company registered with the Registrar of Companies for England and Wales, Northern Ireland or 
Scotland. 
774 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, ch 1, s 6; Company Interest Regulator, ‘Introduction – Community Interest 
Companies’ <http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%201%20-
%20October%202009%20(version%204%20final).pdf> 9. 
775Community Interest Regulator, ‘Chapter 6: The Asset Lock’ (October 2009) 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%206%20-%20Feb%202010.pdf> 3. 
776 Community Interest Regulator, ‘Chapter 6: The Asset Lock’ (October 2009) 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%206%20-%20Feb%202010.pdf> 3. 
777 Companies (Audit and Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 17, s 35; Community Interest 
Regulator, ‘Chapter 6: The Asset Lock’ (October 2009) 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%206%20-%20Feb%202010.pdf> 3. ‘Community’ means 
either the community or population as a whole, or a definable sector or group of people in the United Kingdom or 
elsewhere. Any group of individuals constitutes a community if they share a common characteristic that a 
reasonable person could distinguish from other members of the community, or a section of the community. 
Community Interest Company (Amendment) Regulations 2009 (UK) SI 2008/629, reg 5. 
778 Community Interest Regulator, ‘Chapter 6: The Asset Lock’ (October 2009) 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%206%20-%20Feb%202010.pdf> 26. 
779 Community Interest Company (Amendment) Regulations 2009 (UK) SI 2008/629. 
780 Community Interest Company (Amendment) Regulations 2009 (UK) SI 2008/629. 
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payment to a private financial investor is subject to a dividend cap.781 However, a dividend cap 
does not apply to those paid to certain asset-locked bodies. 
A dividend cap is to achieve a balance that encourages people to invest, and to ensure assets 
and profits are used for the benefit of the community.782 Further, the dividend cap ensures that a 
paid dividend is proportionate to the amount invested and the CIC’s profits.783 
Composition of CICs 
Private CICs must have at least one director, but a CIC public company must have at least two.784 
A CIC, like any other private company, has the option to appoint or not a company secretary, or 
have employees.785 
Membership 
Usually, members of a CIC are its shareholders, providing this is permissible under the CIC’s 
articles of the association.786 A CIC that is limited by guarantee describes its members as 
subscribing guarantors. The membership base of a CIC has the control and the general 
responsibility for decision-making, such as appointing and dismissing directors.787 
A Director’s Duties 
Directors of a CIC, like any other company director, are subject to common law, equitable and 
statutory duties. The scope and nature of a director’s general duties fall under the Companies 
Act,788 which are based on certain common law rules and equitable principles.789 A director has a 
                                               
781Community Interest Regulator, ‘Chapter 6: The Asset Lock’ (October 2009) 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%206%20-%20Feb%202010.pdf> 4. 
782 Community Interest Regulator, ‘Chapter 6: The Asset Lock’ (October 2009) 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%206%20-%20Feb%202010.pdf> 5-6. There are three 
elements to a dividend: (i) maximum share; (ii) aggregate; and (iii) a carried forward unused dividend. 
Community Interest Regulator, ‘Chapter 6: The Asset Lock’ (October 2009) 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%206%20-%20Feb%202010.pdf> 6-8. 
783 Community Interest Regulator, ‘Chapter 6: The Asset Lock’ (October 2009) 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%206%20-%20Feb%202010.pdf> 6. 
784 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 154. 
785 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 270; Community Interest Company Regulator, ‘Chapter 9: Corporate 
Governance’ (October 2009) <http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%209%20-
%20October%202009%20(version%205%20Final).pdf> 9.1. 
786 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 112. 
787 Community Interest Company Regulator, ‘Chapter 9: Corporate Governance’ (October 2009) 
<http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%209%20-
%20October%202009%20(version%205%20Final).pdf> 9.2. 
788 2006 (UK) c 46. 
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general duty to act in accordance with the company’s constitution and to exercise powers for 
conferred purposes.790 
Further, a company director has a duty to promote the success of the company, and do so by 
acting in good faith that benefits its members as a whole,791 having regard to the following: 
a) the likely long-term consequences of any decision; 
b) the interests of the company’s employees; 
c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others; 
d) the impact of the company’s operation on the community and the 
environment; 
e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct; and 
f) the need to act fairly, as between members of the company.792 
A director in certain circumstances has a duty to consider or act in the interests of the company’s 
creditors.793 A director exercising independent judgment, must not infringe upon any agreement, 
or the company’s constitution.794 
Furthermore, a director has the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.795 The 
meaning of exercising this specific duty is objective. Consideration is given to what a reasonable 
diligent person, with the general knowledge, skill and experience of the director, could be 
reasonably expected to do while carrying out the function of a director.796 
Further, directors has a duty to avoid a situation where they have, or can have a direct or 
indirect interest, or possibly a conflict with the company’s interests.797 The duty to avoid conflicts 
of interest refers to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity. Whether a 
company could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity it is considered 
                                                                                                                                                        
789 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 170(3)–(5). 
790 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 171. 
791 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 172(1). 
792 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 172(1)(a)–(f). 
793 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 172(3). 
794 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 173. 
795 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 174. 
796 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 174(2). 
797 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 175(1). 
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immaterial.798 An exception to this duty relates to a transaction, or arrangement a director has 
with the company.799 A further exception to this duty is where there is a situation that cannot be 
reasonably regarded as giving rise to a conflict of interest, or if the matter is authorised by other 
directors.800 Authorisation given by the directors is only effective if the quorum requirements are 
satisfactorily met and the matter agreed without the director’s vote.801 
The duty to avoid conflict of interests does not apply to a company that it is a charity. Where 
a conflict of interest arises in relation to a transaction or arrangement with the company, this duty 
does not apply to descriptions of transactions or arrangements specified in the company’s 
articles.802 The authorisation given by the directors of a charity enables them to authorise such 
matters in accordance with the constitution.803 
A company director has a duty not to accept a benefit from a third party;804 that is, a person, or 
a person acting behalf of another that is other than the company or an associated body 
corporate.805 
7.2.9 Regulator for CICs 
The office known as the Regulator of Community Interest Companies is established under the 
Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act806 and has the role of the 
Community Interest Community Regulator (CICR).807 The CICR is to provide guidance and 
assistance to any matter relating to a CIC.808 Similar to the Commission, the CICR is to maintain 
public confidence in CICs.809 
                                               
798 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 175(2). 
799 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 175(3). 
800 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 175(4). 
801 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 175(6). 
802 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 181(2)(a). 
803 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 181(2)(b). 
804 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 179. 
805 Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 176(2). 
806 2004 (UK) c 27. 
807 The regulator’s office of CICs does not have an official title such as, Companies House. Therefore, this thesis will  
refer to the regulator of Community Interest Companies as the Community Interest Regulator. 
808 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 27(5). 
809 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 41(1). 
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The CICR can exercise its investigative and supervisory powers in circumstances where it 
appears there is misconduct, or mismanagement, in the administration of a CIC.810 Should there 
be a need to protect a CIC’s property, or to secure the proper application of CIC’s property, the 
CICR may order that the property be vested, or transfer the property to the Official Property 
Holder.811 The CICR may order certain persons not to part with the CIC’s property, or make any 
payments in respect to the debtor’s liability. Such an order can be granted without the CIRC’s 
consent.812 Should any person fail to comply with such an order, the CICR may bring civil 
proceedings against that person813 and, with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
instigate a prosecution.814 The CICR may appoint a manager to oversee the property and affairs of 
the CIC.815 The appointed manager can have the same functions as a CIC director, and may be 
prevented from exercising any of a company director’s functions by the CICR.816 Further, the 
CICR may discharge an order to appoint a person to be an administrative receiver, administrator, 
provisional liquidator, or a liquidator of the CIC.817 
Under the CICR’s supervisory powers, a director maybe appointed and removed.818 
Appointing a director for the CICR is by order, which details the terms and period for which the 
director can hold office.819 An order to suspend a director will only remain in force until the 
decision to remove the director has been made.820 Where the Regulations permit the distribution 
of a CIC’s assets to members, the CICR may set limits on payment of interest, on debentures, or 
                                               
810 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 41(3)(a)-42. 
811 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, ss 29, 41(3)(b), 48(1). Vesting 
or the transfer of property is not a breach of a convent or condition against alienation and the right of reverter, 
pre-emption, forfeiture, re-entry, irritancy and option. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community 
Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 48(4)-(5). 
812 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 48(3). 
813 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 12. 
814 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 48(10). 
815 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 47(1). 
816 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 47(4). 
817 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 47(8). 
818 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, ss 45–46. 
819 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, sub-cls 45(4)–(5). 
820 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 46(3). The CICR can only 
suspend a director for a maximum of twelve months. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community 
Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 46(4). 
  145 
debts issued by the CIC.821 A CIC with share capital may be ordered by the CICR to transfer 
shares and pay dividends to new members.822 
7.2.10 Forward Thinking … 
The parliament of the United Kingdom understood that not-for-profits have evolved into trading, 
commercial enterprises, and the CIC form liberalises the strict traditional parameters of not-for-
profit organisations. Pluralists would reject the form of the CIC, as it could be argued that it 
detracts from the purity of achieving charitable objectives – but the reality is that the opposite is 
happening. Not-for-profits engage in trade for non-primary purposes by undertaking business 
activities – for example, selling goods in a charity gift shop.823 Rather than discount the CIC 
form, it has shown that it provides advantages for not-for-profit organisations pursuing a certain 
social and altruistic activity – which even the pluralist would agree with. 
A CIC can be a trading subsidiary to the main charity, and this arrangement provides clear 
differentiation between the main charitable mission and its financial or trading operation/s.824 The 
two arms of this hybrid organisation would not detract from the charity’s altruistic objectives but, 
rather, the commercial aspect complements and support the charity’s purpose. This innovative 
form allows an ancillary trading structure to a not-for-profit organisation, and it should be 
considered in Australia.825 
As already noted, many Australian not-for-profit organisations operate commercial ventures that 
are an extension of the organisation’s community purpose.826 Trading not-for-profits in Australia 
                                               
821 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, s 30. 
822 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) c 27, sub-cls 49(1)–(4). 
823 Oonagh Breen, ‘Holding the Line: Regulatory Challenges in Ireland and England when Business and Charity 
Collide’ in Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Kerry O’Halloran (eds), Modernising Charity Law Recent 
Developments and Future Directions (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 139. 
824 Oonagh Breen, ‘Holding the Line: Regulatory Challenges in Ireland and England when Business and Charity 
Collide’ in Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Kerry O’Halloran (eds), Modernising Charity Law Recent 
Developments and Future Directions (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 150-151. 
825 Oonagh Breen, ‘Holding the Line: Regulatory Challenges in Ireland and England when Business and Charity 
Collide’ in Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Kerry O’Halloran (eds), Modernising Charity Law Recent 
Developments and Future Directions (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 149-151. 
826 Five hundred (500) not-for-profit organisations were surveyed and it was found that 29% of these organisations 
undertook commercial ventures and provided commercial services as part of the organisation’s purpose. 
Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 240. 
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are referred to as social enterprises,827 and the Productivity Commission took the view that these 
should create a partnership with government and the for-profit sector.828 However, the 
Productivity Commission’s suggestion was stated with some caution by acknowledging the 
nature of a not-for-profit organisation provide risks and limited financial returns for investors.829 
Discussion on how to improve the commerciality of not-for-profit organisations, or to create a 
form similar to a CIC, has stalled and the discussion is mainly focused on establishing a national 
regulator. 
7.3 The Regulator for Charities and Other Not-for-Profit Organisations 
7.3.1 The Charity Commission 
The Commission supervises the not-for-profit forms of charities, charitable incorporated 
associations, and unincorporated associations and charities in England and Wales. The 
Commission can best be described as a ‘one-stop shop’ that offers everything conceivable that a 
not-for-profit organisation would need.830 The Commission functions as a regulator, an advisor, 
an educator, and an administrator – not only to charities, but also to the whole of the not-for-
profit sector. 
7.3.2 Status of the Commission 
The Commission forms part of the civil service, a non-ministerial government department.831 
While it performs its function on behalf of the Crown, it is crucial that the Commission remains 
independent from any government and/or ministerial influence.832 The significance of the 
Commission remaining independent is in that it ensures it acts as the sector’s guardian to protect 
                                               
827 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 247. 
828 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 247. Chapter Eight of this thesis discusses the partnership between government and 
the not-for-profit sector. 
829 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) 247. 
830 The term ‘charity’ or ‘charities’ in the United Kingdom context often encompasses all forms of not-for-profit 
organisations. For the purpose of this chapter, ‘charity’ should not be read to exclusively mean a charitable trust. 
831 Charity Commission, ‘Our Status’ <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/About_us/About_the_Commission/Our_status_index.aspx>. 
832 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 1A(3); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 13(3). 
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it from political interests. However, the strictness of the Commission’s independence is 
questioned given its partnership and close relationship with the government.833 
The Commission’s two-way partnership (with the government and the sector) requires it to 
promote awareness of the sector and represent the sector’s concerns to government.834 The 
Commission is required to annually report to, and respond to any requests from, the Office of 
Civil Society within the Cabinet Office under the Minister for Civil Society.835 
7.3.3 The Commission’s Objectives 
The Commission has five key objectives: 
1. the public confidence objective – the Commission is to take action that will 
increase pubic trust and confidence in charities;836 
2. the public benefit objective – the Commission is to promote awareness and 
understanding of the public benefit requirements; 
3. the compliance objective – the Commission is to promote compliance by charity 
trustees with their legal obligations in exercising control, management and 
administration of their charities; 
4. the charitable resources objective – the Commission is to promote the effective 
use of charitable resources; and 
5. the accountability objective – the Commission is to promote the effective use of 
charitable resources.837 
                                               
833 Alison McLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to the Charities Act 2006 (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 17. 
834 Hubert Picarda QC is critical of the Commission’s two-way relationship with the sector and the government. He 
argues that government policy concerning the sector often emanates from the Commission, which makes it only 
the mouthpiece for the sector and, consequently, negatively impacts the sector’s independence. Having the 
Commission speaking on behalf of the sector excludes small not-for-profit organisations from these discussions. 
Conversely, having the Commission as the trusted expert, not-for-profit organisations rely on the Commission 
taking control of the issues, and its views may not necessarily reflect the values of some not-for-profit 
orgnaisations. Hubert Picarda QC, ‘Harmonising Nonprofit Law in the EU’ in Klaus Hopt and Thomas Von 
Hippell (eds), International Corporate Law and Financial Market Regulation – Comparative Corporate 
Governance of Non-Profit Organisations (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 182. 
835 Prior to the election of the Liberal Democrat Party to government, the Commission’s reporting requirements were 
directly to the Office of the Third Sector. Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 7. The Office of the Third Sector has 
been replaced with the Office of Civil Society. Subsequently, the Commission is to report to the Office of Civil 
Society, to the Informal Minister on the Big Society and to the Home Affairs’ Committee Cabinet. Big Society is 
the name given for the government’s agenda to empower communities to make their own decisions about their 
local area, open the public service to allow charities, social enterprises, and private companies to compete with 
each other to offer high quality services, and to encourage social action that allows people to become more active 
in society. Office of Civil Society, ‘Big Society – Overview’ <http://www.cabinet.gov.uk/content/big-society-
overview>; Office of Civil Society, ‘Structure’ <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/office-civil-
society-structure-finalised> 
836 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 1B(3); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 14. 
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These overarching objectives are at the centre of how the Commission carries out its general and 
specific functions. 
7.3.4 The Commission’s General Functions 
The general functions of the Commission are to: 
1. make determinations about whether organisations are charities or not; 
2. encourage and facilitate better administration of charities; 
3. identify and investigate apparent misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of 
charities, and to take remedial or protective action in connection with misconduct or 
mismanagement; 
4. determine whether or not public collection certificates should be issued and remain in 
force; 
5. obtain, evaluate and disseminate information in connection with the performance of the 
Commission’s functions and its objectives; and 
6. give information, advise or make proposals to any Minister of the Crown on matters 
relating to any of the Commission’s functions and how objectives are being satisfied.838 
By combining these statutory functions and powers, the Commission is a super-sized statutory 
body that is all things to the not-for-profit sector. The Commission is a registry, regulator, an 
educator, and an advisor to the not-for-profit sector and its organisations, and each one of these 
functions will be individually examined. 839 
7.3.5 The Commission as a Registry 
The Commission is to keep and maintain a register of charities. As the registry of charities, it 
creates a single point for registration. How this registry is maintained is at the discretion of the 
Commission.840 The information that the Commission makes available to the public for 
inspections is comprehensive.841 
                                                                                                                                                        
837 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 1B(3); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 14. 
838 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 1C(2); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 15(1)(6). 
839 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 9; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 1C(3); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 29. 
840 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 3(3)(b); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 29(1). 
841 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 3; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 38(1). 
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Generally, it is thought that every charity must be registered with the Commission. However, 
there are some forms of charities that are not required to be registered:842 (i) excepted; and (ii) 
exempt charities. 
7.3.6 Excepted Charity 
Despite this specific form of organisation falling outside the need to be registered, an excepted 
charity does remain under the supervision of the Commission.843 Examples of an excepted charity 
are those connected with churches and chapels belonging to a Christian denomination, charitable 
services of the armed forces, or scouts and guide groups.844 However, excepted charities with an 
annual income over £100,000 must be registered with the Commission, unless the Commission 
issues the excepted charity status with a written determination to the contrary.845 The Commission 
also has the power to order a charity to be exempted from registration on a permanent, or 
temporary basis.846 
7.3.7 Exempted Charity 
An exempt charity is exempted from registering with the Commission and, generally, this form of 
charity is not under the Commission’s supervision. However, the Commission, being all things to 
charities, can provide support to exempt charities.847 An organisation that is an exempt charity 
must be listed in Schedule 2 of the 1993 Charities Act.848 Any small charity with a gross annual 
income less than £5,000 is considered an exempt charity and, therefore, does not need to be 
                                               
842 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 28; Charities 
Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 3A; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 30(2). 
843 Full supervision by the Commission means that an excepted charity must provide information about its activities. 
The Commission has the power to investigate the excepted charity if there is a cause of concern. Charity 
Commission, ‘Changes to the Regulation of Excepted and Exempt Charities’ (July 2010) <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Start_up_charity/Do_I_need_to_register/regreq.aspx> 2. 
844 Charity Commission, ‘Changes to the Regulation of Excepted and Exempt Charities’ (July 2010) 
<http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Start_up_charity/Do_I_need_to_register/regreq.aspx> 2. 
845 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 3A(2)(b)-(c)(ii); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 30. 
846 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 3A(2)(b)(i); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 32(b) 
847 An exempt charity may seek an order from the Commission that enables it to take action where its governing 
document does not allow it to undertake such action. Charity Commission, ‘Changes to the Regulation of 
Excepted and Exempt Charities’ (July 2010) <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Start_up_charity/Do_I_need_to_register/regreq.aspx> 3. 
848 Examples of exempt charities listed in Schedule 2 are the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Durham and 
Newcastle, Queen Mary and Westfield College in the University of London, and the colleges of Winchester and 
Eton. For further exempt charities, refer to Schedule 2 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10 and Schedule 3 of the 
Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25. 
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registered.849 However, small charities still have access to the support, advice and resources of the 
Commission. 
7.3.8 Removal of a Charity from the Registry 
Despite clear statutory provisions requiring a charity to be registered, the decision of registration 
ultimately lies within the Commission’s discretionary power. The Commission also has the 
discretionary power to remove a charity from the registry.850 Removal of a charity from a registry 
occurs when the Commission regards the charity to no longer be a charity and/or it has ceased to 
exist or be in operation.851 The removal of institutions from the registry (including cancelled 
institutions) is available for public inspection.852 
7.3.9 The Commission as an Investigator 
Before the Commission can make any order relating to the operation of a charity, it has numerous 
powers to undertake inquiries.853 The Commission and its staff have the power to enter a charity’s 
premises and seize its documents during an investigation.854 Entering a charity’s premises is 
limited, and a warrant must be obtained from a Justice of the Peace. For the Justice of the Peace 
to grant a warrant, the Commission must evidence the following: 
1. that an inquiry has been instituted by the Commission; 
2. there is reason to believe that without a warrant the trustee would refuse to 
produce the document; or 
3. there are grounds for belief that documents, or information will be destroyed 
if not seized. 
Under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (UK), the Commission has a conferred power to 
seize material for the purpose of an inquiry.855 Should the Commission be intentionally obstructed 
                                               
849 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 3A(2)(c), sch 2; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 22, sch 3. 
850 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 3(4); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 34. 
851 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 3(4)(b); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 34(1)(a)-(b). 
852 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 3(7); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 34. 
853 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 8; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 46 
854 Charities Act 1993 (UK) s 31A; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 26; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 56A. 
855 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (UK) c 16 pt 1, sch1. 
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by anyone during a search, this will constitute a summary offence and the offender will be 
punished.856 
7.3.10 The Commission as a Regulator 
The Commission has the statutory power to regulate charities of all sizes and descriptions.857 Its 
primary role as a regulator is to monitor and control charities by ensuring: 
• compliance with charity law; 
• that abuses and poor practices are dealt with; 
• that charities work better within an effective legal, accounting and governance 
framework; and 
• the promotion of sound governance and accountability.858 
The Commission, in carrying out this function and to meet its legislative objectives, has the 
following regulatory powers: 
a) suspending or removing trustees and members; 
b) making directions to protect a charity; 
c) directing the application of charity property; 
d) ordering administration schemes; 
e) determining a charity’s membership; and 
f) restricting a charity’s mortgage. 
Each one of these powers and the circumstances in which the Commission may rely upon these 
powers is examined individually. 
7.3.10.1 Power to Suspend or Remove Trustee 
The Commission is permitted to suspend or remove any trustee, officer, agent or 
employee.859 Where a trustee, an officer, agent or employee has membership of a 
                                               
856 Punishment may be a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale; imprisonment up to 51 weeks; or both. 
Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 26(11); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 49(8). 
857 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 1(4)(c), sch 1A; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, ss 25-26. 
858 Charity Commission, ‘The Charity Commission and Regulation’ (January 2010) <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Our_regulatory_activity/Our_approache/regstance.aspx#1> 2. 
859 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 18A; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 82-83. A trustee’s suspension is for one 
year and the Commission is obliged to review a suspension order. The Commission may discharge a suspension 
order, if appropriate. Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 50, s 18A; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 83. 
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charity, the Commission may order the termination of the individual’s membership,860 or 
order an expelled member to be prohibited from resuming membership of that charity.861 
This specific power, of removing or suspending a trustee from office or employment, is 
not unfettered, and the Commission will use this power in two particular scenarios. The 
first occurs when the Commission is satisfied that there has been misconduct, 
mismanagement, or someone was privy to the misconduct in the administration of the 
charity.862 The second is when the Commission decides it is necessary to protect the 
charity, its purpose, its property, or to secure the proper application of the charity’s 
property or property coming to the charity.863 
The action that the Commission may takes in removing or suspending a trustee might 
result in a charity ceasing operation. Forcing a charity to cease would have a negative 
impact for volunteers and individuals who rely upon on the delivery of a charity’s 
services. An alternative to this strong-handed approach is for the Commission to use its 
remedial powers to order a charity to continue operating when the Commission is 
considering removing or suspending a trustee.864 The Commission may, during this time, 
appoint additional trustees and vest a charity’s property to be held on trust by an official 
custodian.865 Furthermore, the Commission may appoint an interim manager and a 
receiver regarding the charity’s property and its affairs.866 
                                               
860 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 18A(1)(b); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 83. 
861 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 18A(1)(b); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 83(4). The resumption of 
membership is permissible after five years of suspension only with consent by the Commission. Charities Act 
2006 (UK) c 50, s 18A(4); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 83(5). 
862 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 34. 
863 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 34. 
864 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 34. 
865 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 21-22; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 76. The official custodian merely holds 
the property on behalf of the charity and does not exercise any functions of a trustee regarding the management 
and control of the charity. Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University 
Press, 2007) n 21, 34. Once the Commission has ordered the transfer of property to the official custodian, then 
trustees are not to deal with the property or monies without prior consent from the Commission. Alison 
MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to the Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 34. 
866 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to the Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 34. 
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7.3.10.2 Power to Give Specific Directions for the Protection of Charity 
Where the Commission is satisfied that there has been misconduct or mismanagement, 
an order can be made to certain persons to act appropriately.867 This power allows the 
Commission the option to appoint a receiver, another trustee or a manager to take the 
action that the Commission thinks is necessary to protect the charity and to avoid it 
ceasing operation. 
Whatever the Commission’s directions, they must not be inconsistent with any Act 
of Parliament,868 or be inconsistent with the charity’s purpose.869 Once the Commission 
provides direction for action, the person directed must act expediently and in the 
interests of the charity.870 
7.3.10.3 Power to Direct Application of Charity Property 
Where a person is in control of, or in possession of, any property held in trust for a 
charity and are unwilling to apply it properly for the purpose of the charity, the 
Commission will take action.871 The Commission can order the relevant person to apply 
the charity’s property in a manner that the Commission states.872 Unwillingness by a 
trustee to apply the charity’s property properly does not infer that there has been any 
misconduct, dishonesty, bad faith or mismanagement.873 The Commission will intervene 
where it is satisfied that not only a trustee is unwilling to act properly, but also to secure 
the proper application of property for the charity’s purpose.874 
Additionally, the Commission can appoint a receiver or manager where a charity 
lacks the power to act in a way the Commission has directed the trustee. This often 
occurs when charities have an older constitutional document that lacks the power for a 
                                               
867 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 19A; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 20; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 84. A 
person whom the Commission can direct is: any trustee; any officer; any employee; and the charity itself (if the 
charity is a body corporate). Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 19A(2); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 82-83. 
868 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to the Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 35. 
869 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 19A(3); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 84(3)(b). 
870 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 19A; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 48(4). 
871 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 19B(1); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 85(1). 
872 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 19B(2); Charities 2011 (UK) c 25, s 85(1)(b). 
873 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 36. 
874 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 35. 
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trustee to act in the manner directed.875 An older constitutional document may restrict a 
trustee from disposing certain types of land or to transfer land.876 
7.3.10.4 Ordering Administrative Schemes 
The Commission has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court for making schemes in 
relation to the administration of a charity.877 A scheme is likely to be directed where 
there has been a misapplication of funds, or there are other reasons that demand better 
regulation.878 
The Commission can devise an administrative scheme to allow the administration of 
more than one charity under the one scheme.879 The scheme also allows for the merger 
of smaller charities, or where charities of similar nature can become one administrative 
scheme. The Commission has the power to exercise a property cy-près scheme.880 For 
example, in the 1999 case of Versani v Jesani, the Commission relied on its power to 
order a cy- près scheme.881 In Versani, there were a number of different charity groups 
that no longer worshiped together, and the Commission devised a scheme to divide the 
funds between the two partitioned charity groups. 882 
7.3.10.5 Determination of Membership 
The Commission may determine who are members of a charity.883 It relies upon this 
power when there are internal disputes between the charity’s trustees that may be 
damaging a charity.884 To settle an internal dispute, the Commission will appoint a 
person with authority to restore the charity to a functioning body. This authorised person 
can: (i) determine the qualification for membership; (ii) sign the constitution or rules of 
                                               
875 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 35. 
876 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 35. 
877 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, ss 16, 19B(3)(b); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 78(6) . 
878 Attorney General v Dedham School (1857) 23 Beav 350. 
879 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 44; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 73. 
880 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 14B; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 67(1). 
881 [1999] Ch 219. 
882 Versani v Jesani [1999] Ch 219. 
883 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 29A; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 111. 
884 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 39. 
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the charity; (iii) make an agreement to abide by those rules; (iv) conduct elections; and 
(v) do whatever else that is needed to restore the function of the charity.885 
7.3.10.6 Restrictions on Mortgaging 
Trustees have the freedom to mortgage the charity’s land as security for a loan.886 When 
making arrangements for a mortgage, a charity must have a written advice from a 
financial expert.887 The financial advice sought should address the necessity of the 
mortgage, if the mortgage’s terms are reasonable, and the charity’s ability to repay the 
mortgage.888 Where a charity has not sought proper financial advice, then the 
Commission must give consent to the charity to use their land as security.889 
Additionally, consent from the Commission is needed by a trustee to extend grants890 
or loans891 where the charity’s property was used as security.892 This power gives the 
Commission controlling and regulating authority to protect charities from 
mismanagement. 
7.3.11 Regulation of Exempt Charities 
As noted earlier, exempt charities are not under the supervision of the Commission, which now 
holds power to regulate exempt charities and to institute inquires into an exempt charity.893 
Additionally, it is permissible for the Commission to make a range of orders to protect an exempt 
charity,894 access a charity’s dormant bank accounts, repay monies and disqualify a person. 895 
                                               
885 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 29A; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 111(3). 
886 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 41. 
887Financial advice must be from an independent person who has no financial interest in providing that advice. A 
finance officer must be suitably qualified to provide a charity such advice. Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s 
Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 41. 
888 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to The Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 41. 
889 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 28; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 124. 
890 The grant funding can be secured by a charge over the charity’s land. Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to 
the Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 41. 
891 Charities have entered into all-money mortgage have experienced problems owing to poor advice, which did not 
include being informed of all the situations which the charge covered. Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to 
the Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 41. 
892 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 38; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 124. 
893 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, sch 5, para 4; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, sch 9 para 7. 
894 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 18; Charities Act 2001 (UK) c 25, sch 9, para 18. 
895 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 28; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, sch 5, para 7; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, 
sch 9, para 20, 25. 
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7.3.12 The Commission’s Proportionality Framework 
Carrying out its regulatory function, the Commission follows the principles of best regulatory 
practice:896 
• Proportionate –The Commission’s regulatory action is directed to where there are 
greater risks to public trust and confidence in a charity.897 
• Accountable – Being accountable to parliament regarding the effective use of the 
Commission’s resources, and providing reasons behind the Commission’s decisions to 
affected individual/s and charity.898 
• Consistent – The Commission will apply the same approach in assessing the risk in 
every case and decide on an appropriate response to each set of circumstances.899 
• Transparent – The Commission is to be clear about its expectations on how charities 
operate. The Commission will publish guides, key policies, and regulatory decisions 
on their website for charities and members of the public to access.900 
• Targeted – Means that any action undertaken by the Commission is directed at cases 
that posses the greater risks and where the Commission’s actions would have an 
impact when they do act. This also includes the Commission working collaboratively 
with other regulators and agencies.901 
These principles provide the framework for the Commission to be a risk-based and proportionate 
regulator. When assessing risk, the Commission states that they are proactive and focused upon 
preventing problems rather than being reactive.902 Where there is an assessment of a serious case, 
                                               
896 Charity Commission, ‘Risk Framework – Application of the Charity Commission’s Risk Framework’ (January 
2012) <www.charitycommission.gov.auk/Library/arf.pdf> 5. 
897 Charity Commission, ‘Risk Framework – Application of the Charity Commission’s Risk Framework’ (January 
2012) <www.charitycommission.gov.auk/Library/arf.pdf> Annex B, 21. 
898 Charity Commission, ‘Risk Framework – Application of the Charity Commission’s Risk Framework’ (January 
2012) <www.charitycommission.gov.auk/Library/arf.pdf> Annex B, 21. 
899 Charity Commission, ‘Risk Framework – Application of the Charity Commission’s Risk Framework’ (January 
2012) <www.charitycommission.gov.auk/Library/arf.pdf> Annex B, 22. 
900 Charity Commission, ‘Risk Framework – Application of the Charity Commission’s Risk Framework’ (January 
2012) <www.charitycommission.gov.auk/Library/arf.pdf> Annex B, 22. 
901 Charity Commission, ‘Risk Framework – Application of the Charity Commission’s Risk Framework’ (January 
2012) <www.charitycommission.gov.auk/Library/arf.pdf> Annex B, 22. 
902 Cases which are considered high risk involve: significant financial loss to a charity; serious harm to beneficiaries; 
using a charity for terrorist purposes; serious criminal and/or illegal activity within or involving a charity; a 
charity established for illegal or improper purposes; charities used for a private advantage; the charity’s 
independence is questionable; significant non-compliance and breaches of trust or abuse that significantly impact 
on the public trust and confidence in the charity and the sector. Charity Commission, ‘Risk Framework – 
Application of the Charity Commission’s Risk Framework’ (January 2012) 
<www.charitycommission.gov.auk/Library/arf.pdf> 7; Charity Commission, ‘Risk Framework – Our Regulatory 
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the Commission will undertake meaningful investigations and, often, it is required intervene.903 
However, the Commission advises that troubles within charities are capable of being resolved 
early by providing advice and educating the sector and the public.904 
The Commission’s priorities and resources are dedicated to addressing high-risk incidences, 
but the Commission understands that low-risk problems can damage public trust and confidence 
in a charity if not dealt with appropriately.905 
7.3.13 The Commission as an Educator and Advisor 
Another important feature of the Commission is to provide the necessary support to charities, and 
it has the general power to advise trustees.906 Advice or guidance provided by the Commission 
relate to trustees’ performance of their legal duties, and other matters relating to the proper 
administration of the charity. Further, the Commission can issue advice or guidance that is 
directed at charities in general, at a particular charity, or at any class of charity.907 In issuing 
advice or guidance, the Commission does not need to wait for a written application by an 
aggrieved person – it can act on its own motion. 
The Commission, as an educator, publishes a wide range of information on all topics relating 
to the administration of charities, which are easily accessible by the Internet.908 The Commission 
also holds a number of events and seminars at various times through the year across England and 
Wales. These seminar series are part of the Commission’s general commitment to promoting the 
not-for-profit sector, and to increase the public and a trustee’s understanding of the operation, 
administration and legal requirements of a charity. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Approach to Protecting the Public’s Interest in Charity – How we Assess and Manage Risks’ (January 2012) 
<www.charitycommission.gov.auk/Library_framework.pdf> 3. 
903 Charity Commission, ‘Charities Back on Track – Themes and lessons from the Charity Commission’s 
Investigations and Regulatory Casework 2010–11’ <www.charitycommission.gov.uk> 4. 
904 Charity Commission, ‘Charities Back on Track – Themes and lessons from the Charity Commission’s 
Investigations and Regulatory Casework 2010–11’ <www.charitycommission.gov.uk> 3. 
905 Charity Commission, ‘Charities Back on Track – Themes and lessons from the Charity Commission’s 
Investigations and Regulatory Casework 2010–11’ <www.charitycommission.gov.uk> 13. 
906 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 29; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 15(1)(6), (2). 
907 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 29; Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 1C; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 15(3) 
908 To see the list of Charity Commission published material go to: <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Charity_requirements_guidance/ccpubs3.aspx>. 
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7.3.14 Appeal Mechanisms 
All decisions of the Commission are not absolute and are subject to review and appeal. The 
Charity Tribunal (referred to as the ‘First-Tier Tribunal’) was established to hear appeals against, 
and review decisions of, the Commission.909 The First-Tier Tribunal also considers references 
from the Attorney General or the Commission regarding points of law. 
Applications for reviewable matters and appeals are dealt with the First-Tier Tribunal in 
accordance with Schedule 1C of the 1993 Act.910 Hearing appeals and applications for review, the 
First-Tier Tribunal has the power to make the following orders: 
1. to quash the Commission’s decision; 
2. to remit the matter back to the Commission; 
3. to submit all or part of the Commission’s order; 
4. to add to the Commission’s order (anything that the Commission should have 
made); and 
5. to direct the Commission to rectify their decision.911 
Schedule 1C also outlines the person who has locus standi to appeal and who can make an 
application for review to the First-Tier Tribunal. Persons capable of making an application to the 
First-Tier Tribunal are: the Attorney-General;912 charity trustees; any persons in control, or 
management of an organisation; any aggrieved person who has been removed, suspended, or 
disqualified by an order of the Commission; any person that was affected by the decision made 
by the organisation; a solicitor; the charity itself; companies; any person affected by the 
Commission’s decision; and creditors.913 
                                               
909 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, pt 1A, s 2A(4); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 315. 
910 Reviewable matters relates to: (i) the Commission instituting an inquiry into a particular charity; (ii) the 
Commission inquiring into a class of charities; (iii) the Commission’s refusal to make a common investment 
scheme; (iv) the Commission not to make a common deposit scheme; and (v) refusal by the Commission to make 
an order for the disposition of land and allowing a trustee to take a mortgage, or secure a charge of charity land. 
Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 322. 
911 Appeals may be brought to the first-tier tribunal against any decision, order and direction of the Commission if 
listed in the charities legislation. These lists are extensive and prescriptive. Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, col 1, 
sch 1C; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, cols 1,2 sch 6. 
912 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c10, sch 1C, paras 1(2), 3-4; Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 362. 
913 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, col 2, sch 1C. 
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Appeals of the First-Tier Tribunal’s decisions are made to the High Court,914 and are confined 
to point/s of law.915 Figure 4 provides an overview of the Appeals and Review Structure for 
Charities. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
Despite all the efforts our federal policy-makers are taking to reform and regulate the not-for-
profit sector, their plans are well short of world’s best practice. All our policy makers have failed 
to understand the sector. In an effort to preserve the self-regulatory nature of the not-for-profit 
sector, the federal government’s proposal for reform is disconnected from the public’s demand 
for organisational transparency, and to modernise the sector to best assist organisations to 
efficiently achieve their mission in a demanding contemporary context. This is something the 
United Kingdom understood very well. 
The first step to modernise the not-for-profit sector in the United Kingdom was to expand the 
traditional charitable purpose and provide clarity as to whether or not an organisation holds 
charitable status. Furthermore, the United Kingdom has embraced new forms of organisation, 
such as the Charitable Incorporated Organisation and the Charitable Unincorporated Association. 
                                               
914Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 2C(1); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 321(2) col 2, sch 6. 
915 Charities Act 1993 (UK) c 10, s 2C(2); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, 321(4) 
Figure 4 – Overview of the appeal structure 
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These engage in commercial revenue raising exercises, such as attracting investors rather than 
attracting a donor. 
Further, the United Kingdom emphasises that trustees and directors have responsibilities and 
legal duties to the organisation. The Commission in overseeing the not-for-profit sector must 
ensure that the management of any not-for-profit organisation is carried out in a manner that will 
not compromise confidence in the sector and its organisations. 
To achieve confidence in the sector, the Commission has been designed to be all things to the 
sector. It is not only the sector’s guardian, but also its mouthpiece and, regardless of Picarda’s 
QC concerns about the Commission’s independence, its centralised position brings about 
necessary change that will benefit and sustain the sector into the future. Therefore, it would be 
better to have the Commission occupying this position, to advocate through a single voice, than 
having nothing at all – which is the situation in Australia. 
The Commission preserves and ensures that confidence in the sector is not compromised. It 
would advise, educate, and regulate the sector and its organisations. In providing advice and 
education to charities, it offers a necessary and timely guidance for a charity to operate in 
delivering important services, which the public can confidently rely on. Ensuring proper 
management and transparency within a charity, the Commission has wide regulatory powers to 
remove, suspend, and disqualify a trustee and/or a member. When exercising its regulatory 
powers, the Commission will do so proportionately and, moreover, it will work with a charity. 
Therefore, it is clear that the United Kingdom’s Charity Commission represents world’s best 
practice. 
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CHAPTER 8: The Reform Picture so far … 
 
‘It is through not-for-profit organisations that government and communities are 
able to work together to support and strength our democracy.’916 
8.0 Introduction 
Reform of Australia’s not-for-profit sector has been long overdue. There has been an array of 
opinions and recommendations generated from numerous reports and inquiries provided to the 
federal government, with many options on how to best reform the sector. The centrepiece of the 
federal government’s reform is the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission. This 
chapter outlines what entities qualify for registration with the Australian Charities and Not-for-
Profits Commission and, furthermore, the structure, function, and regulatory and enforcement 
powers of the Commission will be analysed. Furthermore, the Commission’s enforcement powers 
are discretionary, and this chapter analyses these powers and other discretionary powers it has. 
8.1 The Reform Picture so far 
Reforming the not-for-profit sector has been sporadic and slow, and more than a decade after the 
first parliamentary inquiry into charities, the federal government has made some advances 
towards reform. Active reform can be seen to have occurred in the areas of taxation, fundraising, 
financial reporting, and regulation with the establishment of a statutory regulator called the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission.917 
8.2 The Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission 
The centrepiece of the federal government’s reform is the new Australian Charities and Not-for-
Profits Commission (the ACNC). The ACNC is promised to be a specialist regulator for the 
                                               
916 Australian Government, National Compact: Working Together (2011) Foreword, 3. 
917 The federal government has amended the income taxation law to improve public ancillary funds, and expand 
deductible gift receipt status to fire brigades and other state recognised emergency services. See Tax Laws 
Amendment Bill 2011. 
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sector committed to delivering best practice regulation.918 For the first time in Australia we have a 
dedicated body with the responsibility and regulatory authority specifically for not-for-profit 
organisations; but to understand the ACNC, an examination of its design and scope is needed. 
8.3 The Structure and Functions of the ACNC 
8.3.1 ACNC’s Structure 
The organisational structure of the ACNC is simple and is made up of an advisory board, a 
Commissioner, and staff who assist the Commissioner.919 The role of the Commissioner is central 
to the administration of this regulatory framework, which is aimed at enhancing the public’s trust 
and confidence in the sector.920 To achieve these fundamental objectives, the Commissioner has 
been given prescribed statutory functions. 
8.3.2 ACNC’s Functions 
The ACNC will have two general functions: to register not-for-profit entities; and to monitor 
them – each of these general functions will be individually examined. 921 
8.3.3 Registering Not-for-Profit Entities 
In implementing the Productivity Commission’s recommendation, the Commissioner’s main role 
will be to register certain entities. The Commissioner will have the power to register a not-for-
profit entity satisfying the following conditions: 
                                               
918 Susan Woodward and Andrea Fung, ‘In Recognition of their Importance – A Specialist Regulator for Australian 
Charities’ (July 2012) 
<http://acnctaskforce.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=publications/articles/NFP_specialist_regulator_J
uly2012/index.htm>. 
919 ACNC Bill div 105 cl 105-10; Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 135–15. 
920 ACNC Bill pt 1–2 dv 15 cl 15–5(1); Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s15–
10(a). 
921 The federal government’s 2011 budget outlined several functions of the ACNC not found in the ACNC Bill. For 
example, the 2011 budget stated that the ACNC will have the function of educating and supporting the not-for-
profit sector; however, pursuant to the ACNC Bill and Act, it will only provide education and guidance to those 
entities registered with the ACNC (see 8.3.3 of this thesis for an description of the type of entities that may 
register with the ACNC). See also Australian Government Budget 2011–12, Budget Paper No.2 – Part 2: 
Expense Measures <http:www.budget.gov.au/2011–12/content/bp2/html/bp2_expens-22.htm> 4; ACNC Bill dv 
15 cl 15-10(g); Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 15–10(g). 
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• has an Australian Business Number (ABN);922 
• is not a terrorist entity, a criminal entity, or an outlawed entity;923 
• complies with governance standards and external conduct standards;924 and 
• to remove any doubt an entity is the type or a subtype of entity.925 
Registration with the ACNC is a prerequisite for organisations to access Commonwealth tax 
concessions and other government exemptions, benefits and concessions.926 Previously, the ATO 
determined an organisation’s charitable status; but now, this decision is made by the ACNC.927 
The role of the ATO is confided to administering a not-for-profit organisation’s tax status.928 
8.3.4 What is a not-for-profit entity for the purpose of registration? 
Pursuant to the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission Act 2012 (Cth), a 
responsible entity means the following:929 
• an individual;930 
• a body corporate;931 
• a body politic;932 
• a constitutional corporation;933 
• an unincorporated association, or a body of persons;934 
• a trust;935 or 
                                               
922 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 25-5(3)(c). 
923 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 25-5(3)(d). 
924 The ACNC Bill states that the regulations will specify governance and external conduct standards. ACNC Bill ch 3 
pt 3-1 dv 45 cl 45-10-50-10. At the time of writing this thesis, the regulations were not available. Furthermore, 
section 50-15 of the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) states that before 
regulations can be made, the Governor-General must be satisfied that appropriate level of consolation be 
undertaken. See Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 50-15(1)(a)(i)–(iv). 
925 ACNC Bill ch 2 pt 2 dv 25 cl 25-5 (3); Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 25-
5(2). 
926 ACNC Bill ch 2 pt 2-1 dv 20 cl 20-5; Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 20-5. 
927 ACNC Bill ch 2 pt 2-1 dv 25 cl 20-5; Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 30-
10. 
928 Federal Treasurer, ‘Budget, Budget Measures, Budget Number 2 2011-12, 322. 10 May 2012. 
929 Hereafter referred to as the ACNC Act. 
930 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-5(1)(a). 
931 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-5(1)(b). 
932 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-5(1)(c). 
933 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-15. 
934 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-5(1)(e). 
935 The ACNC Act notes that a trust is not a legal person and therefore a trustee of a trust is taken to be an entity. 
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-5(e). 
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• a not-for-profit entity.936 
The ACNC Bill provided that a not-for-profit entity was a type of entity that qualified for 
registration with the ACNC.937 However, the ACNC Bill did not expressly provide a meaning of a 
not-for-profit entity, but makes reference to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth).938 The 
glitch here is that this Act does not provide a definition of a not-for-profit entity – it is the 
preceding Income Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth) that defines a not-for-profit entity. Section 3 of 
the 1986 Act defines a not-for-profit entity to be a company that does not carry on for the purpose 
of profit or gain to its individual members, and where the terms of the its constitution prohibits 
any distribution of money or property to its members or a friendly society dispensary. This 
definition may be sound for taxation purposes, but it fails to capsulate all of the structural 
operational characteristics of a not-for-profit entity. However, the ACNC Act does not provide the 
meaning of a ‘not-for-profit entity’, which is a mystery – therefore, the Bill is the guiding 
instrument. The ACNC Act attempts to remedy this shortfall by offering another type of entity 
that qualifies for registration with the ACNC, which is simply referred to as a ‘type of entity’ and 
a ‘subtype of entity and also a registered entity.’939 Essentially, a registered entity is a charity, as 
outlined in Table 8. 
Table 8 – Description of an entity and a subtype of entity940 
Type of 
Entity Subtype of Entity 
Charity Entity with a purpose that is the relief of poverty, sickness or the needs of the aged. 
 Entity with a purpose that is the advancement of education. 
 Entity with a purpose that is the advancement of religion. 
 Entity with another purpose that is beneficial to the community. 
 Institution whose principal activity is to promote the prevention or the control of disease in 
human beings. This also includes institutions whose principal activity is to promote the 
prevention or the control of diseases in human beings.  
 Public benevolent institution. 
 Entity with a charitable purpose described in section 4 of the Extensions of Charitable 
Purpose Act 2004 (Cth) (provision of child care services). 
                                               
936 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 25-5(3)(a). 
937 ACNC Bill ch 8 pt 8-1 dv 205-5 sub dv 205-A cl 205-5(1). 
938 ACNC Bill ch 8 pt 8-2 dv 900 cl 900-5. 
939 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 25-5. 
940 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 25-5(5). 
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The above description of a registered entity is a direct reflection of the traditional charitable 
purposes and, unfortunately, the ACNC Act offers no advancement or modernisation of the 
traditional charitable purposes. Once the Commissioner has made a determination to register a 
registered entity and a responsible entity, the ACNC then moves into a position to monitor it. 
8.3.5 The Monitoring Function of the ACNC 
The monitoring of these entities is achieved through financial reports submitted to the ACNC.941 
The ACNC Act provides that an entity must submit once a year an annual information statement 
to the ACNC that annexes an entity’s financial report.942 Precisely what information an entity is 
obliged to record in an annual information statement is not detailed in the ACNC Bill, the ACNC 
Act or in its Explanatory Material – however, an entity’s financial report must correctly record 
and explain its transactions, financial position, and performance that is capable of being 
audited.943 However, these reporting requirements are only applicable to large- and medium-sized 
entities; small and basic religious entities are excluded from this requirement.944 Table 9 provides 
a description of what constitutes a small, medium and large entity. 
                                               
941 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 60-5. Although the ACNC Act provides an 
ACNC officer with statutory powers to enter premises under a monitoring warrant. Australian Charities and Not-
for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) ss 75-15 – 75-20. An entity will be subject to monitoring if non-
compliance with the ACNC Act and any provision of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Australian Charities and Not-
for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 60-3. 
942 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 60-5. An entity must provide the ACNC 
with an annual information statement before 31 December in the following financial year. Australian Charities 
and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 60-5(2)- 60-10(2). However, an entity with the permission of 
the Commissioner may defer the submission of an entity’s annual information statement. Australian Charities 
and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 60-5(2). Furthermore, the Commissioner may approve a 
different accounting period. Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 60-85. 
943 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 60-15. Only medium and large registered 
entities are required to have annual reports audited or reviewed. Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits 
Commission Act 2012 (Cth) ss 60-20-60-25. 
944 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 60-10. A basic religious charity is a 
registered entity as a subtype of entity (the purpose of advancing religion), which is outlined, in the second 
column of Table 10 above. However, if an entity is registered under the Corporations Act 2001(Cth), the 
Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) and the incorporated association legislation 
of the states and territories the entity is not a basic religious charity. 
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Table 9 – Description of a small, medium and large entity945 
Size of Entity Qualification 
Small Revenue for a financial year is less than $250,000.946 
Medium Revenue for a financial year is less than $1,000,00.947 
Large Not a small or a medium registered entity.948 
The introduction of tiered financial reporting in the ACNC Bill aims to reduce compliance 
burdens and promote transparency through the ‘report-once, use often’ approach.949 Once the 
ACNC receives an entity’s financial account, the public will be able to assess its financial 
information through a central public information portal,950 which is line with recommendation 6.6 
from the Product Commission’s report. 
Non-compliance by an entity with any provisions relating to financial records and governance 
and external conduct standards may incur a civil penalty.951 Before examining the enforcement 
powers of the ACNC, it is worth examining the introduction of governance and external conduct 
standards to increase the public’s confidence in the sector, about which much has been made. 
8.3.6 Governance and External Conduct Standards 
The ACNC Act seeks to create a minimum level of governance standards to increase the public’s 
confidence in the sector. This is to be achieved by an entity demonstrating how it pursues its 
purpose and manages its affairs in a manner that is open, accountable and transparent, all of 
which will minimise the risk of mismanagement and misappropriation.952 Achieving these 
principle-based governance standards is to be specified in the regulations – but, at the time of 
                                               
945 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-25. 
946 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-25(1). Revenue is calculated with 
accordance with accounting standards in force at the relevant time. Australian Charities and Not-for-
Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-25(4). 
947 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-25(2). 
948 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 205-15(3). 
949 Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 17.55, 233. 
950 Australian Government Budget 2011-12, Budget Paper No.2 – Part 2: Expense Measures  
<http:www.budget.gov.au/2011-12/content/bp2/html/bp2_expens-22.htm> 4. 
951 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 90-5. 
952 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 45-1. The public includes donors, 
members and volunteers of an entity. Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 45-
5(1). 
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writing this thesis, the regulations to ACNC Bill and ACNC Act were not available.953  However, 
draft governance standards were released for public consultation.954 Similar to the financial 
reporting obligations, the governance standards are not applicable to all entities.955 
The ACNC Act allows basic religious charities and small entities to be exempt from the 
prescribed governance standards.956 Furthermore, the Commissioner has the discretionary power 
to decide which specific governance standards will or will not apply to certain entities.957 The 
Commission’s decision will be influenced by: what is reasonable for an entity to implement; an 
entity’s circumstances; and the size and level of an entity’s donations, grants and other monies 
received from the public or government.958 The rationale behind these varying expectations is 
based on the presumption that larger entities receive more public monies and are at greater risk of 
funds being mismanaged than smaller entities.959 The varying treatment of entities under the 
ACNC Act also applies to the external conduct standard provisions. 
The external conduct standards outlined in the ACNC Bill will only apply to an entity that 
transfers funds and engages in activities outside Australia.960 These standards aim to prevent 
entities from supporting or contributing to terrorist or criminal activities.961 The pending 
accompanying regulations will prescribe the external conduct standards; however, the regulations 
were not available at the time of writing this thesis. Similar to the governance standard 
provisions, the Commissioner will decide which standards will or will not apply giving regard to 
                                               
953 Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 5.29, 52. 
954 The draft governace standards are outside the scope of this thesis.  However, submissions have been made to 
Treasury and can be access at: 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/2012/Governance%20Standar
ds%20for%20the%20Not-for-profit%20Sector/Submissions/PDF/065_Weinert_Kim_Danielle.ashx>  
955 Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 5.31, 5.36,52–53. 
956 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 45-15(3)-(5). 
957 ACNC Bill ch 3 pt 3-1 dv 45 cl 45-10(4). Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits 
Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) 
Bill 2012 5.44-5.47, 53. See Table 10 for an explanation of what constitutes a large and small entity. 
958 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 45-15(2A); Explanatory Material, 
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits 
Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 4.41–5.43, 53. 
959 Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 5.44–5.47, 53. 
960 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 50-5(1)(a). 
961Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 50-5(1)(a)-(b). 
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an entity’s size, and the extent it receives monies from the public or government.962 Failure to 
comply with these governance standards, or to submit false financial records the Commissioner, 
may penalise an entity. 
8.4 Enforcement Powers of the ACNC 
The ACNC has the power to issue formal warnings if the Commissioner reasonably believes that 
an entity has, or is likely to, contravene the ACNC Act.963 Subsequent to issuing a warning, the 
Commission has the power to direct an entity to do a specified act, address the contravention 
and/or non-compliance of the ACNC Act, and not to enter into specified commercial 
transactions.964 In the event an entity fails to satisfy the Commissioner’s directions, the 
Commissioner may issue an enforceable undertaking965 – for example, suspending or removing 
an entity from the registry.966 The Commissioner is obliged to use the ACNC’s regulatory powers 
in a proportionate manner and, further, the Commissioner has the discretionary powers to impose 
administrative penalties.967 
The Commissioner’s discretionary powers include the ability to increase or decrease the 
amount of an administrative penalty based on the culpability and the actions of an entity.968 The 
ACNC Act provides the Commissioner with the option to increase a penalty by 20 per cent in the 
event an entity or its agent prepare a statement which is reckless, without reasonable care, or 
contains false, or misleading information.969 Conversely, the Commissioner may reduce a civil 
penalty by 20 per cent where an entity informs the ACNC of their false or misleading 
                                               
962 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 50-10(2A); Explanatory Material, 
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits 
Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 5.66–5.67, 55. 
963 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 95-5. 
964 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 100-60. The term ‘specified act’ is not 
defined in the ACNC Bill or the ACNC Act. 
965 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) ss 90-1-90-15. 
966 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 100-5. 
967 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) ss 175-30 and 175-60; Explanatory 
Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits 
Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 13.95, 188. 
968 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-30; Explanatory Material, Australian 
Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission 
(Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 13.102, 189. 
969 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-25. 
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statement.970 The Commissioner’s calculations of a base penalty amount are on a sliding scale, 
which are outlined in Table 10. 
Table 10 – Base penalty amount  971 
Item Situation Base Penalty Amount 
1 The entity or its agent provides a statement that is false or misleading because of an 
intentional disregard of this Act. 
60 Penalty 
Units972 
2 The entity or its agents provides a statement that is false or misleading because of 
recklessness as to the operation of the Act. 
40 Penalty 
Units 
3 An entity or its agent provides a misleading or false statement because of a failure 
to take reasonable care to comply with this Act. 
20 Penalty 
Units 
The ACNC Act also sets out penalties for an entity when it fails to lodge documents on time.973 
Similar to the other administrative penalty provisions, the Commissioner has the power to impose 
a higher penalty for medium- and large-sized entities.974 Medium entities may face a penalty 
double the base penalty amount, and a large entity will be faced with a penalty of five times the 
base penalty amount.975 The maximum penalty, which the Commissioner may impose, can be no 
more than five penalty units, and an entity will have 14 days to pay any penalty.976 Should the 
penalty remains unpaid, a daily general rate of interest will incur,977 and it is treated as a tax-debt 
that the ATO will collect.978 Where the Commissioner has imposed a penalty, the Commissioner 
has the discretion to remit all or part of it.979 Administrative decisions made by the Commissioner 
may be subject to review and appeal where an entity feels dissatisfied.980 
                                               
970 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-30. 
971 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-20. 
972 The current value of one penalty unit is $110.00. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4AA. 
973 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) sub dv 175-C. 
974 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-40(1). 
975 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-40(1)(a)-(b). 45-15(2A). A base 
penalty amount is one penalty unit for a period of 28 days. Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission 
Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-40(2). 
976 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-55. 
977 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-65. 
978 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-70. 
979 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 175-60. 
980 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 160-5. 
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8.5 Reviewing the Commissioner’s Decisions 
An entity may lodge an objection within 60 days of receiving an administrative decision, and the 
entity must state in full the grounds on which the entity relies.981 The Commissioner will decide 
whether or not to uphold an entity’s request for a review.982 This decision is referred to in the 
ACNC Act as an ‘objection decision’.983 When the Commission has made the decision to review, 
it must then decide to allow the objection in full or in part.984 Should an entity disagree with the 
Commissioner’s objection decision, it may apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal or to a 
designated court for a review or appeal the Commissioner’s decision.985 
8.6 Conclusion 
Reforming Australia’s not-for-profit sector at the federal level is something the sector has 
needed. Despite numerous federal government reports and inquiries detailing a number of key 
recommendations on how to best reform the sector (often repeating and/or echoing the same ones 
from the preceding report), reform has been slow and delivered piecemeal. 
The centrepiece of the federal government’s reform package is the creation of the ACNC. 
This body is tasked with regulating not-for-profit entities, and deciding which qualify for 
registration with the Commission. The ACNC’s structure entails an advisory board and a 
Commissioner, and is tasked to enhance the public’s trust and confidence in the sector through 
the regulatory framework of the ACNC. The Commissioner has two very general functions: to 
register and to monitor entities. The registration of certain types of entities is prescribed under the 
ACNC Act and, furthermore, an entity’s registration is a prerequisite for it to access 
Commonwealth tax concessions and other government exemptions, benefits and concessions. 
Once an entity is registered, the Commissioner can carry out the ACNC’s other general function 
to monitor entities. 
                                               
981 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 160-10(1). 
982 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 160-10(4). 
983 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 160-15(2). 
984 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 160-15(1). 
985 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 160-25. 45-15(2A). The ACNC Act does 
not offer any guidance as to what is a designated court. However, the ACNC Bill stated that a court means the 
Federal Court of Australia or a Supreme Court that has jurisdiction in relation to matters arising under this Act. 
ACNC Bill ch 8 pt 8-2 dv 900 cl 900-5. However, the ACNC Bill does not contain any provisions that provide the 
state courts with the jurisdictional power to deal with reviewable or appealable matter under the ACNC Bill. 
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The monitoring of an entity is achieved through it submitting an annual report, which includes 
a financial report. However, small and basic religious entities appears to fall outside the 
monitoring powers of the ACNC, as they are exempt from submitting an annual financial report 
and are not subject to the governance and external conduct standards under the ACNC Act. 
Therefore, the Commissioner’s monitoring function is confined to medium- and large-sized 
entities. Furthermore, the Commissioner is provided with discretionary powers to decide which 
governance and external conduct standards will be or will not be applicable to medium and large 
entities. 
Additional discretionary powers for the Commission are evident where it exercises its 
enforcement powers. The Commissioner may increase or decrease the amount of a base penalty. 
The Commissioner has been provided with the statutory power to impose penalties upon entities 
where they fail to submit financial reports, or when a submitted financial report is prepared 
recklessly, without reasonable care, and/or contains false or misleading information. The ACNC 
has been established to achieve transparency and accountability within the sector to restore the 
public’s confidence; however, there remain concerns about whether the ACNC will achieve 
transparency, and this is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9: Conclusion 
Evaluation of Australia’s Recent Reforms Regarding 
Charities 
 
The future of the sector rests on its ability to engage the community in 
supporting its purpose.986 
9.0 Introduction 
This chapter compares the functions and the power of the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits 
Commission with the United Kingdom’s Charities Commission, and reveals several limitations to 
Australia’s proposed regulatory framework. These limitations are a direct consequence of the 
federal government implementing reform primarily to support its social inclusion policy – rather 
than reforming the sector to equip it for future challenges. 
Australia’s social inclusion policy appears to be modelled on the United Kingdom’s Big 
Society policy. This chapter analyses the fiscal paradigm between not-for-profit organisations and 
government created by social inclusion policies. Lastly, this chapter discusses the known pitfalls 
that social inclusion policies has on the sector and assesses whether Australia is taking the 
appropriate strategic action to avoid these pitfalls. 
9.1 Are These Reforms Measuring Up? 
The federal government has pursued the reform of the not-for-profit sector, and the choices and 
decisions it has made are surprising. Although the ACNC Act remains a work in progress 
(hopefully), the reform picture remains incomplete. The federal government has articulated many 
goals to improve the administration of the sector by establishing the ACNC;987 however, there are 
some deficiencies with the ACNC Act. 
The overall function of the ACNC is unclear, as the ACNC Act does not provide any specific 
details on the Commissioner’s functions besides the general administration of the Act, registering 
                                               
986 Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the Not-for-profit Sector’ (Research Report, Productivity 
Commission, January 2010) xxxiii. 
987 Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012, 5. 
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and monitoring entities.988 These explanations of the ACNC’s functions are very general when 
compared to the Commission’s five specific functions under the Charities Acts of the United 
Kingdom.989 These five functions are clearly expressed and are wider than just assisting not-for-
profit organisations to comply with statutory administrative requirements. The Commission’s 
wider functions comprise remedial and proactive action in connection to charity abuses, and 
ensuring fundraising activities are legitimate.990 The functions of the ACNC should be revisited to 
be more prescriptive and to target perverse conduct within the sector. These prescriptive 
functions would better manage and promote the policy of transparency and accountability. 
Furthermore, to strengthen the ACNC’s function, the ACNC Act should connect the ACNC’s 
functions to its objectives – and the ACNC should demonstrate its own level of transparency. 
The ACNC demands the sector be transparent – therefore, it is only reasonable that the peak 
regulator is also open and transparent. The Commissioner is required to furnish the Minister with 
an annual report about the ACNC’s performance, to be presented to the federal parliament at the 
end of each financial year.991 However, the Act does not provide clarity as to whether the 
ACNC’s performance relates to financial performance and/or particulars of the its functions, such 
as the number of entities registered and deregistered, or complaints received and investigated. 
This imbalance needs to addressed by having the ACNC provide information on its website 
demonstrating how the ACNC and the Commissioner are achieving the objects of the Act, and 
how well they are performing their functions and managing their financial affairs by way of an 
annual report.992 
The United Kingdom Commission’s annual report publishes in great detail how it is 
discharging its functions, how its objectives and duties are being meet, and how it is managing its 
financial affairs.993 The Commission, like the ACNC, is required to furnish parliament with a 
report – but the Commission, additionally, must disclose its annual report to the public (available 
through the Commission’s website), hold a public annual meeting three days after disclosing its 
                                               
988 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) pt 5-1. 
989 See Charities Act 2011 (UK) c25, s 15. 
990 Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 15(1). 
991 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 130-5. 
992 Charities Act 2011 (UK) cl 25, sch 2 para 11. 
993 Charities Act 2011 (UK) cl 24, sch 2 para 11(1). 
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annual report, and advise the Crown on matters relating to its functions and objectives.994 The 
ACNC Act does not require public disclosure of the ACNC’s report; however, the requirement to 
submit its the annual report to federal parliament may be the means of public disclosure – but this 
is not ideal. While the general contention has been not to copy the United Kingdom,995 the ACNC 
should, however, take the lead by being open and transparent in reporting its functions, activities 
and financial affairs, like the United Kingdom Commission. Should the primary aim of the 
ACNC be to promote openness and transparency, additional information and clarity is needed 
regarding the ACNC’s status. 
The ACNC Bill and Act offer no information about the status of the ACNC. The importance of 
knowing its status is to affirm its independence, and to free it from the direction and/or control of 
any minister of the Crown, or any government department. Preserving the ACNC’s independence 
is crucially important, not only to protect the sector’s boundaries, but to prevent the federal 
government using it to command and control the sector. This may not be the intention of the 
federal government, however, the ACNC Act must be amended to clarify the status of the ACNC. 
Perhaps the ACNC Act could have a provision similar to section 13(4) of the Charities Act 2011 
(UK), which allows the Commission to carry out its functions and makes decisions free from any 
interference from parliament, government and/or a government department –the ACNC should be 
afforded the same protection.996 
Further, the ACNC Act could simplify the meaning of a not-for-profit organisation by 
adopting the structural-operational definition, which is conceptually clearer than the definition 
contained in tax legislation. Directly adopting the structural-operational definition in the ACNC 
Act would remove the confusing and unnecessary reference to the two Income Tax Assessment 
Acts. The ACNC Act’s introduction of an ‘entity’ and a ‘subtype of entity’ has been purposely 
designed to support the government’s National Compact framework997 and to overcome the High 
Court’s decision of Aid/Watch Incorporated v. Commission of Taxation.998 Although there have 
                                               
994 Charities Act 2011 (UK) cl 25, s 15(1), sch 2 para 12. See also The Charity Commission Annual Report and 
Accounts 2011-12 (for the year ended 31 March 2012) at 
< http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/about_us/Annual_report_2012.pdf>. 
 
996 Charities Act 2011 (U) c 25. 
997 Australian Government, ‘A Definition of Charity’ (Consultation Paper, Australian Government, October 2011) 1. 
998 Aid/Watch is an organisation to research, monitor and campaign about foreign aid. Specifically, Aid/Watch 
would hold various public debates and release reports critiquing the effectiveness of foreign aid. The 
Commissioner of Taxation removed Aid/Watch’s concessional tax endorsement and its charitable institution 
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been a previous attempts by the federal parliament to introduce a statutory definition of charity, 
these attempts have had limited success.999 Despite the Henry Tax Review calling for the 
introduction of a modern statutory definition of charity, the ACNC Bill’s meaning of ‘an entity’ is 
not modern, nor is there an advancement of the traditional charitable purposes.1000 
Moreover, the ACNC Act ignores the core legal tests of the public benefit test and the doctrine 
of cy-près. The ACNC Act does not state whether the ACNC will take into consideration long-
standing case law when making its determination of an entity’s registration and charitable status. 
The public benefit test cannot be excluded for the fundamental reason that a public benefit is the 
hallmark of a charity, and it distinguishes a charity’s activities from those of government and 
private organisations.1001 Additionally, in borderline cases where a trust may fail to be recognised 
as charitable, the cy-près doctrine may save the trust – therefore, it should not exclude this 
doctrine. However, it is clear that further development to simplify the meaning of an entity is 
needed along with further clarity in the area of financial reporting under the ACNC Act. 
The existing financial reporting frameworks for not-for-profit organisations are complex and 
uncoordinated.1002 Currently, there are four types of reporting requirements for not-for-profit 
                                                                                                                                                        
status. The Commissioner was of the view that Aid/Watch itself did not distribute aid and the organisation’s 
purpose was political and, therefore, not charitable. The High Court held that generating public debate is a 
charitable purpose as it contributes to the public’s welfare. In making its decision, the High Court rejected 
following McGovern v Attorney-General [1982] CH 321 on the basis that Australia has no general doctrine that 
excludes political objects from charitable purposes. Aid/Watch Incorporated v Commission of Taxation [2010] 
HCA 42, 47–49. The federal government expressed its disagreement in the High Court’s finding, giving the 
government another reason to introduce a new definition of ‘charity’. See Australian Government, ‘A Definition 
of Charity’ (Consultation Paper, October 2011) 1–2; Australian Government, Budget 2011–12, ‘Budget Paper No 
1 – Part 1 Revenue Measures’ <http://www.budget.gov.au/2001/content/bp2/html/bp2_revenue-0.7.htm> 11. 
999 Senator Xenophon, on 13 May 2010, introduced to the federal Senate the Tax Laws Amendment (Public Benefit 
Test) Bill 2010. The Senator’s bill sought to introduce a public benefit test. It was proposed that the benefit is for 
the public or a significant section of the public balanced against any detriment or harm that a charitable institution 
may cause when carrying out its activities. The traditional public benefit test could be re-named to the public 
detriment test. The debate on this bill was adjourned and referred to the Senate Standing Economics Legislation 
Committee for inquiry and the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny Bills. Senator Xenophon’s Bill was 
found to be too narrow in addressing a broad range of issues in religious and charitable organisations. This bill 
appears to remain in limbo and will disappear once the government introduces its bill. Senate Economics 
Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Tax Laws Amendment (Public Benefit Test) Bill 2010, 
(September 2010) 1; Tax Laws Amendment (Public Benefit Test) Bill 2010 cl 50-51(1), (2), lines 8–10, 11–17, 3. 
1000 See Recommendation 42, Report to the Treasurer – Australia’s Future Tax System; Australian Government 
Budget 2011-12, ‘Budget Paper No 1 – Part 1 Revenue Measures’ 
<http://budget.gov.au/2001/content/bp2/html/bp2_revenue-0.7.htm> 11. Public consultation is being undertaken 
at the time of writing this thesis. There have been announcements that, from 1 July 2013, a new statutory 
definition of charity for all Commonwealth laws will be introduced. Australian Government, Office for Not-for-
Profit Sector, ‘Introducing a Statutory Definition of ‘Charity’’ (2 November 2011) < 
http://www.notforprofit.gov.au/nfp-reform/not-profit-sector-reform/introducing-statutory-definition-‘charity>. 
1001 Kerry O’Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study (Routledge, 2007) 106. 
1002 Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 17.30, 228. 
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organisations. The manner in which an organisation is to meet its reporting obligations is 
determined by the organisation’s structure, government contracts, fundraising requirements, and 
endorsement for concessional taxation treatment.1003 To overcome and reform these complex 
arrangements, the ACNC has been called upon to explore ways to minimise financial reporting 
requirements through harmonisation – but the ACNC Act and Bill does very little to accomplish 
this objective.1004 
The federal government has acted upon recommendation 6.1 from the Productivity 
Commission and amended the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to reduce the vigorous financial 
reporting and auditing obligations, specifically for smaller organisations. The Corporations 
Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Act1005 introduces a tiered reporting framework for 
companies limited by guarantee only. Table 11 outlines the new tiered and reporting obligations 
for companies limited by guarantee, which does not reconcile to the amounts outlined in Table 9. 
Table 11 – An overview of obligations for companies limited by guarantee 1006 
Tier Criteria Obligations 
1 Small company limited by guarantee 
with an annual revenue less than 
$250,000 and with no deductible gift 
receipt (DGR) status.1007 
Exempt from preparing: a financial or directors’ report; a financial 
report audited; or notifying members of the reports.1008 
2 Company limited by guarantee with an 
annual revenue less than $250,000 that 
has DGR status; and company limited 
by guarantee with an annual revenue of 
more than $250,000, but less than $1 
million, regardless of DGR status. 
Must prepare a financial report, but the report need not be audited 
unless the company is a Commonwealth company (or subsidiary) 
or Commonwealth authority. The financial report need not be 
audited, but must be reviewed. A director’s report is required, but 
contains fewer details than that required of other companies. Any 
member that elects to receive the reports must be provided with 
them. 
                                               
1003 Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 17.33, 228. 
1004 Australian Government Budget 2011-12, Budget Paper No.2 – Part 2: Expense Measures 
<http:www.budget.gov.au/2011-12/content/bp2/html/bp2_expens-22.htm> 4. 
1005 2010 (Cth). 
1006 Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Act 2010 (Cth) s 258A. 
1007 Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Act 2010 (Cth) s 54B. 
1008 Under section 294B, a small company limited by guarantee may be directed by ASIC to prepare financial and 
director’s reports, audit the financial report, and to notify members of those reports. Failure to comply with ASIC 
direction is an offence based on strict liability. Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Act 2010 
(Cth) s 294B(2). 
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3 Company limited by guarantee with 
annual revenue of $1 million or more, 
regardless of the company’s DGR 
status.  
Must prepare financial and directors’ reports (lesser details than 
what is required of other companies).1009 Financial report must be 
audited, and reports must be given to members who elect to receive 
them.  
Since these amendments have been in place, it has been reported that this tiered reporting system 
is onerous.1010 The system introduced by the Corporation Amendment (Corporate Reporting 
Reform) Act 2010 (Cth) has added to the existing complex arrangements and further burdened 
not-for-profit organisations with higher compliance costs.1011 These monetary thresholds are 
inconsistent with those for incorporated associations that operate in those jurisdictions with a 
tiered reporting framework; this highlights how harmonisation is not being achieved. 
Furthermore, the ACNC Act also affixes another framework of financial reporting for those 
entities under the ACNC’s supervision, and it is difficult to ascertain which reporting framework 
applies.1012 
The duplication of registration will have incorporated associations subject to the ACNC’s 
supervision and also to the supervision of the respective state departments. Clearly, the desire to 
harmonise financial reporting obligations and reduce compliance costs for not-for-profit 
organisations will not be accomplished, since the ACNC Act only increases compliance costs and 
creates further administrative complexities for not-for-profit organisations. 
Additional administrative requirements for an entity are the governance standards that the 
ACNC Act will impose. These are aimed at setting minimal standards to maintain, protect and 
enhance transparency and confidence in the not-for-profit sector. However, medium and large 
                                               
1009 Tier 3 organisations are required to provide an annual director’s report, which is a simplified report containing: 
(i) a description of the entity’s short- and long-term objectives; (ii) an outline of the entity’s strategy for 
achieving these objectives; (iii) details of the entity’s principal activities; (iv) how the principal activities assisted 
in achieving the entity’s objectives; (v) how the entity measures its performance (including key performance 
indicators used by it); (vi) the name of each director at any time during or since the end of the year, and the 
period for which the person was a director; (vii) each director’s qualification, experience and social 
responsibilities; (viii) the number of meetings of the board of directors held during the year, and each director’s 
attendance at those meetings; (ix) each class of membership; and (x) the total amount that members of the 
company are liable to contribute if the company is wound up.  Corporation Amendment (Corporate Reporting 
Reform) Act 2010 (Cth) s 300B.  
1010 Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 17.37, 229. 
1011 Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 17.38, 229. 
1012 Once the accompanying Regulations come into effect, there are certain reporting requirements and duties under 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that will be ‘turned off’ for a company limited by guarantee. At the time of 
writing this thesis, the introduction of the ACNC Act permits for the duplication of registration. Dv 2 Australian 
Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Act 2012 (Cth). 
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entities will only be afforded this protection due to the presumption that larger organisations are 
prone to abuse. This presumption is erroneous, as charity abuse are not confined to a particular 
size or form of a not-for-profit organisation. 
Mismanagement and opportunistic behaviour within not-for-profit organisations happens 
because of their amenable structures, which permits a small number of people to have the 
exclusive power to manage and control the organisation’s affairs – and this can be hidden from 
the membership base regardless of its size.1013 Sadly, abuses within all forms and sizes of not-for-
profit organisations does occur, and regardless of the gravity of the misappropriation, small not-
for-profit organisations should also be afforded as much protection as necessary to prevent one-
off and/or systematic abuses. In fact, these can have a greater impact on smaller organisations due 
to their limited resources. The federal government must reconsider this subjective application of 
governance standards to better protect not-for-profit organisations of all sizes and forms, and the 
sector. 
The promotion of regulations to achieve transparency, governance and accountability under 
the ACNC Act is limited to registration and the submission of an annual statement – the federal 
government’s reforms fail to understand and address the major issues that greatly affect the 
sector:1014 managing risks and related parties’ transactions; avoiding charity abuses; preserving 
the sector’s independence; and, moreover, protecting an entity’s property. The ACNC Act in its 
present form fails to address these core issues. While public registration of entities and the 
submission of an annual report are important features of a good governance framework, there 
remain, however, other equally important features that have been excluded. The ACNC Act could 
be improved by requiring entities to have robust internal processes and systems in place to 
manage risk and protect an organisation’s property – such as the timely disclosure of material 
interests. Furthermore, at the centre of the governance framework are an entity’s officers, and 
                                               
1013 Kim Weinert, ‘Is there a perfect environment for a villain and villainess to survive?’ in Rachel Franks and Susan 
E. Meindi (eds), The Real and the Reflected: Heroes and Villains in Existent and Imagined Worlds (Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2012) 53. 
1014 However, at the time of writing this thesis, a consultation paper was issued for the development of governance 
standards. This thesis does not analyse or discuss the draft governance standards outlined in the federal 
government’s consolation paper. 
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attention should be on these officers’ behaviour in governing the entity.1015 An officer 
undertaking a role must follow specific legal duties that are important mechanisms of 
organisational governance, but which are excluded from the ACNC Act and will be found in the 
accompanying regulations.1016 
The appealing characteristic of a not-for-profit organisation is the nature of the activities it 
pursues. These pursuits allow not-for-profit organisations to enjoy a high level of trust; they can 
be perceived as wholesome, and the people connected with them are considered to be selfless.1017 
However, these ideals are challenged when reports emerge about self-interested conduct within 
not-for-profit organisations, and it is no longer acceptable to rely on a traditional presumption 
that not-for-profits and their officers always behave in a purely altruistic manner.1018 Therefore, 
the ACNC Act and not its regulations should include legal duties that impose clear rules to govern 
and prescribe how an individual in position of control should behave. While the ACNC Act does 
impose a duty to notify the ACNC of a breach of the Act, this legal duty does not go far enough 
to promote good governance.1019 The ACNC Act should clearly outline the manner in which an 
officer must act to promote and satisfy the entity’s altruistic mission – which should be done in 
good faith, with due diligence, skill, prudence, and for proper purpose. Although these duties 
generally apply to corporations and to a trustee of a charity, the ACNC Act should include these 
duties and additional obligations on officers (and members) not to engage in conduct that could 
harm the public’s trust and confidence in the not-for-profit sector and its organisations.1020 
                                               
1015 Adrian Cadbury, Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View (Oxford University Press, 2002), 
34. The term ‘officer’ is used here in the absence of the ACNC Bill identifying or describing an individual who is 
appointed and has the responsibility of controlling and managing an entity, such as a trustee or director. 
1016 Ian Ramsay, Corporate Governance and the Duties of Company Directors, Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation, Faculty of Law (University of Melbourne 1997) 10. 
1017 Kim Weinert, ‘Is there a perfect environment for a villain and villainess to survive?’ in Rachel Franks and Susan 
E. Meindi (eds), The Real and the Reflected: Heroes and Villains in Existent and Imagined Worlds (Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2012) 50. 
1018 Kim Weinert, ‘Is there a perfect environment for a villain and villainess to survive?’ in Rachel Franks and Susan 
E. Meindi (eds), The Real and the Reflected: Heroes and Villains in Existent and Imagined Worlds (Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2012) 50. 
 
1019 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 65-5(2). An entity must inform the 
Commissioner of a name change, address for service, a change of its governing rules, an entity has ceased. 
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 65-5(1). 
1020 Kim Weinert, ‘Is there a perfect environment for a villain and villainess to survive?’ in Rachel Franks and Susan 
E. Meindi (eds), The Real and the Reflected: Heroes and Villains in Existent and Imagined Worlds (Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2012) 54. 
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However, having a clear set of legal duties and obligations would be rendered ineffective without 
an effective regulatory body.1021 
The ACNC Act provides the ACNC with the light regulatory powers to remove an entity from 
the registry; however, the ACNC does not have the power to remove, suspend, or disqualify an 
individual from an entity for misconduct. Similar to the Commission in the United Kingdom, the 
ACNC must have the ability to take necessary remedial and/or proactive action against an 
individual within an entity engaging in misconduct or mismanagement.1022 While the ACNC Act 
states that the regulatory powers will be used proportionately, the ACNC does not have the 
ability to remedy particular situations; this will allow an entity to continue operating and, 
moreover, to protect an entity’s property. 
The ACNC Act overlooks the importance of an entity needing to protect its property. The 
Commission has the power to vest a charity’s property in a trust with an official custodian, and to 
appoint an interim manager and a receiver to protect the charity’s property and manage its 
affairs.1023 The ACNC Act should be amended to provide the ACNC with a similar power to 
Commission, which allows it to undertake any action it thinks is necessary to protect a charity 
and avoid it having to cease operation. 
 Furthermore, where an entity may have older constitutional documents, which may prevent it 
undertaking certain transactions, the Commissioner should be given the power to remedy these 
deficiencies with the ACNC (like the Commission) appointing a receiver or a manager. The 
Commission does have the power to direct an entity not to enter into a specified commercial or 
financial transaction, which would affect the business of the entity. However, it is unclear from 
the ACNC Act when the ACNC would need to use this power and, furthermore, there is a concern 
that this may take away an entity’s freedom to enter into arrangements. Additionally, the ACNC 
Act should include provisions that aim to protect the entity’s property (including funds) and allow 
it the freedom to determine for itself whether to enter particular transactions. The ACNC Act 
should incorporate provisions that provide the necessary checks and balances for an entity to seek 
                                               
1021 Kim Weinert, ‘Is there a perfect environment for a villain and villainess to survive?’ in Rachel Franks and Susan 
E. Meindi (eds), The Real and the Reflected: Heroes and Villains in Existent and Imagined Worlds (Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2012) 54. 
1022 Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s1B. 
1023 Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to the Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 34. 
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advice from a financial expert – particularly regarding high-risk transactions.1024 Should the 
Commissioner be provided with remedial powers, this would strengthen the ACNC’s ability to 
maintain and promote an effective not-for-profit sector. 
Another means for the ACNC to promote confidence in the sector is by it assisting entities to 
comply and understand the Act through guidance and education.1025 Such advice would only be 
available to registered entities and limited to how they are to comply with the Act. The ACNC 
should consider widening this function to be similar to the Charity Commission, which provides 
advice to all individuals and forms of not-for-profit organisations on how to best manage and 
administer an entity. The Commission also provides advice to trustees and members on how to 
manage internal disputes and incidences of mismanagement. The ACNC Act should be modified 
to allow the ACNC to offer entities the necessary advice and education on how to appropriately 
deal with issues that might hinder their effective operation and administration, and how to best 
manage an entity. 
As an initial step towards regulating the sector, the ACNC Bill and Act do not convey their 
aims simply or with clarity. The ACNC Act needs to be written in a manner that allows volunteers 
to easily comprehend their requirements under the Act. Despite the desire of the sector’s 
stakeholders for a single legislative regulated framework for all forms and sizes of not-for-profit 
organisations, the ACNC, ultimately, is a national registry for those entities operating in the 
federal system. Under these new arrangements, an entity may find itself being governed by more 
than one regulatory regime. The federal government’s based its abandonment of a single 
regulator for the not-for-profit sector because the Commonwealth lacked the necessary 
constitutional power to create a national regulator.1026 
9.2 A Federal Takeover of the Not-for-Profit Sector 
There is an argument that the Commonwealth does have the necessary constitutional power to 
make laws to regulate all not-for-profit organisations using its power under section 51(xx) of the 
                                               
1024 The United Kingdom has introduced this requirement where the charity uses its land as security for a loan. 
Alison MacLennan, Blackstone’s Guide to the Charities Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 41. 
1025 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 15-5(2)(iii). 
1026 Explanatory Material, Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 17.61, 234. 
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Constitution.1027 Section 51(xx) allows the Commonwealth to make laws about trading or 
financial corporations. Prime facie, a not-for-profit organisation would not be considered to be 
either a constitutional corporation or a trading corporation due to the non-distributive 
characteristic. However, the ACNC Act states that a constitutional corporation is recognised as a 
registered entity with the ACNC.1028 Therefore, it begs the question, can any form of a not-for-
profit organisation be considered a trading and/or financial corporation for the purpose of section 
51(xx) of the Constitution? 
Determining the characterisation of a not-for-profit organisation as a trading and/or financial 
corporation – and within the reach of the section 51(xx) power – turns on the wording of section 
51 and, the legal tests from the High Court of Australiathe High Court. The words ‘trading’ and 
‘financial’ found in section 51(xx) cannot be interpreted in a narrow or strict manner, but in its 
current and popular sense.1029 The popular and current interpretation of the word of ‘trade’ is 
broader than what was denoted in 1900, and it refers to the organisation’s activities, which 
includes buying and selling, negotiations, bargains, transport for reward, the purchase or sale of 
money, credit, news or information, tangibles or intangibles.1030 This wide list of activities 
captures the type of activities undertaken by not-for-proft organisations. For example, the 
Salvation Army provides credit through a no-interest loan scheme, and sells a wide-range of 
goods through their ‘Salvo Stores’.1031 The degree that a section 51(xx) corporation engages in 
trading activities must be significant.1032 Whether an entity can be characterised as a trading 
and/or financial corporation is determined by the nature of the organisation’s activities, whether 
they are actual or intended.1033 
                                               
1027 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp). 
1028 The ACNC Act refers to a constitutional corporation as a federal regulated entity. Australian Charities and Not-
for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) ss 205-15-205-20. 
1029 R v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Western Australia National Football League (1979) 143 
CLR 190. 
1030 R v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Western Australia National Football League (1979) 143 
CLR 190; Patrick Keyzer, Principles of Australian Constitutional Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2010) 
152. 
1031 See The Salvation Army, No Interest Loan Scheme <http://www.salvationarmy.org.au/contactus/victoria-
divisions/pathways/no-interest-loan-scheme.html?s=0>; The Salvation Army, The Salvos Stores (2011) 
http://www.salvationarmy.org.au/salvosstores/shop.html>. Trading activities undertaken by a not-for-profit 
organisation will be complementary to the organisation’s altruistic purpose. 
1032 Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1892) 183 CLR 323, 182-18; Re Dingjan; 
Ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323, 346 (Dawson J). 
1033 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482. 
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In the case of St George County Council, the High Court had to determine whether the 
Council could be considered as a trading section 51(xx) corporation.1034 The High Court  
characterised the Council’s activities as having a public purpose and, rather than a private 
enterprise, its purpose should not be considered as a trading corporation.1035 Menzies J went 
further to express (in dicta) that universities, water and sewage utilities, churches, councils and 
public authorities could not be characterised as trading corporations.1036 A similar view was Gibbs 
CJ, who said that under the actual activities test, the Council did not engage in activities for-profit 
and, therefore, it was not a section 51(xx) corporation, as it was not set up for the purpose of 
engaging in trading activities.1037 Entities under the ACNC Act (apart from a constitutional 
corporation) and incorporated associations legislation would clearly not be considered as trading 
corporations pursuant to the actual activities test. However, the use of the actual activities test by 
the High Court has become dormant. 
The High Court’s current and preferred approach in determining a section 51(xx) trading 
corporation is the significant activities test, which is seen in the decision of Adamson.1038 The 
Adamson case involved the Western Australian Football League (WA League), an incorporated 
association to promote the game of Australian Rules Football with not-for-profit objectives. The 
WA League earned a substantial income from a variety of activities, such as matches, 
broadcasting, fees, advertising, and membership subscriptions. The majority of the HCA held that 
the WA League and its clubs were trading corporations owing to their activities.1039 Barwick CJ, 
Mason and Jacobs JJ found that the WA League and its clubs had substantial trading activities, 
which formed a ‘sufficiently significant proportion of its overall activities’.1040 Moreover, 
Murphy J stated that a ‘trading corporation may also be a sporting, religious, or a governmental 
body. As long as the trading is not insubstantial [sic] and the fact that trading is incidental to 
                                               
1034R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte St George County Council (1974) 130 CLR 533. 
1035 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte St George County Council (1974) 130 CLR 533, 561, 547 (McTiernan J). 
1036 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte St George County Council (1974) 130 CLR 533. 
1037 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte St George County Council (1974) 130 CLR 533, 562. 
1038 R v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Western Australian National Football League (1979) 143 
CLR 190. 
1039 R v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Western Australian National Football League (1979) 143 
CLR 190, 233. 
1040 R v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Western Australian National Football League (1979) 143 
CLR 190, 208. 
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other activities it does not prevent it from being a trading corporation’.1041 Determining an 
organisation’s activities as ‘not insubstantial’ has been subject to further discussions by the High 
Court. 
The previous position of the courts was to determine an organisation’s activities by finding an 
actual amount of monies earned by an organisation.1042 Wilcox J found that the Australian Red 
Cross earned $2 million from the sale of goods and, therefore, it was a section 51(xx) trading 
corporation.1043 However, in 2001, the idea of assessing an organisation’s activity in dollars was 
rejected by the Full Federal Court in Quickenden v O’Connor.1044 
The Quickenden decision quantified an organisation’s activities not in dollars, but in 
percentage.1045 The trial court found that 28 per cent of the University of Western Australia’s 
revenue was derived from trading activities.1046 However, at trial, Carr J calculated the 
University’s trading activities to be at 18 per cent, but either figure according to his Honour 
‘pointed to substantial trading activities’.1047 Although the Quickenden decision does not provide 
a specific threshold figure as to what percentage of activities would constitute an insubstantial 
amount of trading activity, it would be possible, read in conjunction with Adamson, for a court to 
find 10 to 15 per cent of an organisation’s revenue from its overall activities would be substantial 
enough for an organisation to be a s 51(xx) company. 
Therefore, under the preferred significant activities test and, moreover, in light of Menzies’ J 
and Gibbs’ CJ reasoning, not-for-profit organisation are a trading corporation for the purpose of 
section 51(xx). This proposition is easily supported by the data from the ABS, which shows that 
during the 2006–2007 financial year, Australian not-for-profit organisations received $6.1 billion 
of income; and the main source of income for not-for-profit organisations was from the sale of 
goods, which accounted for $3.7 billion.1048 There are many examples of not-for-profit 
                                               
1041 R v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Western Australian National Football League (1979) 143 
CLR 190, 239. 
1042 E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 27 FCR 310. 
1043 E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 27 FCR 310, 340-350. 
1044 (2001) 109 FCR 243. 
1045 Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 109 FCR 243, 273. 
1046 Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 109 FCR 243, 273. 
1047 Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 109 FCR 243, 273. 
1048 Australian Bureau of Statics, 810.6 – Not-for-Profit Organisations, Australia 2006-07 – Other Activities (12 June 
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organisations that heavily engage in trading activities incidental to their altruistic activities.1049 
Therefore, it is reasonably conceivable that the federal parliament can make laws with respect to 
not-for-profit organisations. Once a company has been recognised as a section 51(xx) 
corporation, the next question to ask is: what is the extent of the Commonwealth’s regulation of 
trading corporations? 
The Commonwealth has the power over trading and financial corporations that have already 
been formed.1050 The ACNC Act does not confirm whether an entity becomes incorporated upon 
registering with the ACNC. While entities are incorporated either under the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) or the respective state association incorporated entities and engaging in significant 
trading activities, it is clear the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to regulate them. 
However, it remains unclear whether the Commonwealth can regulate the forms of the 
unincorporated association and charities. The Commonwealth does not have the power to 
incorporate charities and unincorporated associations under section 51(xx);1051 however, it is 
permissible for the Commonwealth to incorporate an organisation under section 51(i) where an 
organisation conducts interstate activity.1052 
Subsequent decisions of the High Court have disapproved and overturned this position, and it 
is now held that the federal government can regulate the activities of a trading section 51(xx) 
corporation, regardless of whether the trading corporation undertakes interstate trade.1053 The 
High Court has expanded the scope of section 51(xx) by finding that the Commonwealth’s 
corporation power is a plenary power and is to be constructed with all of its generality the words 
                                               
1049 There are an enormous number of not-for-organisations undertaking trading activities – too many to identify in 
this thesis. However, it has already been noted in this thesis the trading activities of the Salvation Army, which 
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admit.1054 Therefore, the High Court has held that the corporation power may be extended further 
to regulate all the activities and relationships of trading corporations.1055 
Furthermore, the High Court has found that section 51(xx) is not limited only to the federal 
parliament making laws regulating the activities to a trading corporation, but also to any matters 
that are significantly connected to a trading corporation.1056 This finding by the High Court would 
permit the federal government to use section 51(xx) ‘as a peg upon which to hang legislation’ on 
matters that fall outside the Commonwealth’s strict subject matter.1057 Therefore, the federal 
government has the power to regulate the activities of a not-for-profit’s members, its agents and 
donors. 
There is no thus difficulty in identifying a not-for-profit organisation as a trading corporation 
in accordance to the significant activities test, and the Commonwealth has plenary power under 
section 51(xx) to regulate any activities of a not-for-profit organisations. Furthermore, the scope 
of this regulatory power is widened to catch any other matters that are significantly connected to 
a not-for-profit organisation and not confided to trading activities. This qualification shows that 
the federal government has the constitutional powers to achieve a single, national not-for-profit 
system, and a not-for-profit regulator.1058 However, a federal takeover of the not-for-profit sector 
mirrors a WorkChoices situation, and a federal Labor government would be disinclined to 
exercise its constitutional power in this manner, which may be reminiscent of a WorkChoices’ 
electoral protest and defeat. The federal government’s reticence has it seeking out alternative 
ways to federally cover the not-for-profit sector. 
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One way to establish a new federal regulatory system for the sector is through the referral 
powers of the states and territories.1059 The states have already indicated their objection to a 
federal take over of incorporated associations. Therefore, the sensible alternative for the federal 
government in these circumstances is to encourage the states to harmonise their incorporation 
association legislation specifically in the areas of reporting arrangements and fundraising.1060 
However, as Appendix 1 illustrates, the states’ reporting arrangements are not streamlined or 
harmonised and, in the jurisdictions of Tasmania and Western Australia, tiered reporting 
arrangement would need to be introduced. Harmonisation of state laws is soft reform, and the 
federal government reform plans ignore what the sector requires, which is wide, sweeping, 
revolutionary reforms.1061 Averse to a direct takeover of the sector, the federal government have 
structured the ACNC Act to facilitate an incremental takeover of the sector. 
The objects’ provisions of the ACNC Act facilitates an incremental takeover of the sector by 
the federal government. Pursuant to the ACNC Act not-for-profit organisations must register with 
the ACNC to receive Commonwealth tax concessions and other exemptions and benefits (my 
emphasis).1062 This prerequisite in the ACNC Act will result in every Australian not-for-profit 
organisation, of all forms and sizes, registering with the ACNC, despite the Explanatory Material 
to the ACNC Bill emphasising that registration with ACNC is voluntary.1063 This requirement 
under the ACNC Act effectively conscripts not-for-profit organisations into the federal system 
and jurisdiction. The ACNC system of regulation, as already pointed out, adds another level of 
bureaucracy for organisations registered already in the existing system (being ASIC and the 
respecting states’ executive departments). Complying with the new requirements of the ACNC, 
as well as the administrative requirements of the existing systems, will, over time, prove to be too 
difficult and burdensome for many not-for-profit organisations to navigate and meet the 
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increasing administrative requirements.1064 Consequently, not-for-profit organisations will 
abandon the state system for the reason that registering with the ACNC is linked to tax 
concessions and other government funding, such as government service delivery contracts, which 
many not-for-profit organisations need and heavily rely upon. Ultimately, the design of the 
ACNC is to serve the core purpose of implementing the federal government’s social inclusions 
policy and agenda.1065 
9.3 Social Inclusion Policy 
Social inclusion policies are not a new concept for western governments and, essentially, involve 
governments seeking to share the responsibility of providing social and welfare services with not-
for-profit organisations.1066 The structure behind a government’s social inclusion agenda is the 
National Compact, which provides a framework to allow not-for-profit organisations, in 
collaboration with the federal government, to find innovative ways to deliver services and 
programs to the socially disadvantaged.1067 
The Compact’s framework is designed to reflect a modern regulatory environment consisting 
of a registry and a regulatory body, which grants and revokes charitable exemptions.1068 While 
these mechanisms can be seen in the ACNC framework, however, it remains to be seen whether 
this proposed environment could withstand the known problems of the social inclusion agenda. 
9.4 Troubles with the Social Inclusion Agenda 
The main consequence for not-for-profit organisations being enticed into a partnership with 
government is a phenomenon referred to as the ‘contract culture’.1069 This is the term used to 
describe a shift in how not-for-profit organisations secure funding. Traditionally, these 
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organisations secured funding from the private sector and through grants,1070 but now statutory 
funding has taken over the traditional funding sources.1071 Statutory funding involves the 
government ‘contracting out’, for a fee, to a not-for-profit organisation to provide services1072 that 
were once directly provided by the government.1073 This neo-liberal way reduces the 
government’s role in providing welfare and community services1074 and, in turn, the not-for-profit 
sector becomes the substitute provider of welfare services.1075 Consequently, not-for-profit 
organisations have become highly dependent on statutory funding, and governments also have 
become highly reliant on not-for-profit organisations to deliver welfare services.1076 This new 
construct has brought with it numerous implications for the sector and many not-for-profit 
organisations. 
Governments frequently use terms like ‘collaborative’1077 and ‘joint venture’ to describe this 
new construct.1078 However, in reality, this relationship is far from collaborative – especially for 
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not-for-profit organisations. The more accurate description of the relationship between 
government and the not-for-profit organisations under this new construct is strictly legal and 
fiscal. The government, the purchaser, has the absolute power over not-for-profit organisations, 
the supplier.1079 Since not-for-profit organisations are highly reliant on government contracts, a 
‘quasi-market’ emerges and the government dictates this market’s operation.1080 Funding is 
distributed within this market by the purchaser’s contract, which has created not only a culture of 
contract, but also a competitive tendering culture amongst not-for-profit organisations.1081 
Some not-for-profit organisations are fortunate to be in a non-competitive niche due to the 
uniqueness of their services,1082 however, this is not always so. Many not-for-profit organisations 
find themselves in direct competition with other not-for-profit organisations (who provide similar 
services) and with commercial businesses to secure the government contract.1083 This competition 
leads not-for-profit organisations to being concerned with market share and focused on 
improving their strategic positioning within this market.1084 For not-for-profit organisations to 
remain in this market and to have financial security, being viable in this environment becomes a 
priority.1085 Fearing the loss of financial security, not-for-profit organisations will make 
fundamental shifts in their organisational structure and values to satisfy the purchaser’s 
demands.1086 
Service-delivery contracts permit the government to legitimately monitor and exercise a 
degree of control over a not-for-profit organisation’s activities. These binding agreements will 
link funds to variables, such as the quality of service delivered and certain financial reporting 
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mechanisms.1087 While it may appear contractual conditions are forced upon a not-for-profit 
organisation, governments successfully argue that holding the provider to account ensures that 
public monies are being properly spent and allocated.1088 However, with the government setting 
the agenda, and not-for-profit organisations heavily reliant on scarce government funding, many 
in the sector feel that governments intrude into their general management and goal-setting.1089 
Not only having to satisfy contractual obligations, a not-for-profit organisation also finds 
itself having to meet other demands from the government and, consequently, it changes its 
internal structure.1090 Changes to an organisation’s internal structure can be evidenced by the not-
for-profit organisation becoming more central and bureaucratic,1091 which leads to it operating in 
a more formalised manner1092 and with an entrepreneurial edge.1093 The implications from these 
internal shifts are two-fold: 
1. A not-for-profit organisation responding to government demands, and not wanting to 
jeopardise this relationship, will undertake activities outside the organisation’s original 
mission or trust instrument – this is referred to as ‘mission drift’.1094 Mission drift has both 
legal and taxation implications for a not-for-profit organisation – 
a. The legal implication is that the organisation acts ultra vires and, therefore, contracts 
are void and unenforceable.1095 In these circumstances, officers or trustees will be 
personally liable to the other contracting party for damages relating to a breach of 
warranty.1096 Furthermore, an officer or trustee will be personally liable for a breach of 
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trust when acting outside the organisation’s objectives.1097 Contract culture not only has 
repercussions for the individual director or trustee, but also for the organisation itself. 
b. Where a not-for-profit organisation engages in unauthorised activities, it may risk 
losing its charitable or not-for-profit status.1098 Should it engage in unauthorised 
activities in a limited capacity, then its status will not be affected.1099 Where not-for-
profit organisations carry on activities that are notably outside their mission, then it 
will lose its charitable status and will be taxed at a higher rate.1100 This ‘take it or leave 
it’ situation has brought about changes that also affect an organisation’s members and 
volunteers. 1101 
2. Under the government’s contract, a not-for-profit organisation must deliver services 
efficiently, and many report that this requirement brings pressures that the organisation 
did not experience before the development of contracts.1102 These pressures result in 
increased levels of responsibility and workload for volunteers and members.1103 To cope 
with this demand, the role of the volunteer has become more formalised, less autonomous, 
and subject to more supervision and performance reviews.1104 This has lead to volunteers 
feeling demotivated, resulting in high turnover of volunteers and committee members.1105 
Those remaining volunteers report that their role and participation becomes limited, and 
many are replaced by paid employees with the necessary skills and managerial 
experience1106 to achieve the performance outcomes stipulated in the government 
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contract.1107 This shift towards professionalism has contributed to the blurring between 
volunteers and paid employees,1108 causing tension between them.1109 Further, a not-for-
profit organisation also finds itself having to provide more support to staff, especially 
volunteers. Organisations report that their resources have become strained by having to 
meet added costs for training and recruitment and other administrative needs.1110 These 
tensions and strains have many reporting being ‘fatigued’ by government demands,1111 and 
this has lead to tensions within the sector.1112 
Tension and anxiety at the sector level has lead many not-for-profit organisations to feel 
constrained about challenging government policy.1113 Many report they now have an inability to 
speak out and to advocate on behalf of their members about certain government policies, and this, 
in turn, impacts on the sector’s independence.1114 The influence exerted on many not-for-profit 
organisations by government through contracts has also left organisations feeling obliged to take 
a contract on offer (even with no financial gain) for fear of being deselected.1115 Guarding the 
sector’s independence is crucial to promoting a healthy democracy and having it operate as a 
counter balance to government and the private sector.1116 The sector provides representation and a 
voice for particular individuals and/or communities to have their concerns properly taken into 
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account.1117 This fundamental function is why ‘independence is the gold standard for the 
sector’.1118 
Despite not-for-profits having a legitimate interest in service delivery,1119 it has caused the 
sector to fracture. The contract culture has split the sector into those organisations that deliver 
services under government contract, and those that do not. Organisations that do not deliver 
government services are considered to be on the ‘more ethereal side of civil society’.1120 This 
demarcation of the sector reinforces the perception that certain not-for-profit organisations are 
too close to government.1121 Some with delivery services contracts report that their services 
reflect the political concerns of the purchaser, and the not-for-profit organisation finds itself 
occupying a space in the political arena and engaging in macro-level politics.1122 This fracture is 
referred to as the ‘compact sector’.1123 
The ‘compact sector’ brings another layer of risk to the sector’s diversity. Governments have 
a vested interest in ensuring that high standards are delivered by a not-for-profit organisation 
under the contract.1124 The manner in which these services are delivered has become 
indistinguishable from how the government provides services1125 – this has resulted in the sector 
becoming less diverse.1126 
The cornerstone of the not-for-profit sector has always been its diversity and its 
independence, but the lines have now become blurred. The reshaping of the sector due to social 
inclusion policies is a confronting issue. Shifting from welfare to economics, the sector must 
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sustain its diversity and play a role in its reconfiguration by improving and balancing the 
partnership with government.1127 Good lessons can be learnt from the downfalls of social 
inclusion policy that occurred in the United Kingdom and, for Australia, these lessons are 
important to note as the not-for-profit sector enters into an uncharted paradigm with government,- 
it is crucial that the sector remains independent from government. 
9.5 Is Australia going down the correct track? 
For such a long time Australia’s not-for-profit sector remained invisible to all levels of 
government. The federal government’s reforms claim to enhance accountability and transparency 
within the sector; however, these matters are secondary, and these changes provide the seedbed 
for the government’s social inclusion agenda and Compact document. 
Generally, compacts are guides to good practice for the relationship between governments 
and not-for-profit organisations.1128 However, Australia’s national Compact is not a guide to good 
practice, but an agreement between the federal government and the not-for-profit sector.1129 While 
signing-up to this agreement is non-compulsory, the federal government strongly encourages 
organisations to do so.1130 While this agreement is not a black-letter law contract – it would be 
very difficult to enforce this agreement owing to the language used – the compact does employ 
language that encourages not-for-profit organisations to sign it. 
Platitudes are used throughout the Compact: ‘working [sic] together’; ‘partnership’; 
‘collaboration’; ‘shared vision’; and other aspirational words. These outline generalities for the 
sector and the government to work together, such as to ‘improve community wellbeing and a 
more inclusive Australian society.’1131 Despite these motivating statements, the Compact fails to 
recognise the sector’s independence. 
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The Compact states that ‘signatories from the not-for-profit sector will [sic] agree to work 
with all Australian Government agencies to achieve these goals’.1132 This language creates a top-
down direction that may compromise the sector’s independence, as this takes away a not-for-
profit organisation’s freedom to determine how to mange and deliver programmes for 
themselves, and not be influenced by departmental priorities. The Compact lacks the recognition 
that not-for-profit organisations operate in their own sphere, and many of these are in opposition 
to, rather than in partnership with, government.1133 While the Compact is very general, it is 
important that future re-drafted documents1134 move towards making specific undertakings to 
support the sector’s independence irrespective of the amount of funding given, or whether a not-
for-profit organisation is a signatory to the Compact.1135 
Further, the document makes reference to transparency and accountability within the sector 
being achieved through the Compact.1136 As a stand-alone document, it cannot achieve this; 
however, the ACNC has been created to makes advances towards better transparency and 
accountability for the purpose of the Social Compact. Furthermore, the ACNC will also function 
as a point of contact between governments and registered entities undertaking government 
contracts and play a role in simplifying these interactions.1137 The true position of the ACNC 
seems to be elusive, and the ACNC Act sketches out a model that really serves the purpose of 
being a conduit between the government, and its agencies, and the not-for-profit organisations 
that are contracted to deliver government programs – this rather than the desired regulatory 
institution that would develop best practice standards for the sector. These changes in Australia 
centre on political opportunism rather than advancing the sector so it can be sustainable into the 
future. While the shifts in the sector are inevitable, further action and attention is needed to avoid 
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it from being fractured and to prevent the emergence of contract, competition and compact 
cultures.1138 
9.6 Conclusion 
The ACNC, when compared to the United Kingdom’s Commission, is complicated, and 
introduces an additional level of bureaucracy for not-for-profit organisations. This tangled 
arrangement could have been avoided had the federal government exercised its corporations 
powers under the Constitution. However, the shine of the ACNC is tarnished (albeit ever so 
slightly) when the federal government states that it has been established for the sole purpose of 
implementing and supporting the government’s social inclusion policy – this despite the 
overwhelming call to restore public confidence in the sector through regulation. 
The social inclusion policy entails not-for-profit organisations to deliver, for a fee, services 
that were once the responsibility by government, such as welfare, health and education. Through 
the national compact, not-for-profit organisations will agree to work and collaborate with the 
federal government to deliver services to marginalised groups within society. The language used 
in the national compact is non-specific, and warm words like ‘partnership’ and ‘collaboration’ are 
used throughout. The document is top-down driven, which raises concerns regarding the sector’s 
independence. 
Government using not-for-profit organisations as a vehicle for delivering services is not a new 
policy concept. The notable troubles of social inclusion policy are the contract, competition, 
compact cultures, which lead to the sector being fractured and its independence compromised. 
The federal government could prevent this fracturing by ensuring the sector’s independence 
through the Compact and the ACNC Act, but until the federal government understands the 
importance of this, the opportunity to transform the sector for the future may be lost. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
                                               
1138 Section 73 of the Charities Act 2006 (UK) allows a cabinet minister to appoint a person to undertake a review of 
the respective legislation. The ACNC Bill does not contain such a provision and, as this is a new concept for 
Australia, it would be important to have a similar provision which would allow a review of the ACNC and the 
ACNC Act as to its effectives and, furthermore, to consider any changes to improve its legal and regulatory 
framework. 
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The aim of this thesis was to examine the need for legal duties to be part of a governance 
framework to guide the conduct and behaviour of officers of a management committee within 
incorporated associations. Through an examination of legal duties within the respective state 
associations’ legislation, this thesis discovered that not only are there inconsistencies across 
jurisdictions, but there are also serious gaps in the statutory framework. To identify some 
recognisable general legal duties and obligations, which could be imposed on an officer of a 
management committee, this thesis argued that an officer acts as an agent.  
 
The respective associations statutes gives some support that an officer is an agent of the 
association with actual authority. Likewise the general law finds an officer of an unincorporated 
association may also be an agent. The finding that an officer of an unincorporated and 
incorporated association is a gratuitous agent means that there might be reluctance by a court to 
impose strict fiduciary obligations upon a volunteer.  However, a gratuitous agent would be 
subject to a minimal standard of care expected of a competent agent in the circumstances.  This 
thesis found that the standard of care is reflective of torts law and not fiduciary principle as such.      
 
Inconsistency in the legal landscape for not-for-profit organisations is further shown in this thesis 
when the federal government reforms for the sector are examined.  The main difficulty with the 
federal government’s reform is its lack of coherence with the states and territories legislation.  
This thesis discusses how this problem could have been resolved if the federal government had 
exercised its plenary power under section 51(xx) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act 1900 (Imp).  Further, it was also expected that the federal government’s reform would 
remedy the inconsistences across jurisdictions and introduce a governance and regulatory 
framework based on the United Kingdom’s model. 
 
The United Kingdom modernised the sector to best assist not-for-profit organisations to 
efficiently achieve their mission in a demanding contemporary context. The Charity Commission 
was provided with additional power to function as a regulator, and advisor, an educator and an 
administrator – not only to charities, but also to the whole of the sector.   
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Acting as the sector’s guardian the Commission emphasises that trustees and directors are not to 
breach their legal responsibilities and duties to the charity.  The Commission in overseeing the 
not-for-profit sector must ensure that the management of a not-for-profit organisation is carried 
out in a manner that will not compromise confidence in the sector and its organisations.  Ensuring 
proper management and transparency within a charity, this thesis examined the Commission’s 
wide regulatory powers to remove, suspend and disqualify a trustee and/or member.  When 
exercising its regulatory power, the Commission will do so proportionately and, moreover, they 
will work with a charity.     
 
Reform undertaken by the federal government was not as extensive as the United Kingdom. This 
thesis analyses the reforms undertaken by the federal government to implement a regulatory 
framework for the sector. This analysis shows that Australia’s regulatory framework is to serve 
the government’s social inclusion policy – despite the overwhelming call to restore public 
confidence in the sector through regulation. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
Tiered Financial Reporting Obligations 
for Incorporated Associations 
 
Queensland 
Description Obligation 
Level 1 – An incorporated association that 
has: 
a) current assets of more than $100,000; 
or 
b) total revenue of more than 
$100,000.1139 
Prepare a financial statement for its last reportable financial 
year that is audited by an auditor or an accountant.1140 
Level 2 – An incorporated association that 
is not a level 1 incorporated association or 
a level 3 incorporated association.1141 
Prepare a financial statement audited by an auditor or an 
accountant. The financial statement and the signed audit 
report must be presented at the association’s annual general 
meeting.1142  
Level 3 – An incorporated association that 
has: 
a) current assets less than $20000; and 
b) total revenue of less than $20000.1143 
Prepare a financial statement audited by an auditor or an 
accountant. The financial statement and the signed audit 
report must be presented at the association’s annual general 
meeting.1144 
 
                                               
1139 Total Revenue – means the association’s total income during the last financial year from all its activities before 
expenses, including the cost to the association of goods sold by it, are deducted. Reportable Financial Year – 
means the period starting on the day of incorporation and ending on the second end date after incorporation. 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 58, 58A. 
1140 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 59. 
1141 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 58. 
1142 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 59. 
1143 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 58. 
1144 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 59. 
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New South Wales 
Description Obligation 
Tier 1 – Means any 
association whose: 
a) gross receipts of the 
prescribed amount of 
$250,000, or 
b) current assets of the 
prescribed amount of 
$500,000.1145 
Financial statements must include: 
a) details of any mortgages, charges and other securities affecting any 
property owned by the association; and 
b) a separate income and expenditure statement and balance sheet for each 
trust for which the association is the trustee.1146  
Tier 2 – any association 
that is not a Tier 1 
association.1147 
Financial statements to be prepared must include: 
a) an income and expenditure statement and a balance sheet, which outlines 
the appropriately classified individual sources of income and individual 
expenses incurred in the operation of the association and the 
association’s assets and liabilities; 
b) details of the association’s mortgages, charges and other securities 
affecting any property owned by the association; 
c) a separate income and expenditure statement and balance sheet for each 
trust for which the association is the trustee.1148 
Financial statements must be submitted to the association’s annual general 
meeting.1149 
 
                                               
1145 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 42(1); Associations Incorporation Regulation 2010 (NSW) reg 7. 
Gross receipts for a financial year are equal to the total revenue recorded in the association’s income and 
expenditure statement for that financial year. Assets (other than real property or assets capable of depreciation), 
which are held by the association, also including amounts, held in financial institutions, stocks and debentures. 
Associations Incorporation Regulation 2010 (NSW) reg 7(1)-(2). 
1146 Associations Incorporation Regulation 2012 (NSW) reg 8(1). 
1147 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 46. 
1148 Associations Incorporation Regulation 2010 (NSW) reg 9. 
1149 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 48. 
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Victoria1150 
Description Obligation 
Prescribed Association – Means an 
association that has: 
a) gross receipts in that 
association's previous financial 
year more than $200,000; or 
b) gross assets more than $500, 
000.1151 
 
At the end of each financial year a prescribed association must 
have: 
a) its accounts audited by a registered company auditor, a firm of 
registered company auditors, a member of CPA Australia or the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia; 
b) the person who audits the accounts must provide the 
association with a written report of the audit.1152 
 
 
Description Obligation 
Tier 1 – An association with revenue less than 
$250,000 
Tier 1 associations must prepare financial 
statements that are a ture and fair view of the 
association’s financial position and performance 
during and at the end of its last financial year.1153 
                                               
1150 Victorian incorporated assocciations must prepare financial statements in line with the Associations 
Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic), but only if the association’s financial year commences after 30 June 2013. 
Consumer Affairs Victoria, ‘Adapting to the New Incorporated Associations Laws’ 25 June 2013 < 
http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/clubs-and-not-for-profits/incorporated-associations/adapting-to-the-new-
laws#financial-statements>. 
1151 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 3. 
1152 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 30B. 
1153 Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 92. The financial statement that gives a true and fair view of 
the associations position is a prescribed from under the Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 
(Vic) reg 15, Sch 1.  
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Tier 2 – An association with revenue between 
$250,000 - $1, 000,000 
Tier 2 assocations must prepare financial statements 
in accordance with the Australian Accounting 
Standards.1154  
Tier 3 – An association with revenue of more than 
$1,000,00 
Tier 3 associations must a financial statements (in 
accordance with the Australian Accounting 
Standards) and an audit of financial statements 
(prepared by an independent person and in 
accordance with the Australian Auditing 
Standards).1155 
 
Northern Territory 
Description Obligation 
Tier 1 – An association that is not 
a Tier 1 or Tier 2 association.  
Tier 1 incorporated associations must audit the association’s financial 
statements in accordance with applicable Australian Auditing 
Standards.1156 
Tier 2 – An association that has: 
a) a prescribed amount of 
$25,000 (gross receipts); and 
b) a prescribed amount of 
$50,000 (gross assets).1157 
Tier 2 incorporated associations must audit the association’s financial 
statements in accordance with applicable Australian Auditing 
Standards.1158 
Tier 3 – An association that has: 
a) a prescribed amount of 
$25,000 (gross receipts); and 
b) a prescribed amount of 
$50,000 (gross assets).1159  
Tier 3 incorporated associations must audit the association’s financial 
statements in accordance with applicable Australian Auditing 
Standards.1160 
 
                                               
1154 Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 95. 
1155 Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) ss 98-99. 
1156 Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 46. 
1157 Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 47 (1)(a); Associations Regulation 2004 (NT) reg 12. 
1158 Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 47; Associations Regulations 2004 (NT) reg 11. 
1159 Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 48 (1)(c); Associations Regulation 2004 (NT) reg 13. 
1160 Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 48; Associations Regulations 2004 (NT) reg 11. 
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South Australia 
Description Obligation 
Prescribed Association – is an incorporated 
association that had: 
a) gross receipts in the previous financial 
year in excess of $500,000.1161  
A prescribed association must keep its accounting records 
in a manner that enables an association: 
a) present fair results of the operations of the association; 
and 
b) the accounts of the association to be conveniently and 
properly audited.1162 
  
                                               
1161 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 3(1) (a)(ii); Incorporated Associations Regulations 2008 (SA) reg 4. 
1162 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 35. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
An Overview of Reason/s for 
Disqualification from Office 
 
Jurisdiction Qld NSW ACT Vic SA WA Tas NT 
Indictable Offences1163 ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Fraud1164 ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Unsound Mind1165 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Bankruptcy1166 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ 
Death1167 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ 
No Longer a Resident 1168 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Imprisonment1169 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Non-Compliance with the Act1170 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
 
  
                                               
1163 Indictable offences relating to the promotion, formation or management of a body corporate. Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 63(1)(a); Associations Incorporation Act 1985(SA) s 30(2)(c). 
1164 Offences relating to fraud or dishonesty punishable by imprisonment of three months or more. Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 63(i)(b); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 30(2)(b). 
1165 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 35(1)(e); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 27(e); 
Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 78(2)(c)(iii). 
1166 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 63(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 27(d); 
Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 78(2)(c)(ii); Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 
35(1)(d); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 30(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 
61A(1A); Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 14(5)(b) public officer only. 
1167 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 27(2)(d); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 
78(2)(c)(i); Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 35(1)(f); Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 
14(5)(e) public officer only. 
1168 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 27(2)(d); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 
78(2)(c)(d), however this sub-provision now only applies to the assocation’s secretary no longer residing in 
Australia;  Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 35(1)(f); Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 
14(5)(e) public officer only. 
1169 On indictment and imprisoned summarily. Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 61A(1)(a)(i)-(ii). 
1170 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 63A; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 30(2)(d)(i)-(iii). 
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APPENDIX 3: 
The Principles of Public Benefit (United Kingdom)1171 
Principle 1 - There must be an identifiable benefit or benefits. 
Principle 1a: It must be clear what the benefits are. 
The benefit to the public should be capable of proof through factual and positive evidence where 
necessary. The benefit to the public is capable of being recognised, identified, defined, or described.   
Benefits that are easily quantified and measured are also considered. 
Principle 1b: The benefits are related to the aims. 
Assessing whether an organisation meets the public benefit requirement, the benefits considered are those 
that arises as a result of the organisation pursuing its charitable and stated aims (that falls within a listed 
charitable purpose). When an organisation is pursuing more than one aim, each one of those aims must 
meet the public benefit requirement.1172 
Principle 1c: Benefits must be balanced against any detriment or harm. 
This is an exercise of balancing the benefits against the detriment or harm. Should an organisation’s 
activities have harmful consequences that are greater than the benefits, the organisation is not charitable.  
A charitable aim that is illegal, intentionally deceitful, or misrepresentative is a sham, and it cannot be 
charitable. Where there is detriment or harm present, the balancing exercise is not needed. 
Principle 2 – Benefit must be to the public, or a section of the public 
Principle 2a: The beneficiaries must be appropriate to the aims. 
The term ‘the public or section of the public’ refers to a negligible number of people who can potentially 
benefit now and in the future. The class of people who can benefit must be a public class.  The public class 
must be sufficiently large given the charitable aim is carried out and consideration is given to the 
organisation’s available resources. 
Principle 2b: Where benefit is to a section of the public, the opportunity to benefit must not be 
unreasonably restricted. 
For restrictions to be reasonable they must be legitimate, proportionate, rational and justifiable to the 
nature of the organisation’s charitable aims. Restrictions are evident from the way the organisation’s 
objects are worded. Beyond the wording of the organisation’s objects there are some reasonable 
restrictions that exist, such as: 
Geographical restrictions – beneficiaries are defined by where they live; 
Restrictions based on charitable need – beneficiaries can be defined by some common need (poverty, 
age, disability, etc.); 
Restrictions based on personal characteristics – beneficiaries can be defined by reference to gender, 
race, religion, or other defining characteristic; 
Restrictions based on access to facilities – limitations are placed on who can access facilities, what can 
accessed or degree of access that can be provided by a charity; 
Restrictions based on eligibility to membership – members of a charity are beneficiaries under the 
charity’s membership structure. Restrictions placed on who can join must be reasonable, justifiable and 
                                               
1171 Charity Commission, ‘Charities and Public Benefit – The Charity Commission’s General Guidance on Public 
Benefit’ <http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/guidance/publicbenefittext.pdf>; Charity Commission, 
‘Analysis of the Law Underpinning Charities and Public Benefit’ (December 2008) < http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/library/guidance/lawpb1208.pdf>. 
1172Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 2, 3(2); Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, s 4(2). 
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linked to the charity’s aims. 
Restrictions based on trustees’ discretion – benefits are restricted to a particular group of people on the 
basis of trustees’ exercising their discretion; and 
Restrictions based on ability to pay any fees charged – the charging of fees has, in practice, restricts 
those who can afford to pay fees. 
Should a restriction be considered reasonable, than it is accepted that society as a whole benefits in 
helping that section of society.   
Principle 2c: People in poverty must not be excluded from the opportunity to benefit. 
The term ‘poverty’ means people who are financially disadvantaged. Additionally, the term ‘people in 
poverty’ considers the context of an organisation’s aims and if those aims are intended to benefit and 
where the organisation carries out its aims.   
Principle 2d: Any private benefits must be incidental. 
The term ‘private benefits’ refers to benefits received by people or organisations other than a beneficiary.  
A private benefit will be incidental if evidenced that an individual directly contributed towards achieving 
the charity’s aims and/or it is a necessary result, or by-product of carrying out those items. This occurs 
only if the action was taken with the intention of furthering the charity’s aims and, moreover, the private 
benefit is reasonable in the circumstances. 
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APPENDIX 4: 
Recommendations and Government Response to the 
Report into Disclosure Regimes for Charities 
and Not-for-Profit Organisations1173 
Recommendation 1 
The committee recommends that all Australian Governments agree on common terminology for referring to 
organisations within the Sector. Governments should also develop a common meaning for terms referring to the size 
of these organisations, including ‘micro’, ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’. All government departments should adopt 
this standard terminology. 
Commonwealth Government Response: 
Agree in principle. The Commonwealth Government recognises the broad range of organisations that make up the 
third sector and the lack of clear terminology, particularly when various tax concessions are available. Common 
definitions and terminology will help to build a consistent view of the third sector and its operation within Australia. 
The results of the Productivity Commission’s Review of the contribution of the not-for-profit sector may assist in 
developing a framework, which could underpin standard definitions and terminology. 
The Review of Australia’s future tax system (the ‘Henry Review’) may also examine the complex tax 
arrangements available to various types of organisations under the umbrella of the third sector and consider 
appropriate and alternative arrangements. 
Recommendation 2 
The committee recommends that the Government establish a unit within the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet specifically to manage issues arising for Not-for-Profit Organisations. The unit should report to a Minister 
for the Third Sector. 
Commonwealth Government Response: 
Noted. The Social Inclusion Unit within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet currently provides co-
ordination on these issues across government. This recognises that other departments have responsibility that 
intersect with the third sector and are often more suited to provide overall policy guidance. 
The Social Inclusion Unit reports to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Social Inclusion. 
Recommendation 3 
The committee recommends that there be a single independent national regulator for not-for-profit organisations. 
                                               
1173 Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Disclosure Regimes for Charities and Not-
for-Profit Organisations (4 December 2008) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/Committee/economics.ctte/Charities_08/gov_response.pdf>. 
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Recommendation 4 
The committee recommends that the Australian National Regulator for not-for-profit organisations should have 
similar functions to regulators overseas and particularly in the UK, including a Register for Not-for-Profit 
Organisations with a compulsory sign-up requirement. The committee recommends consultation with the Sector to 
formulate the duties of the National Regulator. 
As a minimum, the Regulator should: 
a. Develop and maintain a Register of all not-for-profit organisations in Australia. Once registered, the 
Commission should issue each organisation with a unique identifying number or allow organisations with 
an ABN to use that number as their Not-for-Profit identifier. This would be enabled using existing ASIC 
website resources. 
b. Develop and maintain an accessible, searchable public interface. 
c. Undertake either an annual descriptive analysis of the organisations that it regulates or provide the required 
information annually to the ABS for collation and analysis. 
d. Secure compliance with the relevant legislation. 
e. Develop best practice standards for the operation of not-for-profit organisations. 
f. Educate/Advise not-for-profit organisations on best practice standards. 
g. Investigate complaints relating to the operations of the organisations. 
h. Educate the public about the role of the not-for-profit organisations. 
The Regulator when implementing its own code of conduct should consider the voluntary codes of conduct 
developed by ACFID and FIA respectively. 
Commonwealth Government Response to Recommendations 3 and 4: 
Noted. The establishment of a single, independent national regulator, enacted by Commonwealth legislation, requires 
agreement by State and Territory Governments to refer to their responsibilities to the Commonwealth. It will be 
considered by Government, drawing on findings of reviews progressing throughout 2009 such as the Productivity 
Commission Review of the contribution of the not-for-profit sector. 
Recommendation 5 
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government develop the legislation that will be required in 
order to establish a national regulator for Australia. 
Commonwealth Government Response to Recommendations 4 and 5: 
Noted. The Council of Australian Government’s Business Regulation and Competition Working Group (‘COAG 
BRCWG’) has included regulatory reform of the third sector as part of its 2009 work plan. 
Recommending a national regulator, the Senate Committee has indicated that the office of the Registrar of 
Indigenous Corporations (‘ORIC’) which regulates Indigenous corporations under the Corporations (Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 is a special measure for the advancement and protection of Aboriginal and Torres 
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Strait Islander people. Any consideration of ceasing ORIC or repealing the CATSI Act requires consideration of the 
impact this may have on Indigenous corporations and their unique role and function. 
Recommendation 6 
The committee recommends that, once a Register is established and populated, this information should be provided 
to the ABS, who should prepare and publish a comprehensive study to provide government with a clearer picture of 
the size and composition of the third sector. 
Commonwealth Government Response: 
Noted. The Productivity Commission Review of the contribution of the not-for-profit sector will consider, among 
other issues, alternatives for, or improvements in, measurements or further quantitative and or qualitative means of 
capturing the not-for-profit sector’s full contribution to society. 
The Australian Bureau of Statics will be conducting a Non-Profit Institutions Satellite Account in 2009. This 
will provide important evidence relating to the contribution of the non-profit sector and feed into the Productivity 
Commission Review. 
The outcome of this Productivity Commission Review will inform any decision regarding the establishment of, 
and use for, such a register. 
Recommendation 7 
The committee recommends that a single, mandatory, specialist legal structure be adopted for not-for-profit 
organisations through a referral of state and territory powers. Given the degree of change such as legal structure 
would mean for some not-for-profit organisations, the legal structure must be developed in full consultation with 
these organisations. 
Commonwealth Government Response: 
Noted. As with Recommendations 3, 4 and 5, the move to a single specialist legal structure requires agreement by 
State and Territory Governments to refer their responsibilities to the Commonwealth Government. It is an issue to be 
considered in light of reviews relating to the third sector taking place throughout 2009, such as the Productivity 
Commission Review of the contribution of the not-for-profit sector. 
The BRCWG has also included regulatory reform of the third sector as part of its 2009 work plan. 
Recommendation 8 
The committee recommends that the Henry Review include an examination of taxation measures affecting not-for-
profit organisations with a view to simplifying these arrangements and reducing confusion and cost of compliance 
for these organisations. 
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Commonwealth Government Response: 
As part of the Henry Review, a discussion paper has been released to seek community input. Chapter 7 specifically 
relates to the tax treatment of not-for-profit organisations and possible alternative arrangements that may assist 
organisations to further their philanthropic and community-based activities. 
Recommendation 9 
The committee recommends that a National Fundraising Act be developed following a referral of powers from state 
and territories to the Commonwealth. This Act should include the following minimum features: 
a. It should apply nationally; 
b. It should apply to all organisations; 
c. It should require accounts or records to be submitted following the fundraising period with the level of 
reporting commensurate with the size of the organisation or amount raised; and 
d. It should include a provision for granting of a licence. 
e. It should clearly regulate contemporary fundraising activities such as Internet fundraising. 
Commonwealth Government Response: 
Noted. State and Territory Governments regulate fundraising activities in accordance with their own legislation. The 
BRCWG, as part of its 2009 work plan, is considering reform options to fundraising legislation. 
Recommendation 10 
The committee recommends that a tiered reporting system be established under the legislation for a specialist legal 
structure. 
Recommendation 11 
The committee recommends that the tiers be assigned to organisations based on total annual revenue. 
Commonwealth Government Response to Recommendations 10 and 11: 
Noted. Refer to response Recommendation 3. 
The Treasury and policy reforms are being considered have conducted a review of financial reporting by unlisted 
companies under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Commonwealth Government is also developing a 
Commonwealth grants policy framework that, amongst other things, will include arrangements to minimise 
unnecessary red tape for grant recipients. 
Recommendation 12 
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government with the Sector to implement a standard chart of 
accounts for use by all departments and not-for-profit organisations as a priority. 
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Recommendation 13 
The committee recommends that a new disclosure regime contain elements of narrative and numeric reporting as 
well as financial, in acknowledgement that the stakeholders of the Sector want different information to that of 
shareholders in the Business Sector. The financial reporting should be transparent and facilitate comparison across 
charities. 
Commonwealth Government Response to Recommendations 12 and 13: 
Noted. The BRCWG, as part of its 2009 work plan, is considering reform options aimed at developing a standard 
chart of accounts. 
The Commonwealth Government will also consider accounting disclosure regimes in light of the findings of the 
Review of financial reporting by unlisted companies by Treasury, which may address some of the issues raised by 
the Senate Committee. 
The findings of the Review of accounting standards for ‘Non-publicly Accountable Entities’, that is non-listed 
entities, by the Australian Accounting Standards Board, and the Productivity Commission Review of the contribution 
of the not-for-profit sector will also be considered. 
Recommendation 14 
The committee recommends that the national regulator investigate the cost vs. benefits of a GuideStar-type system (a 
website portal that publishes information on the aims and activities of not-for-profit organisations) in Australia to 
encompass all not-for-profit organisations. 
Commonwealth Government Response: 
Noted. This recommendation will be considered within the context of the reviews noted. States and Territories will 
be consulted in the process. 
Recommendation 15 
The committee recommends that a Taskforce be established for the purpose of implementing the recommendations 
of this report. The Taskforce should report to COAG. Its membership should include: 
a. A government representative from the Commonwealth; 
b. A COAG-elected representative to speak for states and territories; 
c. One or more qualified legal experts with expertise with the major pieces of legislation affecting not-for-
profit organisations; 
d. A representative form an organisation which manages private charitable foundations; 
e. An accountant with not-for-profit expertise; and 
f. A number of representatives from the peak bodies of not-for-profit organisations, including a representative 
from a peak body for social enterprises. 
The Taskforce should actively seek to ensure that the measure of reform that it implements do not impose an 
unreasonable reporting burden on small and micro not-for-profit organisations. 
  213 
Commonwealth Government Response: 
Noted. The Commonwealth Government will consider the recommendations of the Senate Inquiry throughout 2009, 
as findings of various reviews are reported. It will consult extensively across the third sector, business community 
and State and Territory Governments and seek expert advice as required. The appropriate mechanism for 
consultation will be determined as the issues are considered.   
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APPENDIX 5: 
Summary of the 
Productivity Commission’s Recommendations 
Recommendation 5.1 
The Australian Government should initiate an Information Development Plan for the Not-for-profit sector. Given its 
central role in providing data on the sector and it legislated responsibility for formulating the Information 
Development Plan. 
Recommendation 5.2 
Australian governments should adopt a common framework for measuring the contribution of the not-for-profit 
sector. Having regard to the diversity of the sector’s activities and structures, measurement using this framework 
should embody the principles of proportionality, transparency, robustness, flexibility, and relevance. 
Recommendation 5.3 
To minimise compliance costs and maximise the value of data collected, Australian governments should agree to 
implement a reform agenda for reporting and evaluation requirements for organisations involved in the delivery of 
government funded services. This should: 
• commit to basing reporting and evaluation requirements in service delivery contracts on a common 
measurement framework (appropriately adapted to the specific circumstances of service delivery) 
• require expenditure (input) measures to be based on the Standard Chart of Accounts 
• develop data standards for the relevant non-expenditure items 
• ensure that information generated through performance evaluations are returned to service providers to enable 
appropriate learning to take place and allow organisations to benchmark their performance 
• employ, where practicable, the principle of ‘report once, use often’. 
Recommendation 5.4 
The Australian Government should provide funding for the establishment of a Centre for Community Service 
Effectiveness to promote ‘best practice’ approaches to evaluation, with an initial focus on the evaluation of 
government funded community services. Over time, funding should also be sought from state/territory governments, 
business and from within the sector. Among its roles, the Centre should provide: 
• a publicly available portal for lodging and accessing evaluations and related information provided by not-
for-profit organisations and government agencies 
• guidance for undertaking impact evaluations 
• support for ‘meta’ analyses of evaluation results to be undertaken and made publicly available. 
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Recommendation 6.1 
The Australian Government should amend the Corporations Act to establish a separate chapter relating to not-for-
profit companies limited by guarantee. This should: 
• embody the principles of proportionality in relation to reporting, fees and charges 
• provide clear rules on the disposal of assets in the event of the company being dissolved or restructured, in 
addition to the proposed prohibition on the payment of dividends 
• include a plain English guide (as currently exists for small and medium scale enterprises) 
As part of this process, the Australian Government should, in consultation with stakeholders, examine whether there 
are additional requirements that are inappropriate or unduly restrictive for not-for-profit organisations that should 
also be addressed. 
Recommendation 6.2 
Australian governments should, through the Council of Australian Governments Business Regulation and 
Competition Working Group, pursue harmonisation of state and territory based incorporated associations legislation, 
with an initial focus on: 
• aligning not-for-profit organisations’ public corporate and financial reporting requirements 
• rules on the distribution of assets on the dissolution or restructuring of a not- for-profit organisation 
• allowing not-for-profit organisations to migrate from one legal form to another and to move to the 
Commonwealth jurisdiction without onerous transaction costs. 
Recommendation 6.3 
To promote confidence in and reduce the compliance costs associated with fundraising regulation, Australian 
governments, through the Council of Australian Governments Business Regulation and Competition Working 
Group, should: 
• agree to and implement mutual recognition and harmonised fundraising regulation across Australia, through 
the establishment of model fundraising legislation 
• support the development of a fundraising register for cross-jurisdictional fundraising organisations and/or 
activities, to be administered by the proposed national Registrar for Community and Charitable Purpose 
Organisations 
• clarify the responsibility for regulation of fundraising undertaken through electronic media such as the 
internet, and move to ensure appropriate regulation of such mediums including through Commonwealth 
legislation. 
Recommendation 6.4 
Responsibility for endorsement for Commonwealth tax concessional status for not-for-profit organisations and 
maintaining a register of endorsed organisations should sit with the Registrar for Community and Charitable Purpose 
Organisations. To retain endorsement for Commonwealth tax concessions, endorsed organisations should be required 
to submit an annual community- purpose statement to the Registrar which would be accessible to the public. The 
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Australian Commissioner for Taxation should have the right to seek a review of decisions of the Registrar in relation 
to the endorsement of not-for-profit organisations for tax concessional status. The Commissioner should also have 
the power to issue a directive to the Registrar for the dis-endorsement of an organisation where there has been a 
breach of taxation compliance requirements. 
Recommendation 6.5 
The Australian Government should establish a one-stop-shop for Commonwealth regulation by consolidating various 
regulatory functions into a new national Registrar for Community and Charitable Purpose Organisations. While 
ultimately the Registrar could be an independent statutory body, initially it should be established as a statutory body 
corporate or organ in the Australian Securities and Investment Commission. 
The Registrar will undertake the following key functions: 
• register and regulate not-for-profit companies limited by guarantee and Indigenous corporations, with a 
stakeholder team dedicated to Indigenous corporations 
• assess the eligibility of not-for-profit organisations for Commonwealth tax concession status endorsement 
and maintain a register of endorsed organisations 
• register cross-jurisdictional fundraising organisations and/or activities by not- for-profit organisations 
• provide a single reporting portal for public record corporate and financial information. 
• provide appropriate guidance in relation to governance matters 
• investigate compliance with regulatory requirements 
• provide complaints handling in respect of the above functions. 
Recommendation 6.6 
The Registrar should implement the principle of ‘report once, use often’ by providing a single reporting portal and 
form for annual reporting on community- purpose, governance arrangements, financial accounts and fundraising 
activity. Australian governments, through the Council of Australian Governments, can support this principle and 
substantially reduce compliance costs for not-for-profit organisations by: 
• adopting and developing an implementation strategy for the Standard Chart of Accounts for reporting by 
not-for-profits in receipt of government grants or service contracts 
• expanding the Standard Business Reporting initiative to include reporting requirements by not-for-profits 
• encouraging their agencies to utilise the governance and financial account information (that will be lodged 
with the Registrar) to meet their organisation level ‘health check’ requirements for contracting purposes. 
Recommendation 7.1 
The Australian Government should adopt a statutory definition of charitable purposes in accordance with the 
recommendations of the 2001 Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations. 
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Recommendation 7.2 
State and territory governments should recognise the tax concession status endorsement of not-for-profit 
organisations at the Commonwealth level. Given the disparities between eligibility for tax concessions across 
jurisdictions, state and territory governments should utilise such Commonwealth endorsements in determining 
eligibility for their jurisdictional concessions, and seek to harmonise tax concessional status definitions or 
classifications with the Commonwealth over time. 
Recommendation 7.3 
The Australian Government should progressively widen the scope for gift deductibility to include all endorsed 
charitable institutions and charitable funds. Consistent with the Australian Taxation Office rulings on what 
constitutes a gift, payments for services should not qualify as a gift. 
Recommendation 7.4 
To encourage cost-effective giving, the Australian Government should explore options to promote and support 
planned giving, especially payroll giving. Specifically, the Australian Government should provide funding for a 
national campaign to promote payroll giving and the associated tax benefits. As part of the campaign, governments 
should encourage the establishment of payroll giving within all their agencies. 
Recommendation 7.5 
Australian governments should assist in the development of a sustainable market for not- for-profit organisations to 
access debt financing through: 
• building business planning skills for not-for-profit organisations, notably social enterprises 
(recommendations 9.2 and 9.6) 
• improving funding certainty for those not-for-profit organisations involved in the delivery of government 
services to improve loan viability by improving clarity about funding (recommendation 11.1) and the 
appropriate length of contract (recommendation 12.5) 
• exploring options to encourage (for a limited period) community development financial institutions to 
develop appropriate financial products and services for the sector 
• exploring options to make better use of the corpus of philanthropic foundations and trusts to make loans to 
deductible gift recipients and endorsed charitable institutions. 
The Australian Government should establish an advisory panel, chaired by Treasury, to consider options and assess 
progress in developing a sustainable market for not-for-profit organisation debt products with the aim of establishing 
mainstream financial products for investors who are willing to accept a lower risk adjusted financial return for an 
accompanying social return. 
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Recommendation 8.1 
The Department of the Treasury and Finance and Deregulation should jointly conduct a review into the feasibility, 
the costs and the benefits of requiring value for money assessments for governments’ procurement to consider 
significant input tax concessions. Such a review should be wide-ranging, including the not-for-profit and for-profit 
sectors. 
Recommendation 9.1 
Information and communication technology has the potential to enable more cost-effective and higher quality human 
services. With due considerations to protocols for protecting privacy, in specific service areas, Australian 
governments should explore the potential for selective sharing of client information between agencies and not-for-
profit organisations and other providers, through the utilisation of enhanced information and communication 
technology. 
Recommendation 9.2 
State and territory governments should review their full range of support for sector development to reduce 
duplication, improve the effectiveness of such measures, and strengthen strategic focus, including on: 
• developing the sustainable use of intermediaries providing support services to the sector, including in 
information technology 
• improving knowledge of, and the capacity to meet, the governance requirements for not-for-profit 
organisations’ boards and management 
• building skills in evaluation and risk management, with a priority for those not-for-profit organisations 
engaged in delivery of government funded services. 
Recommendation 9.3 
Australian government agencies providing extensive grants to, or using external agencies for, service delivery should 
establish evaluation programs to assess the effectiveness and actual cost of their programs. Where related to 
community services, these evaluations should be posted with the Centre for Community Service Effectiveness. 
Recommendation 9.4 
The Cooperative Research Centre program should facilitate applications by collaborations of not-for-profit 
organisations (include universities) government agencies and business in the areas of social innovation by: 
• actively promoting the opportunities that are now available; and 
• providing specialised advice and facilitation support to organisations expressing interest but lacking the 
knowledge and resources to develop the partnership required. 
Recommendation 9.5 
Australian governments should require all programs (of over $10 million) delivering community services through 
not-for-profit organisations to set aside a small proportion of the program budge (for example, one per cent) to a 
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program related social innovation fund. The find should support trials of new approaches to service delivery, 
including evaluation of their cost-effectiveness. 
Recommendation 9.6 
The Australian Government should find the Enterprise Connect program to expand its specialised services to a new 
Centre that provides business advisory services to orgnanisations involved in social enterprise activity. 
Recommendation 10.1 
Australian governments should introduce a system of ‘Working with Vulnerable People Checks’ that provides for 
checks to be portable between organisations for a designated time period. 
Further, Australian governments should explore the feasibility of developing a consistent national system 
allowing portability across states and territories of police checks and the exchange of information on people deemed 
unsuitable for working with vulnerable people, especially children. 
Recommendation 10.2 
In order to ensure that not-for-profits can sustain their workforces, and as wages are a major factor in the successful 
recruitment and retention of staff, Australian governments purchasing community services need to base funding on 
relevant market wages for equivalent positions. Costings need to take into account the skill sets required to perform 
the purchased services and be indexed appropriately to market wage growth within that industry sector. 
Recommendation 10.3 
The Australian Government, in consultation with Skills Australia, should commission the Community Services and 
Health Industry Skills Council to undertake workforce planning for the community services sector having regard to 
the current and future workforce challenges arising from growing demand and increasing supply constraints. 
Recommendation 11.1 
Australian governments should, in the contracting of services or other funding of external organisations, determine 
and transparently articulate whether they are fully funding particular services or activities undertaken by not-for-
profit organisations, or only making a contribution towards the associated costs and the extent of that contribution. 
Australian governments should fully fund those services that they would otherwise provide directly (allowing for co-
contributions from clients and any agreed contributions by service providers). In applying this criterion, governments 
should have regard to whether the funded activity is considered essential, as part of the social safety net or an 
entitlement for eligible Australians. 
Recommendation 11.2 
Australian governments should ensure that service agreements and contracts include provision for reasonable 
compensation for providers for the costs imposed by changes in government policy that affect the delivery of the 
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contracted service, for example, changes to eligibility rules, the scope of the service being provided, or reporting 
requirements. 
Australian governments funding service provision or making grants should respect the independence of funded 
organisations and not impose conditions associated with the general operations of the funded organisation, beyond 
those essential to ensure the delivery of agreed funding outcomes. 
Recommendation 12.1 
Australian governments should ensure that they choose the model of engagement with not-for-profits that best suits 
the characteristics and circumstances of the service being delivered. In choosing between alternative models of 
engagement, governments should consider the nature of the outcomes sought, the characteristics of clients, and the 
nature of the market. In particular: 
• there should be no presumption that purchase of service contracting will always be the most appropriate 
model; 
• where governments are seeking the delivery of a clearly defined outcome and markets are genuinely 
contestable purchase of service contracting should remain the preferred approach; and 
• where truly competitive markets develop and clients face real choice in the services available to them, 
governments should consider moving to client-directed service delivery models. This transition should be 
conditional upon there being appropriate safeguards in place to protect and empower vulnerable clients (or 
their carers) in exercising choice and ensure an acceptable minimum level of service quality and provision. 
Recommendation 12.2 
Where a market-based approach is not feasible or appropriate, governments should use other models of engagement. 
This may involve governments entering into either extended life or short-term joint ventures. 
Extended life joint ventures should adopt an iterative process that will: 
• involve all parties in the design of the program; 
• embed and fund an agreed evaluation process, informing program design and modification; 
• regularly review and revise the service delivery approaches in light of findings from evaluation, changing 
demands or environmental conditions; and 
• provide long-term or rolling funding with capacity to adjust funding in light of the modifications. 
Recommendation 12.3 
Australian governments should ensure that whatever model of engagement is used to underpin the delivery of 
services it is consistent with the overarching principle of obtaining the best value for money for the community. In 
determining value for money, governments should explicitly recognise any indirect or wider benefits that providers 
may be able to generate. An evidence based approach should be used to assess the nature, extent and relevance of 
these types of benefits on a case-by-case basis. 
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Recommendation 12.4 
Australian governments should assess the relative merits of the lead agency model on a case-by-case basis. This 
should include an assessment of the costs to not-for-profits of adopting this approach including any duplication of 
reporting and accountability requirements, the additional transaction costs associated with sub-contracting, and the 
potential for loss of diversity among providers. 
Recommendation 12.5 
The length of service agreements and contracts should reflect the length of the period required to achieve agreed 
outcomes rather than having arbitrary or standard contract periods. Extended life service agreements or contracts 
should set out clearly established: 
• processes for periodically reviewing progress towards achieving a program’s objectives; and 
• conditions under which a service may be opened up to new service providers or a provider’s involvement is 
scaled back or terminated. 
Recommendation 12.6 
When entering into service agreements and contracts for the delivery of services, government agencies should 
develop an explicit risk management framework in consultation with providers and through the use of appropriately 
trained staff. This should include: 
• allocating risk to the party best able to bear the risk 
• establishing agreed protocols for managing risk over the life of the contract. 
Recommendation 12.7 
Australian governments should urgently review and streamline their tendering, contracting, reporting and acquittal 
requirements in the provision of services to reduce compliance costs. This should seek to ensure that the compliance 
burden associated with these requirements is proportionate to the funding provided and risk involved. 
Further, to reduce the current need to verify the provider’s corporate or financial health on multiple occasions, 
even within the same agency, reviews should include consideration of: 
• development of Master Agreements that are fit-for-purpose, at least at a whole-of-agency level; and 
• use of pre-qualifying panels of service providers. 
Recommendation 12.8 
The Department of Finance and Deregulation should develop a common set of core principles to underpin all 
government service agreements and contracts in the human services area. This should be done in consultation with 
relevant government departments and agencies and service providers. 
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Recommendation 14.1 
The Australian Government should establish an Office for Not-For-Profit Sector Engagement, for an initial term of 
five years. The Office would support the Australian Government in its efforts to: 
• implement sector regulatory and other reforms and the implementation of the Government’s proposed 
compact with the not-for-profit sector; 
• promote the development and implementation of the proposed Information Development Plan; 
• oversee the establishment of the proposed Centre for Community Service Effectiveness; 
• implement the proposed contracting reforms in government funded services 
• act as a catalyst for the promotion and funding by government agencies of social innovation programs 
• facilitate the establishment of the advisory panel on development of a not-for- profit capital market; and 
• facilitate stronger community and business collaboration. The Office should, through the relevant Minister, 
report publicly on an annual basis on its achievements. 
Recommendation 14.2 
Compacts between Australian governments and the sector must be supported by well documented plans of action, 
including at agency level, if appropriate, and supported by practical measures including monitoring and evaluative 
processes that give concrete expression to the proposed relationship. 
Recommendation 14.3 
State and territory governments should develop a public strategy for implementing government-sector reforms 
arising from this report. Priority areas should include means to improve government-sector engagement, enhanced 
risk assessment and risk management strategies, contract design, effective reporting, and evaluation methods. 
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